Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response.     

Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning1

This paper argues on the basis of a series of historical examples that include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaya and Northern Ireland, that there is no perfect counterinsurgency model and that each counterinsurgency campaign is different. Counterinsurgents need to have a series of basic tenets to wage successful war against guerrillas and insurgents. These include: a clear political policy from the government under insurgent attack, a strategy to keep the population safe, successful intelligence gathering, a recognition that successful counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and a high priority on the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure. This paper urges that in period of peacetime it is essential that militaries develop a Standing Counterinsurgency Concepts Unit that can conceptualise past and present insurgent patterns and build this into military and strategic planning.     

Rebels of the frontier: origins,organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban

The Pakistani Taliban, factionalized into some 40 groups, form a decentralized insurgent movement, often characterized by infighting, divergent motivations, and a shifting web of alliances. The Pakistani Taliban remain little understood because most scholars have avoided a serious treatment of the insurgent movement and instead focused on analyzing the geopolitics of the region and Pakistan's ‘double game’. This article seeks to fill this gap by dissecting the movement through selected theories of organization and mobilization. First, I explain the various dimensions of the conflict and the origins of the insurgency. Next, I discuss the Pakistani Taliban's political organization, categorizing it as composed of various warlord regimes. I further list the Taliban's component groups and numerical strength and chart the leadership structure. Lastly, I analyze insurgent recruitment strategies, accounting for the role of selective incentives, coercion, and genuine grievances.     

The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05

The political side of counterinsurgency has long been recognized as more important than the military side. The major works on counterinsurgency call for political reform that redresses legitimate insurgent grievances. Thereby, insurgents are encouraged to pursue their aims via political instead of military means. In western Iraq, insurgent perceptions of US weakness inhibited effective political reform. Moderate Sunnis did not engage the Coalition or Iraqi government until these perceptions had been revised. The connection between insurgent perceptions and effective political reform deserves greater attention. With the exception of some arguments from the political science field, the literature on counterinsurgency insufficiently addresses the importance of insurgent perceptions.     

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy

This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.     

Counterinsurgency as armed reform: The political history of the Malayan Emergency

Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end.     

From Nationalism to Factionalism: Faultlines in the Naga Insurgency

Do ceasefires or peace talks create fragmentation in the insurgent groups? Rather than proposing claims that can offer predictions about armed groups behaviour under ceasefires or peace processes, the analysts tend to focus largely on the dynamics between state and non-state actor. The experts pay little attention to overtime changes in social and local political context which might contribute to propelling a rebel group towards fragmentation and factionalism. The present study intends to fill this gap by exploring the shifting role of public opinion and ethnic support for the peace talks to ascertain whether it can increase the likelihood of factionalism in rebel groups or not. This article applies this approach to the case of Naga National Movement (1947–2015) in India, and finds that the proposed variable appears to have increased the frequency of factionalism in the movement.     

Remembering the war of liberation: legitimacy and conflict in contemporary Algeria

The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir.     

Understanding women at war: a mixed-methods exploration of leadership in non-state armed groups

ABSTRACT

Recent efforts aimed at understanding women’s contributions to nonstate armed groups have produced large-scale data sets on female combatants (Wood and Thomas 2017) and more limited data on women’s roles as supporters and leaders in armed groups (Henshaw 2016; 2017, Loken 2018). The present study aims to build on this literature by providing new data on the scope of women’s leadership in insurgent groups. While existing quantitative literature has focused mostly on the experience of female combatants, we argue that the presence of women in leadership roles is crucial to understanding how gender might influence the outcomes of insurgency. We introduce new data on over 200 insurgent groups active since World War II. While our analysis confirms earlier small-sample work demonstrating women’s presence in leadership roles, a qualitative analysis reveals that leadership is often gendered–revealing patterns of tokenization and tracking women to low-prestige leadership roles. At the same time, our findings challenge past research on jihadist organizations, showing limited expansion in the authority of women.     

The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts: The Colombian Guerrillas

This article explores the motivations that push individuals to join and remain in insurgent groups. Though I consider the Colombian guerrillas, these findings are not necessarily case-specific. I argue that socio-psychological motivations at the individual level may be the most significant reason for joining, surpassing in importance grievance-based, ideological and even economic motivations. Moreover, I find that the lack of cohesion inside the Colombian guerrillas may boost economic motivations, further weakening insurgents' commitment to the pursuit of political power, and to the improvement of the socio-political position of those they claim to represent. This type of research contributes to a greater understanding of those in armed groups and it provides insights for developing focused recruitment prevention programs. It also contributes to the growing literature that explores the meaning and character of insurgencies, and possibly terrorist organizations.     

Controlling the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: ‘Political’ and ‘Military’ Strategies from Successful Counterinsurgency in Punjab – India

This article examines the ‘political’ and ‘military’ strategies used by the Indian state successfully to quell the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, and applies these lessons to controlling the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. At a conceptual level, this article argues that insurgencies are both a ‘military’ and ‘political’ phenomenon, and that ways to quell them can be either ‘military’ or ‘political,’ or a combination thereof. At the empirical level, this article argues that stability cannot be restored to Iraq until Sunni political actors are effectively brought into the mainstream political process through either ‘military’ or ‘political’ means, or a combination thereof. The analysis in this article provides substantive depth and detail to these otherwise seemingly straightforward propositions.     

End of the cycle: assessing ETA’s strategies of terrorism

ABSTRACT

In May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives.     

Syria and the perils of proxy warfare

The ongoing civil war in Syria is evolving into a ‘proxy war’, in which both the Baathist regime and its insurgent adversaries are becoming increasingly reliant upon support from external powers. Proxy warfare has a superficial appeal for sponsoring states, as it appears to offer a convenient and risk-free means of fulfilling foreign policy goals, which will not incur the financial and human costs of direct military intervention. Using Syria as a case study, this article shows that the conduct of proxy warfare has several potential political, strategic, and ethical consequences, which any democratic government in particular is obliged to consider before it resorts to this indirect means of foreign intervention.     

Whither the Iraqi Insurgency: Prospects for Counterinsurgent Success

The 2003 conflict between Iraq and the US-led Coalition resulted in liberation for the country, enabling its citizens to experience freedom they have not had for decades. While the US-led operation was successful, insurgent movements have hindered the reconstruction efforts and the rebuilding of the government in Iraq. The tactics used by these insurgent groups are not that of 'traditional' warfare, therefore the US and Coalition forces adapted their tactics to respond to this new threat. It is argued that with the application of the Manwaring Paradigm (also known as the SWORD Model), the US and Coalition forces successfully responded to the insurgent movements during the period leading up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005.     

Developing Civil Society in the Non-state Sphere: Welfare and Rights-based Organisations Associated with Ethnic Armed Groups in Myanmar

Armed groups are usually seen as threats to humanitarian action but less attention has been paid where they provide assistance to constituent populations. Ethnic armed groups (EAGs) in Myanmar have developed associated welfare organisations that perform this role. This article argues this is due to EAG social embeddedness and flexibility to changes in sources of funding and support, and the influence of their relations with international humanitarian organisations. This article further contends a subset of advocacy, health and education organisations have evolved to form a nascent civil society within the political and social non-state sphere of some established EAGs.     

Insurgent courts in civil wars: the three pathways of (trans)formation in today’s Syria (2012–2017)

As part of research on the meso-foundations of conflict, the field of ‘rebel governance’ examines political institutions that regulate the affairs of civilians in wartime as well as their relations with armed actors. Judicial institutions play an important role in this and research has shown that they are widespread among both historical and current insurgencies. However, usually these bodies have been analysed in the context of one hegemonic faction like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Afghan Taliban. What is missing so far is an analysis of different pathways of (trans)formation of rebel courts. As exemplified by the three case studies of judicial institutions in Eastern Ghouta, Idlib and Aleppo, these are shaped by the distribution of power between ‘same-side’ groups, yielding unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar constellations. The analysis is located on the meso or movement level of insurgent social structures, complementing research on the micro and macro levels.     

Policeman versus Soldiers,the debate leading to MAAG Objections and Washington rejections of the Core of the British Counter Insurgency Advice

The British recognized that insurgencies were based upon a struggle for political legitimacy and subordinated to this was the military conflict. Their plan countered insurgents by denying them political legitimacy. They cast the insurgent in the role of the criminal while they enhanced the government's legitimacy. Policemen were considered vital to this process because they arrest and charge criminals. If policemen impute criminality upon insurgents then the use of army troops had the opposite effect. Armies are used in combat and this bestows a well-recognized legitimacy on the foes they combat. The American military advisory group in Vietnam found this difficult to accept.     

‘Mad Dog?’ Samuel Huntington and the Vietnam War

Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has frequently been considered a Vietnam War hawk. His observation that ‘forced-draft urbanization’ might help the United States win the war has come to define his engagement in contemporary strategic debates. This essay argues that both Huntington’s academic work and his private policy advice to the U.S. Government in fact urged a political settlement to the conflict. It argues that in spite of this, Huntington refused to break publicly with the U.S. policy because of his wider concern over what he saw as a crisis of authority in the U.S. foreign policy and governing institutions in the era.     

Countering insurgency: Turkey’s policy toward the PKK’s transnational dynamics in Europe

Insurgents often develop international connections and benefit from external assistance from a variety of sources. Support from diaspora communities has long been considered one of the critical external factors in the persistence of insurgent groups. Yet how the counterinsurgent state addresses external support from transnational ethnic communities and what factors influence the state's policies remain understudied. By focusing on the transnational political practices of the Kurdish community and the PKK in Western Europe, this paper examines how Turkey has addressed the diasporic support for the PKK since the 1980s. It shows that three major factors – the composition of foreign policy decision-makers, their ideological contestation over the Kurdish question, and the European political context – have affected Turkey's policy regarding the PKK's transnational dynamics in Europe.     

Framing Political Violence: Success and Failure of Religious Mobilization in the Philippines and Thailand

How do religious civil wars evolve? Many violent conflicts are fought between groups of different faiths. The paper argues, however, that religious differences rarely directly lead to conflict onset. Rather, the apparent religious dimension of many civil wars is a consequence of successful religious framing. Political and military leaders offer religious interpretations designed to legitimize the use of force and to mobilize believers to violent action. Such framing processes can be more or less successful, depending inter alia on the authority of the political and religious leadership, on the coherence and appropriateness of the frames, on the existence of persuasive counter-frames, and on the availability of communication infrastructures that allow for effective dissemination of religious frames. Comparing violent conflicts in the Philippines and Thailand, the paper shows that religious mobilization can fail along the theoretically predicted lines.