Provocation,war and restraint under the nuclear shadow: The Kargil conflict 1999

ABSTRACT

The Kargil conflict was a limited war between India and Pakistan fought along the Kashmir Line of Control during the spring/summer of 1999. Named for the principal town in the combat zone on the Indian side, it was the first open warfare between India and Pakistan as declared nuclear weapons states and included the first combat employment of the Indian Air Force since 1971. Despite its intensity, it was also characterised by considerable restraint on both sides. The potential for conventional escalation, however, was high and the possibility of nuclear confrontation could not be excluded. It had significant long-term ramifications for both countries and constitutes an important part of the backdrop to their relations today.     

The Kashmir conflict in South Asia: voices from Srinagar

This article looks at the Kashmir conflict in South Asia, which has been going on since 1947, when India and Pakistan became independent from British colonial rule. After looking at some historical background, the article looks at both the external dimension as well as the internal dimension of the conflict. The external dimension tends to focus on Indo-Pak relations over Kashmir and the internal dimension looks at India's repressive state policies within the state of Kashmir. This article uses Mary Kaldor's “New War” thesis as a theoretical framework to understand the situation and pays special attention to the conflict's very complex and multifaceted nature. The article argues that although the levels of violence have differed from time to time in the region since 1947, today the conflict seems to have less to do with Indo-Pak relations or the external side of things and has more to do with the internal dimension and India's undemocratic ways within Kashmir. Today, Kashmir is one of the most militarised conflict zones in the world. The stationing of the Indian military and paramilitary forces in the region has only exacerbated the situation since it is the security personnel who cause much of the problem. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act gives these security forces extraordinary powers in the region, which they often abuse. The armed forces have no real understanding of the local culture or sympathy for local religious sentiments. Poverty, corruption, administrative failure, police brutality, identity politics and human rights abuses are some of the key features associated with this conflict. Methodologically, a number of interviews were carried out with the local people in the region recently. From the data gathered through the interviews, it is very obvious that the people still feel very oppressed and that the situation is still very volatile, fraught with uncertainty. Finally, after making an assessment of the situation, the article tries to suggest methods of peaceful building and conflict management as the way forward.     

Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors,agendas and expanding benchmarks

Militant jihad as witnessed in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is centred around the primary objective of finding a separate homeland for the Muslims of the state. Opinion on whether this homeland would be an independent entity or merged into Pakistan remains inconclusive. And yet, this externally sponsored violent extremism, spearheaded by interlinked militant formations with significant local participation, has remained deeply religious, highlighting the alleged machinations of the Hindu Indians, both in the state and in India in general, against the Muslim population. Over the years, the objective of liberating Kashmir from Indian control has been attempted not just through an armed movement that targets the symbols of Indian state sovereignty within J&K, but has invested resources carrying violence into the Indian heartland and also making the movement transnational in character by aligning with global terror formations like the al Qaeda and the Islamic State. This paper is an examination of the shifting agenda as well as the activities of three primary militant formations operating in J&K: the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad and an assessment of the transformation of the Jihad that has bilateral, regional and international security implications.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Airpower in India's 1999 Kargil War

For 74 days in mid-1999, India waged an intense war against intruding Pakistani forces on the Indian side of the Line of Control dividing Kashmir in the Himalayas. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was a key contributor to India's eventual victory in that war. Among other things, the IAF's combat performance showed how the skillful application of air-delivered firepower, especially if unmatched by the other side, can shorten and facilitate the outcome of an engagement that might otherwise have persisted indefinitely. It also showed that a favorable position in the conventional balance remains strategically useful even in conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence.     

Why Pakistan failed: tribal focoism in Kashmir

The classical repertoire of insurgency types is under-specified, and does not apply well to the case of Pakistan's conduct of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan's approach to insurgency has been a consistent tribal variant of focoism, in which there is a reliance on imported itinerant insurgents to conduct raids to stimulate an uprising. This has its basis in the traditional warfare of the region, learned US insurgency doctrine in the 1960s, and an historical disregard for subject populations, which has led to an aversion to fostering grass-roots political movements.     

Looking ahead in India

India and China contain more than 40% of the world's population, yet in India it is painfully clear that the political commitment necessary to tackle India's greatest problem is not there in full measure. India's present per capita income is less than $300, and nearly 65% of the people live below the poverty line. The average Indian woman produces 5 children; even if the Indian government's efforts to reduce family size to 2 children is successful by the year 2040, India will have a population of 2.5 billion. The possibility that India will succeed in reducing average family size to 2 children appears remote. 30 years ago, India became the 1st developing country to formally make family planning a matter of national policy. In the early years of the national family planning programs, practitioners had access mostly to sterilization and condoms. Over the years, theIndian government persuaded the US and other western donors to give $2 billion to population control programs. Still, the population continues to grow annually at the rate of 2.1%. Government statistics reflect the ups and downs of national population control policies; thenumber of new family planning users increased from 4.3 million in 1974-1975 to 12.5 million in 1976-1977, due largely to a dramatic increase in vasectomies. Tge number of new contraceptive users fell to 4.5 million after the "emergency" was lifted in 1977. The present Indian generation is far more receptive culturally as well as sociologically to the concept of population control than most other developing countries. What is needed now is renewed political committment by the Gandhi adminiostration. India cannot afford to replicate the Chinese way of tackling overpopulation without inflicting human abuses and without undermining its painstakingly cultivated democratic system.     

India–Africa defence cooperation against the backdrop of the ‘Make in India’ initiative

Although India is a major importer of defence equipment, it has also been manufacturing defence equipment for some of its needs. The Government of India’s ambitious ‘Make in India’ initiative for the defence sector aims to achieve self reliance in defence equipment production. This essay explores the opportunities for bilateral arms trade between India and Africa, as a new facet of India-Africa defence cooperation. It covers India’s arms export policy, policy reforms in India’s defence sector, and the opportunities for Indian and African defence markets.     

OF HAWKS AND DOVES

The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally, despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors’ findings indicate that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to which nuclear aspirants’ sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention.     

The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India

India is at a crossroads today. While it is fast emerging as a global power with a vibrant democratic polity, a robust economy and a nuclear-weapons capable military, the country is also witnessing a growing polarisation between the rich and poor and between urban and rural areas, a rise in communal tensions, large numbers of suicides by impoverished and indebted farmers and a spurt in terrorist activities and attacks by various disgruntled organisations and groups. Of these various challenges, as attested to by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself, the most dangerous threat to India's territorial integrity, prosperity and wellbeing has come from the Naxalite insurgency or ‘people's war’ that is manifest in large areas of eastern, central and southern India. But what factors account for the formation and persistence of Naxalite insurgency in India? What are the key objectives of the Naxalites and why is violence directed against the Indian State? And how has the Indian State (both central and state governments) responded to the Naxalite insurgency and with what effect? These are the main research questions that we attempt to answer in this paper. We put forward two broad arguments. First, the Naxalite insurgency in India is the latest manifestation of peasant struggles caused by grinding poverty, exploitation and inequality that have prevailed in rural areas for centuries. What sustains these struggles to this day is the fact that socio-economic conditions in rural areas have changed little and the policies followed by the post-independent Indian State have generally failed to mitigate rural problems. Second, the Naxalite insurgency has emerged as the most dangerous threat mainly due to the movement's spatial spread, growing support base in tribal and backward areas and enhanced fighting capabilities. The Indian State has viewed the movement as a ‘law and order’ problem and responded with force. But a ‘law and order’ approach to the Naxalite insurgency is unlikely to produce a lasting resolution of the problem, since it would not effectively redress deep-rooted grievances felt by a majority of India's rural poor for decades.     

THE EXERCISE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Skeptics of the Bush administration have castigated its strong aversion to formal international agreements in responding to the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), citing unilateral actions as the default alternative. Yet this critique misses the growing emergence of a conscious framework guiding the administration's actions: an emphasis on the exercise of national sovereignty and the corollary principle of sovereign responsibility. Rejecting the paradigm of arms control as the answer to WMD proliferation, the current administration instead advocates a toolkit of alternative mechanisms based on the full exercise by individual nation, states of their domestic authorities and rights under international law, acting in their capacities as responsible citizens of the global community. This paper will examine that philosophical approach and its concrete application through the following policies: (1) the Proliferation Security Initiative; (2) enforcement of national laws and regulations as exemplified by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the U.S. proposals for consideration by Biological Weapons Convention signatories; and (3) preemptive warfare to disarm the WMD programs of a threatening state.     

The Kargil Conflict: Waging War in the Himalayas

In 1999 India and Pakistan engaged in a limited war in the Himalayan peaks of Kashmir. Pakistani irregulars occupied territory in the Indian-held district of Kargil. A campaign that lasted 74 days and cost each side more than 1,000 casualties concluded with India in control of the commanding heights around Kargil. The conflict exposed flaws in the Indian armed forces as well as enduring truths of combat in the high mountains. Political constraints combined with the unforgiving environment and a determined enemy to diminish India's military advantage. Transition from counterinsurgency to high-intensity combat in the Himalayas proved to be a daunting task. Early failure was only overcome through innovation and adaptation to the environment. Specialised forces, unconventional techniques and the focused application of overwhelming firepower ultimately secured victory.     

The Kashmir insurgency: As bad as it gets

In January 2000, the Kashmir militancy is gaining ground and Indian forces are on the defensive. This is despite a decline in militancy from 1996 to mid‐1999. While India has managed to secure greater international support from the West, the failure of an elected state government in Kashmir to regain the confidence of Kashmiris has cost Delhi support. The militant revival is being driven by increasing professionalism, along with strong support from backers in Pakistan. Given there is now a 12‐year period of violence to analyse, new literature brings interesting insights.¹     

‘Just another border incident’: The Rann of Kutch and the 1965 India–Pakistan War

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.     

Preventing the ‘Smiling Buddha’: British-Indian nuclear relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear force, 1964–68

This article examines two related issues: the policy objectives pursued by the British government to prevent India from developing nuclear weapons and the challenges presented to the Indian government in balancing Gandhian idealism with the reality of nuclear diplomacy. Building on recent research, the following issues are explored: the implementation of Anglo-American non-proliferation policy in Asia, the provision of security guarantees for India and Pakistan and the UK proposal to establish a Commonwealth Nuclear force as a means of maintaining British influence in the region. The analysis is placed within the context of Britain's overall defence policy during the 1960s focusing particularly on the British withdrawal from East of Suez and the development of nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO. The article argues that the Wilson government regarded security guarantees for India as an obstacle towards the successful conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. Britain's primary objective in advancing the concept of a Commonwealth Nuclear Force was not to increase Indian security in the face of Chinese nuclear threats but to explore possible options to internationalise Britain's nuclear forces after initial plans for a NATO nuclear force had failed.     

Expansion of Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean: implications for India

This paper examines the ongoing expansion of China’s maritime power in the Indian Ocean region and analyses its potential impact on the extant balance of Sino-Indian maritime power in the region. It posits that the expanding Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean could seriously challenge India’s geostrategic advantage in the near future and that India can no longer take for granted its strategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean nor the strength of its historical ties with the various regional states. It further argues that the current Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region, to be the “net security provider” for the entire region, is unsustainable and thus needs to be reviewed and rebuilt leveraging the geographic advantage enjoyed by India over China in the Indian Ocean.     

INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Decisionmaking processes leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by democratic states have served as the basis for theories about nuclear proliferation. In contrast, less is known about how a totalitarian regime responds to immense external pressure to abolish unconventional weapons it considers crucial for its security and survival. This article will analyze how we can explain Iraq's behavior after the passing of Resolution 1441 and during the United Nations inspections in 2002–2003.     

THE AMBIVALENT NEUTRAL

Traditional analyses of Switzerland's nuclear weapons program often explain both its beginning and its end by merely subsuming it under the broad logic of security calculations: the country originally developed an interest in nuclear weapons due to its precarious security environment after the end of World War II; it ended its nuclear ambitions roughly two decades later when it felt less threatened by external powers. Yet this depiction of the Swiss case brushes aside the historical political context in which Switzerland's nuclear decision-making was embedded. Drawing upon studies in sociology and political theory, this article argues that understanding the Swiss debate on nuclear weapons is possible only if we manage to comprehend the significant political and cultural changes that took place within Swiss society. These changes deeply affected the country's defense and foreign policy conceptions and also altered prevalent notions of neutrality, thereby ultimately foreclosing the nuclear option. In more abstract theoretical terms the article moreover suggests that we need to overcome depictions of objectively given threats or predetermined interests and develop analytical tools that help us disentangle the complex, non-linear ways in which threat perceptions, identities, and preferences evolve and shape states’ proliferation policies.     

The fragility of elite settlements in Tunisia

Six years after the revolution that ousted Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia remains in flux. On the face of it, the country should be celebrated for transitioning from political ferment to consensual normalcy. Unfortunately, there is more to Tunisia’s transition to consensual politics than meets the eye. The country is still caught in a turbulent grey zone where strong authoritarian tendencies threaten to pull down the country’s tortuous march towards democratic stability. Some developments are particularly worrisome. The old authoritarian discourse emphasising stability and law and order has regained credence. The repressive habits of the police and security services are also back in full swing. The outlook for democratic stability darkens as the chasm between ordinary citizens and political elites expands. The lurch towards illiberalism and the failure of the successive postrevolutionary governments to make even the slightest dent in Tunisia’s dreadful unemployment rate and sharp regional economic inequalities are undermining faith in elite settlements and state institutions.     

India’s Taliban Dilemma: To Contain or to Engage?

India’s Afghanistan policy in the 1990s is termed a zero-sum game of influence with Pakistan. New Delhi’s aversion to the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime is considered a marker of this rivalry. This paper revisits India’s approach towards Afghanistan and examines if New Delhi was necessarily averse to engaging with pro-Pakistan political factions during 1990s. Based on fresh primary interviews with former Indian policymakers, media archives, and official reports, the paper shows that India engaged with and accommodated pro-Pakistan factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996. The Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in September 1996 challenged India’s engage-with-all approach. Nonetheless, the decision to sever ties with the Taliban and to bolster anti-Taliban factions was highly debated in New Delhi. Many in India saw the Taliban as a militant Islamist force sponsored by Pakistan. For others, however, it was an ethno-nationalist movement representing Pashtun interests, and not necessarily under Islamabad’s control.