Layered defense of deceptively based ICBMs

The basing of ICBMs is a fundamental problem of defense analysis. Deceptive basing and antiballistic missile defense are two of the methods available to attempt to insure that there are ICBMs surviving after undergoing an attack. This article treats tradeoffs among missiles, silos or shelters, exoatmospheric interceptors, and endoatmospheric interceptors. Most of the analysis deals with 200 missiles, the number of MX missiles which were recommended to be moved among the 4600 shelters of the Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) deployment, though some variants in the number of missiles (from 115 to 400) are also treated here. The basic reference point of the analysis is the provision of 1000 ICBM warheads delivered in a second strike. The combination of exoatmospheric interceptors and endoatmospheric interceptors is referred to as “layered defense.” Warheads are destroyed by interceptors after the warheads separate from the missile which carries them. Exoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve a non-nuclear kill, while endoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve either a non-nuclear or nuclear kill, depending on the technology available to both sides. Exoatmospheric interceptors may be capable of protecting value targets against the warheads of a second strike. To the extent that this can be achieved, they facilitate a first strike with relative impunity and hence are destabilizing. This article explores various layered defense topics.     

战术导弹打击机场跑道毁伤概率

在分析了导弹打击机场后毁伤评估标准和技术现状的基础上,阐明了评估指标及方法,针对军用机场的特点选择打击跑道为攻击目标,分析了战役战术导弹母弹的落点规律和子弹散布规律,瞄准点的选择方法,并进行了毁伤概率计算,基于最小起降窗口概念,实现了给定机场目标和毁伤等级要求下导弹型号的最优选择,最少导弹消耗量预测.并通过实例进行了验证实验.     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.     

Domestic factors in the making of defense policy: The case of the Netherlands

The importance of domestic factors in explaining the foreign-policy process can, today, not be overlooked. It has been suggested that four sets of variables play an important role in determining the chances for domestic groups to exercise influence on this process: external autonomy, internal (domestic) consensus, the availability of time and the presence or absence of conditions of influence such as legitimacy, resources and access. From a series of case studies on foreign policymaking in the Netherlands two were selected for this article: the introduction of the neutron warheads and the deployment of cruise missiles. Both were very controversial in the Netherlands. They show that under favourable conditions, i.e. divisions within the ruling Christian Democratic Party, committed and well-organized domestic groups which are capable of keeping public opinion mobilized over time can have an important and even decisive influence on the outcome of the making of defence and foreign policy. Domestic conditions being what they are, the making of defense policy in the Netherlands is bound to remain a delicate balancing act for any Dutch government.     

Proliferation and critical risk

Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers.

To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces.

Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike.     

Israeli self-defeating deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War

Israel's failure in deterring Iraq from launching missiles on its home front in the 1991 Gulf War demonstrates the failure of deterrence theory to capture the dynamic of deterrences in ‘complex systems’. In such conflictual systems the recipe for successful deterrence – rational actors, credible and clear deterrence threats, and a defender that has a reputation for realizing his threats – may fail to acheive the expected outcome. Moreover, the credibility of the deterrer may be the reason for the collapse of deterrence. Evidence from the post-Cold War era suggests high prospects for the recurring of complex deterrence systems and thus reinforces the importance of this case.     

Damage calculations for unreliable warheads

For large numbers of perfectly reliable, optimally targeted warheads the square-root law approximates the expected fraction damage achieved on an area target. In this paper a more exact expression is derived for this damage fraction which Holds for all numbers of warheads. This expression is shown to converge to the square-root law when a large number of warheads are fired. The more exact expression is used in a procedure to calculate expected damage when warheads are unreliable, and this procedure is shown to be superior to a modified square-root approximation which has been used previously.     

A duel complicated by false targets and uncertainty as to opponent type

An attacker, being one of two types, initiates an attack at some time in the interval [-T, 0]. The a priori probabilities of each type are known. As time elapses the defender encounters false targets which occur according to a known Poisson process and which can be properly classified with known probability. The detection and classification probabilities for each type attacker are given. If the defender responds with a weapon at the time of attack, he survives with a probability which depends on the number of weapons in his possession and on attacker type. If he does not respond, his survival probability is smaller. These probabilities are known, as well as the current number of weapons in the defender's possession. They decrease as the number of weapons decreases. The payoff is the defender's survival probability. An iterative system of first-order differential equations is derived whose unique solution V₁(t),V₂(t),…,V_k(t) is shown to be the value of the game at time t, when the defender has 1, 2,…, k,… weapons, respectively. The optimal strategies are determined. Limiting results are obtained as t→-∞, while the ratio of the number of weapons to the expected number of false targets remaining is held constant.     

侵彻子母弹对跑道封锁概率与打击效果评估

现代战争中为取得制空权使用侵彻子母弹对敌方的机场跑道进行攻击是一种有效的战术手段.如何有效地规划打击方案是指挥员所关心的问题.就此建立了相关的数学模型,研究使用侵彻子母弹对跑道打击的封锁概率和弹头有效率问题.还讨论了在使用卫星遥感影像检测跑道上弹坑存在误差条件下,对目标打击效果评估准确性的问题.并使用仿真方法,综合上述因素,对封锁跑道的多种战术技术组合条件做了实验,给出了定量的计算结果,为打击方案的设计提供了理论依据.     

制导精度对弹道导弹动能拦截效果的影响分析

本文首先从碰撞几何关系角度建立了直接碰撞毁伤来袭弹头内所有子弹头的碰撞毁伤模型,并得出了碰撞弹坑需求;其次从碰撞能量角度建立了直接碰撞产生的动能与对弹头造成侵彻弹坑的关系。通过仿真计算,得到了碰撞精度与弹目交汇速度、KKV的质量和体积之间的关系,可为KKV的设计提供参考。     

Deferred verification: verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes

ABSTRACT

Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament.     

The modern naval fortress: an additional sea denial option for coastal states

As fixed facilities, naval fortresses seem unlikely to be important in a sea denial strategy which is usually about mobility, but new defence technologies and the changing geostrategic environment may revive the concept of the fortress. Extended ranges of anti-ship means allow onshore firepower to engage enemies over distance, even beyond the economic exclusive zones where most maritime territorial disputes occur. In the face of size limits on missile warheads that constrain their destruction of hardened targets, various active and passive defence technologies against missiles can enhance the survivability of onshore fortresses. Furthermore, onshore locations give fortresses the advantage of being unsinkable and able to accommodate greater energy and firepower capacity in contrast to vessels, as well as other mobile platforms. The onshore nature of fortresses also gives a different political meaning to being attacked, for the clear violation of sovereignty, as opposed to vessels and aircraft in a disputed space. However, the fact those fortresses are not invincible means cooperation with other existing capabilities still necessary. The case of Vietnam demonstrates how fortresses could strengthen the inferior defence capability of a coastal state vis-à-vis. a stronger sea power.     

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN

Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces.     

North Korea,deterrence, and engagement

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.     

Bi‐objective missile rescheduling for a naval task group with dynamic disruptions

This paper considers the rescheduling of surface‐to‐air missiles (SAMs) for a naval task group (TG), where a set of SAMs have already been scheduled to intercept a set of anti‐ship missiles (ASMs). In missile defense, the initial engagement schedule is developed according to the initial state of the defensive and attacking units. However, unforeseen events may arise during the engagement, creating a dynamic environment to be handled, and making the initial schedule infeasible or inefficient. In this study, the initial engagement schedule of a TG is assumed to be disrupted by the occurrence of a destroyed ASM, the breakdown of a SAM system, or an incoming new target ASM. To produce an updated schedule, a new biobjective mathematical model is formulated that maximizes the no‐leaker probability value for the TG and minimizes the total deviation from the initial schedule. With the problem shown to be NP‐hard, some special cases are presented that can be solved in polynomial time. We solve small size problems by the augmented ? ‐ constraint method and propose heuristic procedures to generate a set of nondominated solutions for larger problems. The results are presented for different size problems and the total effectiveness of the model is evaluated.     

超视距反舰导弹打击水面舰艇编队计算模型

对水面舰艇编队采用超视距反舰导弹进行饱和攻击时,需要计算所需导弹数量。文章通过交战模型原型和损伤积累目标毁伤规律的分析,逐步建立超视距导弹对水面舰艇编队攻击作战的概率计算模型,以确定发射导弹数目与目标毁伤程度之间的关系。     

Incremental approximation of optimal allocations

This paper concerns the approximation of optimal allocations by δ allocations. δ allocations are obtained by fixing an increment δ of effort and deciding at each step upon a single cell in which to allocate the entire increment. It is shown that δ allocations may be used as a simple method of approximating optimal allocations of effort resulting from constrained separable optimization problems involving a finite number of cells. The results are applied to find δ allocations (called δ plans) which approximate optimal search plans. δ plans have the property that as δ → 0, the mean time to find the target using a δ plan approaches the mean time when using the optimal plan. δ plans have the advantage that. they are easily computed and more easily realized in practice than optimal plans which tend to be difficult to calculate and to call for spreading impractically small amounts of effort over large areas.     

A Castle in the Air? The Building,Arms, Action and Incident on the Eleventh-Century ‘Castle’ Capital from Westminster Hall

The restoration of Westminster Hall in the 1830s revealed a number of eleventh-century carved capitals, one depicting, as then described, ‘an armed man assailing a castle’. Aided by archaeological evidence from Abinger (Surrey), the ‘castle’ can be convincingly interpreted as a motte-top tower, carried by earth-fast posts, open-sided below and faced above with boards painted to resemble masonry. It is the only known depiction in elevation of a type of tower that is likely, given its simplicity, to have been widely used in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The assailant, armed with an axe, carrying a round shield and wearing a helmet with nasal, is shown climbing the tower’s external stair at the moment of being despatched or wounded by the defender’s spear. The incident, an individual action rather than a ‘siege’ as such, has many oddities, and may represent a topical event or scene from history or mythology. The story of the Trojan War is suggested as a possible source.     

基于Gauss伪谱法的空空导弹最优中制导律设计

研究Gauss伪谱法在空空导弹最优中制导律设计中的应用。建立空空导弹中制导律设计问题最优控制模型,首次提出采用Gauss伪谱法求解最优中制导律设计问题的思路,详细阐述了求解流程,通过仿真算例验证了求解方法的有效性,并同比例导引、打靶法等传统方法进行了对比。仿真结果表明,综合考虑性能指标、计算精度、计算效率等因素,Gauss伪谱法具有明显优势,Gauss伪谱法求解结果和求解效率与配点个数密切相关。研究结果为空空导弹中制导律设计提供理论参考。     

对抗仿真中防空导弹微分对策模型研究

针对防空导弹与目标的空间对抗,建立了防空导弹微分对策空间对抗模型,并推算得到了最优策略,运用自适应神经网络评判方法对模型进行求解,通过给定条件下的仿真证明了该算法的有效性,显示了该模型可应用于防空导弹与目标的空间对抗问题。