Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence

This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland.     

Decommissioning and paramilitary strategy in Northern Ireland: A problem compared

This study examines the problems of paramilitary decommissioning in Northern Ireland. It analyses why decommissioning has become so contentious in the Northern Ireland peace process. Decommissioning, though, is not a unique or intrinsically insurmountable problem. This is demonstrated by highlighting the issue in international context. Three examples of decommissioning in conflict resolution processes are assessed: the Lebanon, El Salvador and Mozambique. These varied examples do supply some limited lessons for Northern Ireland. This study argues that the explanation for the intractability of decommissioning in Northern Ireland resides, to a greater extent, in the tactical and strategic reasoning of the main paramilitary groupings in Northern Ireland. The factors that condition their thinking, however, can be found in the nature of the peace process itself which provides the paramilitiaries with every incentive to retain possession of their weapons.     

The Provisional IRA,the Irish border,and Anglo-Irish relations during the Troubles

Using hitherto largely unexplored governmental archives from London and Dublin, this article focuses on the security challenges arising from the existence of the land frontier between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and the significance of issues of cross-border security cooperation for Anglo-Irish relations from the beginning of the Troubles until the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. It argues that the relatively safe haven of the Republic was essential to the longevity of the IRA's campaign and that successive Irish governments exploited British security concerns to expand their political influence on Northern Ireland.     

The Imperfect Peace: Explaining Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland

This article examines why paramilitary campaigns in Northern Ireland have continued despite the current peace process. In advancing three instrumental explanations of paramilitary violence, the author provides a useful analytical framework which shows that while organizational interpretations are dominating the public discourse, republicans and loyalists continue to use paramilitary violence as a strategic means of threat and coercion. Furthermore, even though policy implications are not discussed in detail, it will be demonstrated that the dominance of organizational imperatives has resulted in excessive leniency by the state, which - in turn - has contributed to the fragility of the peace process.     

Principles of Minimum Force and the Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland, 1969–1972

Developing literature on Operation Banner, the codename for the British military operation in Northern Ireland, has indicated that the conduct of soldiers deployed was not always in line with principles of minimum force. Adherence to these principles would seem to have been essential to the success of the operation given the initial deployment of the soldiers was in the role of military aid to the civil power. This article will examine the role of one of the British Army’s most aggressive units, the Parachute Regiment, and will show how the responses of the regiment to the demands of the operation in Northern Ireland were frequently in contravention of minimum force principles.     

Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland

The role of the British Army in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner (1969–2007) is an instructive case study of counterinsurgency operations as well as an important chapter in recent British military history. Given troops deployed to the province as aid to the civil power, it is particularly useful in discussions about the principle of minimum force. This article seeks to explore the issue of minimum force through the example of Operation Motorman, the Army's successful attempt to remove the barricades, which had established so-go areas for the security forces in Northern Ireland.     

Winning the ‘War on Terror’? Roy Mason's Contribution to Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland

Roy Mason's tenure as Northern Ireland Secretary marked a watershed, yet it has provoked little analysis. Contrary to his popular image, security policy under Mason remained within the limits that had determined the formulation of British counter-terrorism ever since 1972. It was precisely because of this strategic environment that Mason's contribution was little more than a change in rhetoric, the implications of which were contradictory. Likewise, his key political idea of promoting ‘constitutional security’ negated its stated purpose by furthering instability, and – in the longer term – by making Dublin's permanent inclusion in the government of the province a political imperative.     

Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism

This article compares an ETA shooting incident in the Basque lands with an IRA bombing in Northern Ireland with the aim of examining the often overlooked role of symbolism in ethnic terrorists acts. The study of symbolism is important because it plays a part in impelling the terrorist to act and then in defining the targets of their actions. And one of the most important symbolic acts is that of sacrifice, particularly the blood sacrifice whereby acts of violence link with religion and with man's collective being. The article examines how the importance of symbolism to ethnic nationalist terrorist arises from the particular cultural, social and religious milieu in which they live. This analysis suggests that the terrorist act itself is symbolic of the terrorist cause and should not be only understood in purely rational 'means-ends' terms.     

Setting a place at the table: ending insurgencies through the political process

This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.     

Ireland's Ho Chi Minh trail? The Republic of Ireland's role in the Provisional IRA's bombing campaign, 1970–1976

A common criticism levelled at successive governments of the Republic of Ireland during the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ was their alleged inactivity in the face of a ferocious Provisional IRA campaign. Such criticisms were based in large part on the perception of the southern state as a supply base for militant republicanism. The Republic was undoubtedly a formidable logistics hinterland for such militants. However, criticisms of the reactions of authorities in the south are unfair. This article considers the explosives capabilities of the IRA during the first six years of their campaign. It does so with reference to their attempts to obtain commercial explosives as well as measures employed by them to obtain homemade explosives. The article also considers countermeasures employed by the southern government and reveals the extent to which they sought to shut down IRA capabilities in the south. It is argued that, ultimately, the IRA's campaign in this regard could only be contained and never unilaterally halted.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

The use of undercover military units in counter-terrorist operations: a historical analysis with reference to contemporary anti-terrorism

This article examines the use of specialised plain-clothes military units in counter-terrorism, concentrating on examples involving liberal-democratic states. It analyses the benefits and problems arising from clandestine military activity, focusing in particular on British army units (notably 14 Intelligence Company and the Force Research Unit in Northern Ireland). The article concludes by arguing that such formations have a clear utility – notably in gathering intelligence on terrorist groups – but other aspects of their role are inherently controversial (notably in cases where undercover soldiers use deadly force against suspected terrorists). It also states that plain-clothes military operations need to be conducted on the basis of accountability, both for strategic reasons, and also in accordance with the norms of liberal democracy.     

Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal insecurity

The phenomenon of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has generated many security concerns. This article explores the implications of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria for internal security. The article, which relies on a study of secondary sources of data, reveals that the insurgency has spawned varied implications such as an international image crisis, huge economic losses, a health and humanitarian crisis, a huge burden on the security apparatuses, arms proliferation, and endangered national unity. It holds that the insurgency is essentially interlinked with a breakdown of the social contract manifested in opportunistic behavior, economic stagnation, and lack of functioning institutional mechanisms for policy conduct and conflict resolution. Owing to the security menace posed by the insurgency, the article recommends that the root causes of the insurgency should be tackled rather than relying on reactive measures that cannot guarantee enduring peace and internal security.     

Constructive Ambiguity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland

The Belfast Agreement of 1998 was hailed at the time as a breakthrough in conflict resolution both in Northern Ireland and as a model for international emulation. In fact it has turned out to be neither; rather it has been a sad exercise in surrendering to terrorism and the cause of increased sectarian segregation and enmity. The core of the problem lies in the 'constructive ambiguity' at the heart of the Agreement - that is, a form of words that all could sign up to because each party could interpret them differently. This may have enabled everyone to sign up, but also implied they were signing up to different things and therefore were not in agreement. Consequently clever word games and spin by politicians and senior civil servants have created an, in some ways, worse situation, largely because real, substantive issues were ducked. This in turn has its roots in postmodernism, whose baleful influence can be seen throughout not only the Agreement but most government policy over the past 20 odd years.     

The management of security incidents by private security

This article is about the management of security incidents in organisations and companies which are under the protection of private security personnel, whether in-house or contracted. Incidents can be defined as accidental or anecdotal (bird flies into a camera) to a violation of law or company policy. Managing security incidents is one of the key functions of a private security service provider. The purpose of this study is to explore the management of security incidents and the information related thereto, identify shortcomings and find solutions for managing these shortcomings. Interviews were used to gain insight from personnel within the private and government sectors which are served by the private security industry. It was found that security incidents are handled in a routine way by organisations from the different sectors. One major shortcoming is that security incidents and the information related thereto are not managed by security service providers according to an operational framework or model with the required infrastructure and resources. The significance of this study is for security incidents to be managed correctly, so that the information related thereto may be captured accurately, analysed and used proactively and reactively to improve physical protection systems, develop preventative strategies and provide actionable information products in order to reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses.     

处理群体性事件应注意的语言方法艺术

随着新旧体制的更换、经济转轨和社会转型,由各种社会矛盾引发的群体性事件愈来愈多,并呈现愈来愈复杂和激烈的特点。但是绝大部分群体性事件仍然属于人民内部矛盾,只能采取团结-批评-团结、说理教育等解决人民内部矛盾的方法来平息,因而对领导干部掌握正确的处理群体性事件的语言方法艺术提出了紧迫而严格的现实要求。本文正是从这一现实背景出发,通过分析群体性事件的特点,结合各级各部门多年来处理群体性事件的经验,提出处理群体性事件应注意的十点语言方法艺术。     

INTRA‐GROUP COMPETITION AND INTER‐GROUP CONFLICT: AN APPLICATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post‐conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post‐conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision‐making in rendering individual decision makers non‐decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning1

This paper argues on the basis of a series of historical examples that include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaya and Northern Ireland, that there is no perfect counterinsurgency model and that each counterinsurgency campaign is different. Counterinsurgents need to have a series of basic tenets to wage successful war against guerrillas and insurgents. These include: a clear political policy from the government under insurgent attack, a strategy to keep the population safe, successful intelligence gathering, a recognition that successful counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and a high priority on the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure. This paper urges that in period of peacetime it is essential that militaries develop a Standing Counterinsurgency Concepts Unit that can conceptualise past and present insurgent patterns and build this into military and strategic planning.     

The Randomization of Terrorist Attacks

The purpose of this article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorist organizations deliberately randomize their attacks (by type, timing, location, and targets) to generate uncertainty and intimidation. A choice theoretic framework is applied to the analysis of the terrorist organization's behavior to determine whether welfare (utility) gains from the randomization of terrorist attacks are plausible and feasible. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence for each resource input but it turns out that randomization cannot manufacture a situation where higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.The results imply that, rather than randomization and instability, the rational terrorist organization is more likely to prefer stability. The findings and implications provide a theoretical explanation for the non-randomness of terrorist attacks.Thismay be one small step towards explaining the patterns – non-randomness – in the time-series of terrorist incidents.