Vicarious warfare: The counterproductive consequences of modern American military practice

This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.     

The Russian hybrid warfare strategy – neither Russian nor strategy

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its initial actions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the term hybrid warfare has received much public attention. Many have argued that the Russian actions we saw in Ukraine were part of a completely new strategy while others have suggested that there was nothing new in Russia’s actions. This article takes a critical look at these claims. Through the assessment of the history of the term hybrid warfare and a rigorous analysis of the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, this study finds that the Russian hybrid warfare strategy is rather a western myth than a formal comprehensive Russian strategic concept. Additionally, through the assessment of the Russian use of information operations and the way she has utilised the cyberspace in several recent conflicts, the study finds that against all claims Russia did not make these areas its main battlefield, but rather has been using them in support of its traditional concepts.     

Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures: A Critique of the Literature

This article examines critically the literature of hybrid war and evaluates the countermeasures often proposed. It explains the concept of hybrid warfare and its varied interpretations, illustrating how it is a manifestation of current anxieties in armed conflict. The selection of the literature is based on works that are referenced, that offer a scientific approach, and which review either the phenomenon of hybrid warfare or its countermeasures empirically. Unscientific works have been omitted. The analysis of the literature presented here shows that the antidotes to ‘hybridity’ lie not in the operational or tactical sphere but in strategic and political domains.     

From the sea to outer space: The command of space as the foundation of spacepower theory

Colin Gray once lamented the absence of a ‘Mahan for the final frontier’ and spacepower theory in strategic studies. This article proposes the command of space as the fundamental concept of spacepower theory, and that Mahan himself has much to offer in the endeavour of spacepower theory-making than has hitherto been realised. The theory is advanced by tempering versions of the ‘command of space’, stressing its educational intent, and explaining the nuanced sub-concepts of space control and denial through understanding some precedents set by seapower theory. In the process, aspects of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory are unified.     

The snowball phenomenon: the US Marine Corps,military mythology and the spread of hybrid warfare theory

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the book by Ofer Fridman and seeks to situate the strategic debate on hybrid war in the context of debate on the US involvement in Iraq. It points to intellectuals from the Marine Corps having a significant role in the initial development of the hybrid warfare concept at a time of some reservation in US military circles over COIN strategy as this was set out in the field manual FM3-24. Thereafter, the hybrid war concept rapidly spread and became a conceptual device used to explain Russian strategic intentions in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine in 2014.     

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis.

Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 ?1. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, 1929, published in Malcolm Brown (ed) T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005) p.284.      

关于战略级推演模拟型作战实验的思考

摘要：在划分作战实验类别的基础上,界定了战略级推演模拟型作战实验的基本概念;从国家战略目标确立、国际局势把握、联合作战指挥人才培养的角度,阐述了战略级推演模拟型作战实验的作用及意义;从以军事战略方针为指导、与军队建设和军事作战协调发展、以作战实验机构为依托、以作战实验技术手段为支撑的角度,分析了战略级推演模拟型作战实验的基本要求;从功能结构、逻辑概念结构、运行模式的角度,进行了战略级推演模拟型作战实验室的初步设计。研究结果可为推动作战实验的创新发展提供理论参考。     

军事应用网格MAGrid本体研究

本体论提供了对研究领域进行概念化描述的基本理论和方法.为了适应网络中心战的发展需求,提出了一种新的军事应用网格构想--MAGrid,并着重从本体论的角度对其进行研究和设计.在介绍本体论相关知识的基础上,提出了相应的层次化本体结构,并对MAGrid的两类主要本体--网格服务本体和网格应用本体进行了描述.通过该研究,为新时期军事应用系统的开发提供了新的思路和方法,对于提高军事系统整体效能具有一定的理论参考和应用价值.     

The art of net assessment and uncovering foreign military innovations: Learning from Andrew W. Marshall’s legacy

ABSTRACT

Andrew W. Marshall, who shaped the way in which contemporary international security experts think about strategy, has been mostly associated with the invention of net assessment. The intellectual sources of this analytical technique, and of the related competitive strategies concept, could be traced to Marshall’s efforts to uncover Soviet post-World War II defense transformations. This article outlines the essence of these Soviet innovations – the empirical frame of reference that inspired Marshall. It provides a new perspective on the history of the net-assessment methodology, advances the debate within strategic studies over the nature of military innovations, and offers insights for experts examining defense transformations worldwide.     

The danger of “hybrid warfare” from a sophisticated adversary: the Russian “hybridity” in the Ukrainian conflict

The term “hybrid warfare” is a new one that the West began to use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats. Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis, most Western authors attributed “hybrid threats” mostly to non-state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of “hybridity” in the modern battlefield when practised by a powerful state actor. Russian “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine has already been seen as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods, that have been complemented with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic and information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term “hybrid” is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although “hybrid threats” can come both from state and non-state actors, the Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use all forms of warfare.     

Carlo Bianco and Guerra per bande: an Italian approach to irregular warfare

Since the end of the Cold War, a huge debate over how war has been changing has emerged; a common feature is that modern conflicts are not state vs. state wars, but ‘irregular wars’. In order to better understand modern irregular warfare, it is important to analyse past authors and ideas. Carlo Bianco’s concept of Guerra per bande highlights elements of mobility with different cooperating units, of terror, and of complex terrain. The present study offers the first English analysis of Carlo Bianco and underlines the similarities of his work to the hybrid warfare concept.     

电子战系统效能的模糊评估方法

电子战装备的系统作战效能分析一直是个较为复杂的问题。在阐述电子战系统作战效能概念的基础上,根据电子战装备的分类,建立了电子战系统效能评估的指标评价体系框架,对电子对抗装备中较为重要的侦察、干扰设备效能评估指标进行了分析。对基于模糊数学综合评判和层次分析法理论的电子战系统作战效能评估的研究作了较为详细的分析,并进行了应用仿真。     

The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has again emerged as a topic of both contemporary and historical interest in the age of what has been called a global counterinsurgency. However, little attention is being paid to the historical lineage of a COIN doctrine that is being rediscovered and promoted by an enthusiastic group of military intellectuals and commanders as the basis for US Army and Marine Corps doctrine. This article argues that historical claims for COIN success, based on courting popular gratitude by improving economic conditions, are at best anchored in selective historical memory, when not fantasy fabrications. The first argument of this article is that COIN does not constitute a distinct form of warfare, but merely a sub-set of minor tactics. Second, ‘hearts and minds’, so-called population-centric warfare, has seldom been a recipe for lasting stability. Rather, historically counterinsurgency succeeded when it has shattered and divided societies by severely disrupting civilian life. In fact, COIN is a nineteenth century legacy of empire whose uniqueness and impact was mythologized in its own day, and that is unlikely to prove a formula for strategic success in the twenty-first century.     

Clausewitz’s Concept of Strategy – Balancing Purpose,Aims and Means

The task of coming to a proper appreciation of Clausewitz’s thoughts on war is to combine a hierarchical structure with that of a floating balance. This article examines the relation of purpose, aims and means in Clausewitz’s theory and highlights that this relation is methodologically comparable to the floating balance of Clausewitz’s trinity. Modern strategic thinking is characterised by the ‘ends, ways, means relationship’ and the concept of the ‘way’ as shortest possible direct connection between ends and means. If strategy is nothing else than the direct way of linking the political purpose with the means, understood as combat, this understandings results in ‘battle-centric’ warfare. My thesis is that the aim (goal, way) in warfare is not a direct link between purpose and means, but rather an indirect, intermediary dimension, a mediation (in Hegelian terms) between purpose and aims with its own grammar. This article distinguishes (sometimes going beyond Clausewitz) between the rationality of the whole process of war, the rationality of the separate aspects of purpose, aims and means in warfare and finally their conflicting tendencies. This article highlights Clausewitz’s different concepts of purpose and aims and tries to shed at least some light of the strategic implications of this difference. This interpretation of Clausewitz leads to the definition of strategy as maintaining a floating balance of purpose, aims and means in warfare.     

United States defence contractors and the future of military operations

ABSTRACT

The United States’ global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States’ strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare.     

The continuing resonance of the war as risk management perspective for understanding military interventions

In the late 1990s and 2000s, a slew of books and journal articles proposed that a nexus between risk management and warfare was emerging. This article argues that risk management ideas continue to shape recent campaigns against Libya, Islamic State, Syria, and the war on terror from Niger, Yemen to Somalia. It uses existing literature on risk and warfare to examine four key aspects of contemporary interventions. First, the article evaluates the overall strategic context as security concerns shift from terrorism toward renewed great power competition. Second, it re-assesses the risk calculus for military action through the language and grammar of risk invoked by politicians. Third and fourth, it addresses the continuing reliance on air power and the managerial ethos of military operations as important features of war as risk management.     

The underlying causes of military outsourcing in the USA and UK: bridging the persistent gap between ends,ways and means since the beginning of the Cold War

This article reappraises the two most-studied country cases of military outsourcing: the USA and the UK. It argues that the contemporary wave of military contracting stretches back to the beginning of the cold war and not only to the demobilisation of armies in the 1990s or the neoliberal reforms introduced since the 1980s. It traces the political, technological and ideational developments that laid the groundwork for these reforms and practices since the early cold war and account for its endurance today. Importantly, it argues that a persistent gap between strategic objectives and resources, i.e. the challenge to reconcile ends and means, is an underlying driver of military contracting in both countries. Contemporary contracting is thus most closely tied to military support functions in support of wider foreign and defence political objectives. Security services in either state may not have been outsourced so swiftly, if at all, without decades of experience in outsourcing military logistics functions and the resultant vehicles, processes and familiarities with public-private partnerships. The article thus provides a wider and deeper understanding of the drivers of contractualisation, thereby improving our understanding of both its historical trajectory and the determinants of its present and potential futures.     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.     

Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study

ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has become a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. This essay aims at outlining ISIS warfare through an analysis of its operations in the frame of hybrid warfare theory proposed by Frank Hoffman. Therefore, the paper deals with: the role of terrorist tactics in ISIS warfare and the relationship between terrorism and insurgency; ISIS use of technology, mainly with regard to suicide attacks and to drones; and the relevance of urban warfare. Finally, the paper highlights how ISIS operates and the most threatening features of its warfare.     

‘Innovate or die’: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver warfare in the United States Marine Corps

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article contributes to the understanding of the origins of maneuver warfare as the capstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. It does so by identifying a second source that fostered change in the Marine Corps – one in addition to disquiet about the conduct of the war in Vietnam – which stemmed from the challenges posed by the United States' post-Vietnam strategic and military reorientation. And second, this article examines the influence of organizational culture, or identity, on innovation in the Marine Corps. A critical strand in the growing literature on military innovation focuses on organizational culture and how it influences the behavior and responses of particular military organizations. This article contributes to this literature by analyzing the influence of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps in shaping what was deemed an appropriate response to the challenges it confronted in the 1970s.