THE RIGHT INTERVENTION

Sovereignty has often been used to protect leaders at the expense of citizens. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) allows for intervention without the consent of the target state in a way that the OAU system of complete consensus never did. Ensuring that intervention is effective is as important as the decision of when and why to intervene. Sanctions, criminal prosecutions and military interventions are the broad options available to the AU. To be effective, though, the AU will need to agree on how intervention will be authorised and on mechanisms for its implementation. While the AU may have limited resources, not all action is costly. If African leaders speak out against human rights violations whenever they occur and combine this with a small, well-trained regional force, the benefits will far outweigh the costs.     

The rhetoric and practice of the international responsibility to prevent mass atrocities: Reflections on South Africa’s peacebuilding role in South Sudan (2005–2013)

While global consensus on the meaning and application of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle remains tenuous, there is little contention among major actors that the development of the norm should prioritise the prevention of mass atrocities. In particular, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) – which have a role to play that is vital to the future development of R2P as a global norm but which continue to express reservations about the intent and application of the doctrine – have been strong advocates of the preventive aspects of the principle. This rhetorical consensus, however, belies the conceptual and practical challenges that are associated with the prevention of mass atrocities. In this paper, the example of South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) interventions in South Sudan from 2005 to 2013 is used to reflect on the role of external actors in supporting conflict-affected states to implement the preventive aspects of R2P. It is argued that while South Africa, like other BRICS countries, has used the rhetoric that atrocity prevention should be at the core of R2P to legitimise its opposition to military intervention for humanitarian purposes, it has struggled to back this rhetoric with coherent strategies and concrete actions to prevent mass atrocity crimes within its sphere of influence. The gap between rhetoric and practice in the preventive aspects of R2P is not unique to South Africa, but highlights fundamental difficulties inherent to global efforts to prevent mass atrocities.     

AMENDMENT TO THE AFRICAN UNION'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE

Heads of State and Government passed the first amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union within seven months of the launch of the organization. This article provides a legal analysis of the broadening of Article 4(h) of the Act, the right of intervention, to prevent a “serious threat to legitimate order”. It argues that this clause is inconsistent with the other grounds for intervention, which aim to protect African peoples from grave violations of human rights when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The amendment, by contrast, aims to uphold state security, rather than human security. The context in which this and other amendments were adapted from proposals by Libya in Durban 2002 is considered in terms of political implications for the African Union.     

EASTERN SUDAN INDIGENOUS CONFLICT PREVENTION,MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

In the wake of heightened media and political pressure about the Darfur humanitarian catastrophe, the African Union (AU) hurriedly deployed its monitors in Darfur, to be augmented later by a protection force to safeguard the monitors, albeit without adequate pre-deployment and logistic assessment. Without doubt, the Darfur crisis has become the AU's major preoccupation for the past year. The deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since June 2004 has presented many challenges to the AU and its partners. A restrictive mandate, inadequate troops to cover Darfur, serious operational, logistical and capacity shortfalls have combined in an inextricable way to present the AU's mission to some observers as spineless and ineffective. The UN and partners have acknowledged the lead role of the AU in Darfur, and have been very supportive with assistance in these critical deficient areas. How the AU will take advantage of this favourable environment and optimise the benefits from its partners will be crucial to its success in Darfur. The article emphasises the need for the AU to strengthen its capacity and expertise at all levels of command through technical cooperation and appropriate assistance from the UN and partners. The entire world is waiting to see how Africa delivers on this critical assignment.     

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.     

South Africa's arsenal of terrorism legislation

After only ten years in existence, the African Union (AU) has already made its mark on the landscape of peace and security in Africa. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the AU's leading collaborative interstate security policy, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. It examines four countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya – and how engaging with the APSA through early warning systems can contribute to developing the elements necessary for sustainable peace, namely regional stability, conflict management, and good governance.     

Political dynamics in Kenya’s post-electoral violence: Justice without peace or political compromise?

The political upheavals that erupted in Kenya after the release of the 2007–8 election results resulted in the death of approximately 1 200 people, as well as the loss of livestock and other valuable property. While the Kenyan government tried to seek solutions to the crisis, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of top government officials. For its part, the African Union (AU) accused the ICC of racism by targeting only African leaders, and maintained that such practices undermine the rule of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the Rome Statute. The AU is therefore advising African countries, including Kenya, to consider withdrawing from the ICC. Will the ICC's intervention into the situation in Kenya bring justice and peace to the country, or will it add to the existing injuries affecting not just the country but the region as well? Through a critical analysis of contemporary scholarly discourse, this article unravels the dilemma of the ICC's intervention and the likely consequences of this action for the people of Kenya and Africa.     

Country survey: Angola

This paper is a survey of Angola’s defence sector and policy from 1992, the year the civil war ended, to 2012. Angola achieved its independence upon the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeating National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Since then, fuelled by its rich natural resources, the country has grown steadily. The MPLA military forces were a central factor behind independence and maintain their central role to this day. Moreover, Angola’s support for African peace with monitoring military missions is a clear indication that the country aims to intervene in African security and military issues, with its military capabilities funded by oil revenues.     

The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace

In this paper, I critically analyse the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), as it relates to the responsibility of intervening forces towards the people they claim to protect and the challenges that the situation in Libya now poses in the region and for the African Union (AU). I focus most of my attention on the coercive elements of the RtoP framework (Pillar III). This is the most contested element in the framework. Three questions guide this article: were there legitimate grounds to justify an external intervention in Libya? In the words of Hugh Roberts in Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go, ‘[w]hat if anything has Libya got in exchange for all the death and destruction that have been visited on it’ since 2011? What are the practical implications and consequences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, led by the United States (US), for regional peace? I discuss the problems surrounding the US–NATO intervention, followed by an analysis of the various positions and narratives leading up to the intervention, the framing and justifications provided for the intervention, and an analysis of the AU's proposal for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. I analyse the various debates that took place in the US (Pentagon/White House), at the United Nations, among scholars in the West and in Africa, and among various actors who tried to broker a ceasefire in Libya before and during the intervention. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for regional peace.     

‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

Beyond the state: reconceptualising African security in the 21st century

Confronted with myriad security challenges, African states and the much-vaunted peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) has proven not to be up to the challenge. Indeed, this is implicitly acknowledged by the AU itself if one considers the creation of such security structures as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which exists outside its peace and security architecture. This paper argues for a radical rethink of security structures on the African continent – one in which state structures of security coexist with newer forms of security actors, including private military companies (PMCs), community movements and the business sector. Whilst this shift in security actors is already happening on the ground, policymakers need to embrace this new reality.     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AFRICA

This paper explores the contribution of the African Union (AU) to human security promotion in Africa. It contends that human security concerns informed the formation of the AU. Through the efforts of the AU Commission, the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of human security doctrines. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The commission is now in the difficult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade significant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as a guiding principle and the desirable norm. Through the African Citizens' Directorate (CIDO), the commission is using indigenous African civil society groups to institutionalise human security doctrines in Africa. The commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to make human security the only security norm. While member states of the AU that have never been comfortable with the introduction of human security doctrines into the continental integration project are tacitly undermining the CIDO's ability to work with civil society groups to institutionalise the doctrines in Africa, the leaders who enthusiastically supported the integration of human security doctrines into the documents and work of the AU have seemed in recent times to be less resolute in their support of AU Commission's human security work.     

《突发事件应对法》第14条分析——兼论国家武装力量应对突发事件的行为规范

国家武装力量依法应对突发事件应当依据《突发事件应对法》进行。但是，该法仅在第14条中对武装力量应对突发事件作了概括性的规定。本文从三个方面对《突发事件应对法》第14条进行了解读，企望比较全面地论述国家武装力量依法应对突发事件的行为规范。     

Interstate border disputes in Africa: Their resolution and implications for human rights and peace

Many researchers have focused on the role colonialism has played in causing interstate border disputes in Africa. Besides the colonial issue, this paper seeks to investigate what other factors fuel interstate border disputes in Africa and determine how effectively the disputes can be resolved. In recent decades, Africa has been tormented by and is still experiencing numerous interstate border disputes which have serious implications for the disputing states. Some of the disputes are resolved, but violations of human rights and instability still occur in these regions. By analysing the content of some relevant documents and with the use of interviews, this paper reveals that most disputing African states rely heavily on foreign intervention (especially by their erstwhile colonial masters) in the resolution of their disputes. It is argued that African leaders need to be more committed and exhibit better leadership in resolving their border disputes, and that they should always seek the expertise of African forums such as the African Union (AU) before calling for foreign intervention. It is suggested that African leaders and the AU understand the problems of Africans better than anyone else, and they are also the ones mostly greatly affected by these disputes. Thus, there needs to be more of a focus on addressing the root causes of disputes in order to avoid them resurfacing, rather than seeking to merely halt them.     

Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

The period after 9/11 can be characterised as the terrorism moment in world history. Every actor in international relations—the state, regional, continental and international as well as civil society organisations—has been mobilised to combat what, apparently has been conceived as a common security threat to humanity. The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) was a divine coincidence at a time when multilateralism and international cooperation were being challenged by the threat of terrorism. In the post-9/11 period, the main concern of the Union has been to reinforce and implement existing counter-terrorism instruments adopted at the continental level in coordination with states and regional organisations. This article discusses and appraises the endeavours undertaken by the AU and its precursor organisation, the OAU, in tackling and dealing with the threat of terrorism despite limitations to its human and financial resources. In recognition of the nature of the states in Africa and the challenges facing the Union, we argue that the role of the AU remains critical in order to fill the gaps where its member states or regional mechanisms are lacking. In this regard, we stress that the role of the AU should be complementary and serve as an interface between the continent and the international community, including the United Nations.     

THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

Founded on the basis of the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community that came into force in May 1994, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was inaugurated in Addis Ababa on 18 March 2004. The inauguration followed the ratification by a majority of the 53 African Union (AU) member states of the PAP Protocol that had come into force on 14 December 2003.

While it is suggested that the PAP will oversee the AU Executive once the continental parliament has been given legislative power in its second term, the debate on the role that the PAP should play continues to rage. This article enters the debate by giving an overview of the workings of the PAP and makes some concrete proposals on ways in which the continental parliament can contribute to the continent. The article underlines the need for the PAP to develop or seek the capacity to conduct or commission research on pertinent issues for further recommendation to the assembly. It proposes that the continental parliament should send observer missions to countries holding elections on the continent so that it may contribute to the entrenchment of democracy on the continent.

The article also identifies some of the challenges that lie ahead of the continental body, including funding as well as the challenge of maximising the participation of ordinary Africans.     

UNAMID: an African solution to a complex case of geopolitical dynamics

This article examines the geopolitical dynamics associated with the African Union (AU) and United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) from the start of the Darfur conflict in 2003 until the time when UNAMID became fully operational in 2011. It provides an overview of the complex forces and geopolitical dynamics that affected the deployment of UNAMID and shaped its unique hybrid character. It mainly highlights those primary geopolitical factors that hindered the full deployment of UNAMID. It is concluded that this period was a showcase for the newly established AU and its support for its member states, as well as a new approach for the international community to maintain international peace and security in alliance with regional organisations.     

‘Responsibility to protect’ and the African Union: Assessing the AU’s capacity to respond to regional complex humanitarian and political emergencies

Despite its many institutional and political weaknesses and limitations, the African Union (AU) has been developing a variety of tools and mechanisms to respond effectively to complex disasters and emergencies (both natural and manmade) by building up a comprehensive regional security architecture. Furthermore, it has become the first and only regional or international organisation to enshrine the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) in its Constitutive Act. This regional approach to and formal endorsement of the R2P principle allowed it to assume a particular place in the promotion of peace and security in its area. This article aims to critically assess the effectiveness of the AU on the African continent by exploring its real capacity in preventing and responding to emergencies and violent conflicts, and therefore in rendering the principle of R2P operational. The article argues that the formalisation of principles does not necessarily mean their effective implementation. The organisation's use of the R2P principle is also greatly conditioned by internal and external factors.     

Tanzanian scepticism of a militarised East African Federation and underlying military concerns

Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring public support for regional integration. Until now, however, scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military mechanism in the sub-Saharan African context. Using Afrobarometer data, we demonstrate that military concerns are vital when exploring Tanzanian attitudes towards the proposed political federation of the East African Community (EAC), the East African Federation (EAF). More specifically, opposition to military cooperation strongly influences Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF. This finding is highly relevant given that referendums in the participating member states must be passed to facilitate political integration. Heightened opposition towards military cooperation raises the possibility of the public rejecting a politically integrated EAC. This poses a potential obstacle to the implementation of joint security policies and crucial mechanisms to provide a more stable region at large. We account for alternative explanations of Tanzanian opinion formation and reflect on the strength of military-orientated concerns for investigating public support for the East African project specifically and regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa more widely.