Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

美军装备采办合同管理及其标准化

在我军武器装备建设逐渐"以计划为主要管理方式和手段"向"以合同为主要管理方式和手段"转变的背景下,装备采购合同管理的研究日趋深入。而装备采购合同"行政合同"的性质及合同标的物复杂性的特点,进一步凸显了标准化在保证装备采购合同规范性、降低不确定性、减少交易成本和提高工作效率中的重要作用。文章在对美军装备采办合同管理标准化特点与经验详细分析和提炼的基础上,对比我军装备采购合同管理体制及标准化现状,有针对性的提出了装备采购合同管理标准化建议,梳理了标准化重点,并为日后时机成熟时制定适用于装备采购合同管理的相关标准或指南,奠定了一定的研究基础。     

我军装备采购合同管理存在问题及对策

论述了装备采购合同的重要作用,分析了合同管理中存在的问题,就加强装备采购管理所应采取的措施提出了一系列建议,包括创新装备采购合同管理体制,完善装备采购合同管理的法治环境,提高装备采购合同管理队伍的专业化水平,变革装备采购合同管理模式和方法和落实军事代表质量监督职责等。     

论英文本对外经贸合同的语言特征

实务中有不少涉外经济合同纠纷是因各方对合同文字的理解不一而引起的,究其原因,主要是起草者对合同语言的特殊性缺乏应有的了解,结果导致合同语言的模糊性和不确定性。本文从词法、句法及篇章等三个层面对英文经贸合同语言的特殊性及其变化规律进行探讨,以期能有助于对此类合同的理解和起草。     

Expectation of contract incentives

The application of statistical expectation to risk density functions and fee/incentive-element relationships is shown to be useful in structuring contract incentives. A mathematical procedure for calculating the expected value of fee for a given risk/incentive arrangement is described along with cost examples and related sensitivity analyses. The structuring of equivalent incentives is demonstrated by the use of the contracting procedure used for procuring the C-5A aircraft.     

Economic impact and the notion of compensated procurement

The paper consists essentially of two parts. In the first part a linear economic impact model is presented whose structure is based on subcontracting flows. The structural coefficients are defined in terms of flows per area. The model is derived from two identities that are analogous to the income and expenditure identities of national income accounting. The parameters are prime contracts and when one or several of the prime contracts are changed, the model determines the impacts of such changes on the various regions that have been selected. The impacts can be combined with regional multipliers to derive changes in regional income and regional employment. Fragmentary data for this kind of model have been collected on a one-time basis by DOD in 1965 and some results based on the data are presented. The second part of the paper is concerned with normative economics. A scheme is suggested, called compensated procurement, that outlines how the Department of Defense might employ the impact model in a macroeconomic setting. The basic idea is that a stabilization fund be established to finance an array of potential projects which are contracted for to balance sudden shifts in defense demand. Only short-run stabilization is advocated.     

Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition

In Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, the manufacturer specifies the resale price that retailers must charge to consumers. We study the role of using a RPM contract in a market where demand is influenced by retailer sales effort. First, it is well known that RPM alone does not provide incentive for the retailer to use adequate sales effort and some form of quantity fixing may be needed to achieve channel coordination. However, when the market potential of the product is uncertain, RPM with quantity fixing is a rigid contract form. We propose and study a variety of RPM contracts with quantity fixing that offer different forms of flexibility including pricing flexibility and quantity flexibility. Second, we address a long‐time debate in both academia and practice on whether RPM is anti‐competitive in a market when two retailers compete on both price and sales effort. We show that depending on the relative intensity of price competition and sales effort competition, RPM may lead to higher or lower retail prices compared to a two‐part tariff contract, which specifies a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Further, the impact of RPM on price competition and sales effort competition is always opposite to each other. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

A game theoretic approach to a two firm bidding problem

In this paper a model is developed for determining optimal strategies for two competing firms which are about to submit sealed tender bids on K contracts. A contract calls for the winning firm to supply a specific amount of a commodity at the bid price. By the same token, the production of that commodity involves various amounts of N different resources which each firm possesses in limited quantities. It is assumed that the same two firms bid on each contract and that each wants to determine a bidding strategy which will maximize its profits subject to the constraint that the firm must be able to produce the amount of products required to meet the contracts it wins. This bidding model is formulated as a sequence of bimatrix games coupled together by N resource constraints. Since the firms' strategy spaces are intertwined, the usual quadratic programming methods cannot be used to determine equilibrium strategies. In lieu of this a number of theorems are given which partially characterize such strategies. For the single resource problem techniques are developed for determining equilibrium strategies. In the multiple resource problem similar methods yield subequilibrium strategies or strategies that are equilibrium from at least one firm's point of view.     

A model for manpower productivity during organization growth

A mathematical model is developed that enables organization and manpower planners to quantify the inefficiencies involved in rapid buildups of organizations, such as is frequently found in the aerospace industry shortly after the award of a major contract. Consideration is given to the time required to train, indoctrinate, and familiarize new workers with their jobs and the general program aspects. Once trained, workers are assumed to be productive. If the ratio of untrained to trained workers exceeds a critical value, called the buildup threshold, then the performance of the trained workers is degraded to the extent that they are no longer 100 percent efficient until this ratio returns to a value less than the threshold. The model is sufficiently general to consider an arbitrary manpower plan with more than one peak or valley. The model outputs are functions of real time and consist of the fraction of the total labor force which is productive, the fraction of the total labor units expended for nonproductive effort, the cumulative labor costs for productive effort, and the cumulative labor cost for all effort.     

Convex/stochastic programming and multilocation inventory problems

This paper examines a convex programming problem that arises in several contexts. In particular, the formulation was motivated by a generalization of the stochastic multilocation problem of inventory theory. The formulation also subsumes some “active” models of stochastic programming. A qualititative analysis of the problem is presented and it is shown that optimal policies have a certain geometric form. Properties of the optimal policy and of the optimal value function are described.     

“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

A branch‐and‐bound‐based solution approach for dynamic rerouting of airborne platforms

This article is a sequel to a recent article that appeared in this journal, “An extensible modeling framework for dynamic reassignment and rerouting in cooperative airborne operations” [ 17 ], in which an integer programming formulation to the problem of rescheduling in‐flight assets due to changes in battlespace conditions was presented. The purpose of this article is to present an improved branch‐and‐bound procedure to solve the dynamic resource management problem in a timely fashion, as in‐flight assets must be quickly re‐tasked to respond to the changing environment. To facilitate the rapid generation of attractive updated mission plans, this procedure uses a technique for reducing the solution space, supports branching on multiple decision variables simultaneously, incorporates additional valid cuts to strengthen the minimal network constraints of the original mathematical model, and includes improved objective function bounds. An extensive numerical analysis indicates that the proposed approach significantly outperforms traditional branch‐and‐bound methodologies and is capable of providing improved feasible solutions in a limited time. Although inspired by the dynamic resource management problem in particular, this approach promises to be an effective tool for solving other general types of vehicle routing problems. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Contract award analysis by mathematical programming

ABSTRACT A large manufacturer of telephone directories purchases about 100,000 tons of paper annually from several paper mills on the basis of competitive bids. The awards are subject to several constraints. The principal company constraint is that the paper must be purchased from at least three different suppliers. The principal external constraints are: 1) one large paper mill requires that if contracted to sell the company more than 50,000 tons of paper, it must be enabled to schedule production over the entire year; 2) the price of some bidders is based on the condition that their award must exceed a stipulated figure. The paper shows that an optimal purchasing program corresponds to the solution of a model which, but for a few constraints, is a linear programming formulation with special structure. The complete model is solved by first transforming it into an almost transportation type problem and then applying several well-known L.P. techniques.     

装备采购线性合同优化研究

高额装备费支出使对招投标合同优化问题备受国防经济学界关注,对装备采办过程中招投标线性合同的优化进行了研究。采用招投标模型与委托-代理模型分析相结合的方法,先从道德风险与风险分担2个方面分析装备采购合同的优化问题,然后引入竞争效应,分析风险分担的问题。即使在双方为风险中性不需要风险分担时,DoD仍然需要在最初的投标竞争与中标后承包商降低成本行为之间进行权衡。一般的投标中,应使最终支付基于实际成本和投标值2个因素,并考虑最终支付基于道德风险损失。研究的基本结论是:固定价格合同应尽可能少地使用;若存在2个以上的投标人,成本加价合同也应禁止使用;在使用激励合同时,应慎重选择合同系数,提出了计算优化线性激励合同系数的方法。     

An evaluation of incentive contracting experience

Incentive contracts are intended to motivate defense contractors to perform more efficiently and control costs more closely. By increasing the total profit as actual costs are reduced below a predetermined cost target, they encourage contractors to achieve cost under runs. Consequently, the principal advantage claimed for these contracts is that they make the financial incentives to reduce costs more effective. This study examines the effectiveness of incentive contracts as a means for controlling defense procurement costs. The study considers the various effects that incentive contracts may have on both contractors' performance and contract costs, and presents empirical evidence suggesting that these contracts may not have accomplished their intended goal of increased efficiency and lower procurement costs.     

构建科学的继续教育质量评估体系

根据继续教育的实际特点 ,以继续教育管理工作为对象 ,依据管理系统分析、模糊层次分析、灰色系统评估等理论 ,建立了继续教育教学质量评估体系递阶层次结构模型 ,对评估指标的权重分配给出了科学的数学计算 ,制定了具体的评价标准 ,并依此建立继续教育管理信息系统     

基于系统动力学的工程项目目标控制

针对工程项目目标控制问题,通过德尔菲法确定工程项目目标控制的主要影响因素,基于系统动力学反馈与仿真分析理论建立了工程项目目标控制系统动力学模型。采用专家打分法确定参数,利用Vensim软件对模型进行模拟演化和算例分析,讨论不同策略和策略组合的工程项目目标控制效果,最终得到基于算例工程的理想方案为0时增加人工8人,0时加班1 d,管理费水平为3。采用该方案,该工程的完工时间提前47.2%,质量下降2.0%,费用上升6.7%。通过不同策略和策略组合的效果比较,得出结论：加班宜尽量少用,尤其要避免连续加班;尽量避免无效管理费用支出,但对于可以带来管理水平提高的管理费用支出宜适量增加;增加人工越早越好。     

Flexible supply contracts for short life‐cycle goods: The buyer's perspective

In this paper we analyze a two‐period supply contract which allows for order adjustment by the buyer. The buyer is required to place orders for two periods. After observing initial demand, the buyer is then allowed to adjust the second order, paying a per unit order adjustment penalty. We describe the optimal behavior of the buyer under such a contract, both in determining the initial order quantities and in subsequently adjusting the order. We compare the solution to a contract where no adjustment is allowed and to the case where adjustment is allowed without penalty. We demonstrate that flexible contracts can reduce the potentially negative effect of correlation of demand between two periods. Further, we investigate how the duration of the first period vis‐à‐vis the second period affects the profitability of the buyer as a function of the degree of correlation. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 25–45, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10002     

装备合同履行管理的动态演化博弈研究

在装备合同履行中存在着明显的信息不对称现象。为提高装备合同的履行效益,减少信息不对称的影响,在有限理性假设的前提下,建立了装备合同履行监督的动态演化博弈模型。对合同履行过程中承制单位与军事代表、合同履行管理部门之间的博弈关系进行了探究,得到了各参与方在不同条件下均衡策略的选择,并对优化装备合同的履行管理提出了建议。     

Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility

In this article we address an important class of supply contracts called the Rolling Horizon Flexibility (RHF) contracts. Under such a contract, at the beginning of the horizon a buyer has to commit requirements for components for each period into the future. Usually, a supplier provides limited flexibility to the buyer to adjust the current order and future commitments in a rolling horizon manner. We present a general model for a buyer's procurement decision under RHF contracts. We propose two heuristics and derive a lower bound. Numerically, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the heuristics for both stationary and non‐stationary demands. We show that the heuristics are easy to compute, and hence, amenable to practical implementation. We also propose two measures for the order process that allow us to (a) evaluate the effectiveness of RHF contracts in restricting the variability in the orders, and (b) measure the accuracy of advance information vis‐a‐vis the actual orders. Numerically we demonstrate that the order process variability decreases significantly as flexibility decreases without a dramatic increase in expected costs. Our numerical studies provide several other managerial insights for the buyer; for example, we provide insights into how much flexibility is sufficient, the value of additional flexibility, the effect of flexibility on customer satisfaction (as measured by fill rate), etc. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008