Kinetic responses to global terrorism: Lessons from Africa

This essay recalls the immediate and longer-term responses of the US and its allies to the events of 9/11. It contends that the die for contemporary developments in transnational terrorism was cast in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – in particular the launching of sustained ‘anti-terrorist’ military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more covert ‘kinetic’ operations elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. The essay seeks specifically to expose the counter-productivity of using military operations as the primary antidote to transnational terrorism. Focusing on the African ‘laboratory’ and the spread of transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy, particularly in West and East Africa, the essay concludes that radical Islamists have mastered the ‘battle of the narrative’ and that the Western penchant for dispensing a kinetic brand of medication is feeding rather than fighting the virus of global terrorism.     

TERRORISM AND DETERRENCE POLICY WITH TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT 1

This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians’ vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be ‘hawk to ‘dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from ‘dove’ toward ‘hawk,’ with terrorism intensified in the society.     

TRENDS AND MARKERS

Africa is severely affected by sub-state terrorism—a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in the crisis facing a number of African states. While the importance of root causes in so-called sub-state terrorism is generally accepted, this issue is hotly contested internationally in debates on terrorism. In fact, both sub-state and transnational terrorism have essentially local causes and linkages, and therefore much of what is categorised as terrorism should be treated more appropriately as insurgencies. Recent events in Somalia are of particular concern, as Western responses to the war on terror may further complicate the domestic situation, with self-fulfilling results. Great care should be exercised by African states in adopting either the language of or the prescribed solutions for transnational terrorism as part of the ‘global war on terror’.     

9/11: WHAT DID WE KNOW AND WHEN DID WE KNOW IT?

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden published a signed statement calling for a fatwa against the United States for its having ‘declared war against God’. As we now know, the fatwa resulted in the unprecedented attack of 9/11. The issue of whether or not 9/11 was in any way predictable culminated in the public debate between Richard Clarke, former CIA Director George Tenet and the White House. This paper examines whether there was any evidence of a structural change in the terrorism data at or after February 1998 but prior to June 2001, controlling for the possibility of other breaks in earlier periods. In doing so, we use the standard Bai–Perron procedure and our sequential importance sampling (SIS) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for identifying an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates. We conclude that sophisticated statistical time‐series analysis would not have predicted 9/11.     

Remittances and terrorism: A global analysis

This paper is the first global investigation of the relationship between remittances and terrorism. To discern this relationship, we draw terrorism event data from the Global Terrorism Database and International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorism Events. When a host of standard terrorism controls is employed, lagged remittances as a share of gross domestic product have a positive and significant impact on both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. For the venue country’s viewpoint, lagged remittances have a greater marginal impact on domestic than on transnational terrorism. However, when we investigate remittances to the home country of the perpetrator, lagged remittances have the greatest marginal impact on transnational terrorism. Throughout our investigation, standard terrorism controls perform according to our priors and those of the literature, lending credence to the isolation of the impact of remittances. We also account for endogeneity concerns.     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

Terrorism,crime and public spending: Panel VAR evidence from europe

Within a panel VAR framework and utilizing generalized impulse response and forecast error variance decomposition analysis, we explore the dynamic effects of terrorism and crime on public order and safety spending across European countries during the period 1994–2006. Our findings show that a ‘shock’ in terrorism and/or in crime, significantly increases the subsequent trajectory of public order and safety spending. As a by-product, we find that public spending is ineffective in reducing observed crime or terrorism.     

Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three‐way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep‐seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.     

Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future Continues

This work continues to develop the 'netwar' concept that the authors introduced in 1993 and have expanded upon in their various RAND and other writings ever since. Deeper understanding of the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of networks will prove useful in combating terrorism and transnational crime, but also in understanding militant social activism, both of the violently disruptive sort and that which aims at fostering the rise of a global civil society. This essay also assesses recent US performance in the terror war, and concludes by raising concerns over the possible rise of a new form of network-based fascism.     

CHILDREN IN THE SPOTLIGHT

September 11 2001 has put the spotlight on terrorism, and it has been at the apex of the international security agenda ever since. Politicians, lawmakers, scholars and others have been debating the meaning and definition of terrorism for many years. Numerous myths and misconceptions persist on this highly debated issue. With the aid of historical case studies, this article aims to demonstrate how broad a concept terrorism has become. It focuses on its subjective and value-laden interpretation and hence the difficulty of arriving at a universally acceptable definition. The author introduces the concept of ‘colonial terror’, which depicts a distinct form of state terrorism perpetrated during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Like many before her, the author concludes that the definition and meaning of terrorism lie in the eye of the beholder.

There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing the concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some system of power. In each case it is clear how to proceed. Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon—concentrating on major examples, if we are serious—and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as ‘terrorist’ just in the cases where they can be attributed (whether plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed or termed ‘retaliation’ or ‘self-defence’. (Noam Chomsky)     

我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪特征分析

现代恐怖主义正在迅速蔓延全球，恐怖主义活动已经严重威胁了各国的国家安全和人民的正常生活，而且，现代恐怖主义越来越朝着国际化的方向发展，这种国际性恐怖主义犯罪活动的危害性和有效打击难度都明显加大。我国也不可避免地卷入到跨境恐怖主义犯罪漩涡中来。深入研究我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪活动的特征，以期提高防范和惩治我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪活动的针对性。     

GM(1,1)和SVR的雷达电子部件状态趋势预测模型

为提高雷达电子部件状态趋势预测的精度,根据测试数据特点,提出了基于GM(1,1)与支持向量机回归(SVR)的组合预测模型。采用粒子群优化算法分别对GM(1,1)和SVR模型进行了改进,提高了单一模型的预测精度。在此基础上,结合GM(1,1)模型对趋向性数据的预测优势和SVR模型对数据波动的强适应性,达到了取长补短、相得益彰的效果。实验结果表明该组合模型不但具有更高的预测精度,而且对不同预测对象有更强的适应能力。     

我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪的防控与惩治

我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪日益猖獗,不仅造成了大量的无辜平民伤亡和公私财产的损失,而且侵害了其他国家的利益和国际社会的共同秩序。防范和惩治我国跨境恐怖主义犯罪活动,应当坚持经济和社会的协调发展,消除恐怖主义滋生的土壤;积极参与多边安全合作,探寻维护我国安全利益的新途径;完善我国反恐怖主义犯罪的刑事立法。     

Does Terrorism Increase after a Natural Disaster? An Analysis based upon Property Damage

Does an emergency such as a natural disaster lead to a surge of terrorism? This paper contributes to the emerging literature on this issue. We consider the experience of 129 countries during the period 1998–2012 to determine the effect of a natural disaster on both domestic as well as transnational terrorism. We also control for endogeneity using expenditure on health care and land area in a country as instruments. In contrast to the existing literature, we measure the extent of terrorism by the value of property damage. The results indicate that after natural disasters, (a) transnational terrorism increases with a lag, and (b) a statistically significant impact on domestic terrorism is not observed.     

ON ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINS OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Using the ITERATE dataset, we explore the origins of transnational terrorist activity, from 1982 through 1997, in 118 countries. We model terrorism, not as a function of a nation’s ethnic, religious or linguistic fractionalization, but as an independent measure of perceived ethnic tensions. When we control for institutional quality, evidence that political rights and civil liberties mitigate the terrorism‐producing effects of ethnic tensions exists only since 1990. Economic freedoms, on the other hand, robustly reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating in ethnically tense societies.     

Merits and Limits of Counter-ideological Work Against Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal

Counter-ideological work is touted as crucial in combating terrorism. This article attempts to analyse the role of counter-ideology in dealing with a particular type of terrorism: Muslim jihadist extremism. This paper reiterates findings from existing research, in arguing that counter-ideology is indispensable for three reasons: firstly, to prevent Muslims from genuinely believing that terrorism is sanctioned by the faith; secondly, it is instructive to assure non-Muslims that Islam per se, is not the problem; and finally, it can be used to ‘rehabilitate’ terrorists who are in detention. However, this paper also suggests four criticisms of many counter-ideological efforts, and posit that in order for such work to be truly effective, the following shortcomings need to be rectified: firstly, the creation of unnecessary frontiers that may alienate potential allies; secondly, the inability to ‘preach to the right crowd’; thirdly, the perils of promoting ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ Islam; and finally, credibility issues associated with the people spearheading such works. An underlying factor that lurks in the background of all of these is the role of the ulama, or Islamic religious scholars. This article further hopes to contribute to the literature on counter-terrorism by exercising more scrutiny on the role of the ulama.     

装甲装备周转备件需求最优组合预测

针对单项统计预测模型存在的不足,提出采用组合预测方法进行周转备件需求预测的观点,并建立了周转备件需求最优组合预测模型。首先,介绍了组合预测的基本原理和常用的周转备件单项预测方法。在综合权衡预测结果精度和稳健性的前提下,建立了基于预测误差绝对值和最小的周转备件最优组合预测模型,并给出了确定各加权系数和预测评价效果的方法。最后,结合案例验证了该组合预测方法的有效性和优越性。     

On the effectiveness of top‐down strategy for forecasting autoregressive demands

We investigate the relative effectiveness of top‐down versus bottom‐up strategies for forecasting the demand of an item that belongs to a product family. The demand for each item in the family is assumed to follow a first‐order univariate autoregressive process. Under the top‐down strategy, the aggregate demand is forecasted by using the historical data of the family demand. The demand forecast for the items is then derived by proportional allocation of the aggregate forecast. Under the bottom‐up strategy, the demand forecast for each item is directly obtained by using the historical demand data of the particular item. In both strategies, the forecasting technique used is exponential smoothing. We analytically evaluate the condition under which one forecasting strategy is preferred over the other when the lag‐1 autocorrelation of the demand time series for all the items is identical. We show that when the lag‐1 autocorrelation is smaller than or equal to 1/3, the maximum difference in the performance of the two forecasting strategies is only 1%. However, if the lag‐1 autocorrelation of the demand for at least one of the items is greater than 1/3, then the bottom‐up strategy consistently outperforms the top‐down strategy, irrespective of the items' proportion in the family and the coefficient of correlation between the item demands. A simulation study reveals that the analytical findings hold even when the lag‐1 autocorrelation of the demand processes is not identical. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007.     

导弹遥测故障的GM-Verhulst-SCGM预测算法

遥测故障预测是保障导弹遥测系统可靠性的基础。根据导弹遥测故障的历史数据,结合GM(1,1)模型、Verhucst模型和SCGM(1,1)c模型构建了导弹遥测故障的GM-Verhulst-SCGM组合灰色预测模型,按照预测有效度算法取得组合预测模型的权重系数。选用导弹遥测故障的训练组实际值作为原始数据,分别利用各预测模型估算对比组导弹遥测故障数据。预测结果表明,相比单一预测模型,组合灰色预测模型具备更高的故障预测精度。在验证组合灰色预测模型可行性的基础上,进一步估算了同一型号导弹未来时序的遥测故障数据,为相关部门及时改善导弹遥测技术及避免导弹故障提供理论及方法借鉴。     

Spatial Distribution of Minority Communities and Terrorism: Domestic Concentration versus Transnational Dispersion

Qualitative studies of terrorist movements frequently highlight the importance of diaspora communities as important factors in producing and sustaining terrorist activity in countries. The underlying theoretical argument is that bifurcation of tight-knit minority communities between countries nurtures separatist or irredentist sentiments among affected community members, thus prompting terrorist activity, while minority community members in other countries might mobilize financial and political resources to support terrorist activity among their compatriots. In this study, we empirically test whether transnational dispersion, versus domestic concentration, of minority communities in countries produces higher incidents of terrorism. Conducting a series of negative binomial estimations on a reshaped database of around 170 countries from 1981 to 2006, derived from the Minorities at Risk database and the Global Terrorism Database, we determine that both transnational dispersion of kin minority communities and domestic concentration of minorities within countries increase terrorism and that transnational dispersion is a particularly robust predictor of terrorist attacks.