对信息战的认识和对策建议

本文首先研究了信息战的一些基本概念和分类,再后研究了信息战的作战能力和技术,同时分析了１６种信息战功能,提出了信息战技术主要是由以改进的常规电子战技术为基础的技术和黑客形成的技术组成的观点,并提出了四点对策建议     

美军推行信息战困难重重

美军研究信息战理论已历时多年,在海湾战争结束后不久,就鼓吹要用信息战这种新的作战理论取代“已经过时”的空地一体战理论。最近又提出了信息战战略这一新概念。其实,说起来容易,做起来并不简单。美国推行信息战战略举步维艰。     

21世纪:遏制信息战——访我国信息战专家沈伟光

马亚西(以下简称马):非常高兴能有机会采访您,您能不能首先把您这些年来研究信息战的情况介绍一下。沈伟光(以下简称沈):我个人这15年对信息战研究最大的贡献,一个是提出这个名词、这个概念。我的《信息战》一书1990年3月出版,当时人家不承认、不理解,很多人都不敢想象。第二个就是宜传、教育、推广。1995年写了两篇文章,一个是《信息战对军事领域的十大影响》,这篇文章《新华文摘》转载了;另一个是为《解放军报》写了《当代军事革命的重心——信息战》,反响很大,有很多来信。后来我又写了一些文章。     

信息战应确立的几个观念

信息战作为一种新的战争形态,正对世界军事领域的变革发生着深刻的影响,研究信息战特点,揭示信息战的本质,正是为准备信息战指引方向的。分析未来信息战中可能发生的实际情况,并借鉴西方国家对信息战的认识和准备中的经验及教训,以使我军准备信息战少走弯路、早出成效。我认为,未来信息战准备应当确立以下几个观念:     

信息战概论

信息战是军界和广大军事爱好者所关注的一个热点,本专题试图系统地介绍有关这方面的情况。美国在信息战的理论、政策、技术等方面的准备似乎已有了点眉目,可以预见,作为新军事革命核心的信息战正以稳健的步伐迈向21世纪。我们既不能把它看得神秘,认为可望而不可及,也不能无视它将成为一种全新战争形态的趋势。     

信息战实践的复杂性

本文介绍了信息战的内在本质和研究、发展方略。着重分析了实践信息战的复杂性。     

信息战:一个老概念的新见解

本文论述了信息战的概念与功能,主要针对的各级决策。信息战的广泛前景及所面临的挑战和机遇。     

基于系统动力学的信息战模型

根据信息战的内容和特点,分析了信息因素和兵力因素在信息战过程中相互作用的关系,结合系统动力学理论,建立了信息战系统动力学模型;并结合仿真实例对信息战的相关因素进行了定量与定性相结合的分析,说明了制信息权在信息战中的决定性作用,为信息战研究提供了理论参考.     

台湾信息战研究现状

信息战是高技术条件下作战的一种重要样式 ,其特点在近期的科索沃战争等几场局部战争中已初现端倪。信息战在台湾被称为“资讯战” ,也是台湾在进行战争准备时极为重视的一个环节。最近 ,台湾海峡的军事形势日趋紧张 ,军事专家认为 ,一旦两岸战争爆发 ,电子信息战可能会首先打响。因此 ,台湾也正在积极加强对信息战的研究和准备。一、对信息战研究的重视程度高台军认为 ,台湾的总体军事实力与大陆相比处于明显劣势 ,而对信息战的研发 ,风险低、报酬高、投资小、效益大 ,应优先发展。台军方已经充分利用了西方发达国家几乎所有的信息资源来构…     

信息战及其发展

信息技术的飞速发展与应用,信息战理论的广泛研究与探讨,必将在当前和未来的军事领域产生深远的影响。本文介绍了信息战的起源和有关信息战的概念,综述了美国为准备信息战而采取的一些措施,包括关键技术研究与武器装备研制等。     

基于微分对策理论的信息战模型

基于兰彻斯特作战理论,提出了一个新的微分对策模型来研究在交战双方均有信息战系统协助作战的条件下的最优火力分配策略。又运用微分对策理论对该模型进行分析和求解,并对所得到的结论作出符合战术意义的解释。     

Syria and the perils of proxy warfare

The ongoing civil war in Syria is evolving into a ‘proxy war’, in which both the Baathist regime and its insurgent adversaries are becoming increasingly reliant upon support from external powers. Proxy warfare has a superficial appeal for sponsoring states, as it appears to offer a convenient and risk-free means of fulfilling foreign policy goals, which will not incur the financial and human costs of direct military intervention. Using Syria as a case study, this article shows that the conduct of proxy warfare has several potential political, strategic, and ethical consequences, which any democratic government in particular is obliged to consider before it resorts to this indirect means of foreign intervention.     

战区防空雷达组网系统体系结构及通信链路研究

针对优化现役战区防空雷达系统的部署结构,提高其战时稳定性、提升其整体作战效能的问题,提出了一种“雷达组网系统”实用研发对策,并对其具体的系统体系结构、雷达群站系统构成、信息链路等问题进行了探讨和研究。     

现代战争计划的设计

现代战争的战争形态和作战样式发生了巨大改变,传统战争计划的制定难以适应新的作战指挥方式。为提高作战指挥的时效性和作战决策的正确性,对现代战争的战争计划的设计要求和设计流程进行了分析,总结了需要解决的关键技术,对深入开展战争计划的设计研究具有一定的启示。     

A Typology of War Ethics

Interdisciplinary communication on war is impeded by doctrinal gaps concerning its morality, immorality, and amorality. Much is written on ad bellum ethical standards for military force by states, mainly in the fields of international politics and religious studies. However, a necessary first step in comparing these different approaches to war ethics with each other is to develop a system for classifying them. The classification system offered in this paper places war ethics on a grid with two scales. One axis of the grid ranges from permissiveness to restrictiveness. The other axis ranges from regard for self to regard for others. Twelve forms of war ethics are assigned points within the grid, including pacifism, just war, holy war, UN Charter obligations, several variants of realism, cost–benefit analysis, isolationism, and various ideological war ethics such as communist and fascist approaches. In doing so, this paper lays the groundwork for “quantifying” war ethics, to enable measurements of their effects against other state-level characteristics and outcomes of interaction.     

The Clausewitzian fallacy of absolute war

Clausewitz was much preoccupied with the apparent contradiction between real and absolute war. Why did war in history so rarely exhibit the extremes of violence and energy implied in the pure concept of war? Clausewitz’s commentators have usually followed him in thinking that this was a genuine problem in need of a solution, but I want to question that view. I will argue that Clausewitz did not have a coherent philosophy of absolute war, and therefore the contradiction he posited between real and absolute war was equally meaningless – as, too, was his effort to resolve it by claiming that some real wars approached or even attained the absolute form of war. The real problem was not the opposition of real and absolute war, but the self-contradictory theory of absolute war.     

采取仿真模拟技术预设战争实现训练与实战接轨

文章研究信息化条件下局部战争战法。利用模拟作战实验室实践检验、论证完善战争设计理论,普及电脑游戏开发战争想象力,借虚拟数学方式预测战争结果。强化“战争设计”对训练的牵引作用,落实训战一致。强调加强军事理论研究的针对性、前瞻性．综合考虑武器装备、战争战例、军事训练水平、人员素质、战役战术等因素,对未来可能发生的战争进行准确预测。     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.     

军用移动电站战伤修理的若干问题

分析研究了电站平时修理和战伤修理的主要区别,提出了电站战伤评估逻辑图和战伤修理方法。     

Beyond balancing? Intrastate conflict and US grand strategy

Grand strategic theorists share an historical emphasis on interstate conflict, yet in contrast to the more frequent intrastate conflicts, these represent only 7 of the some 273 US military deployments since 1900. We argue that these intrastate conflicts limit the utility of regional balances of power in mitigating forms of conflict that the US may consider inimical to its national security interests. When considering potential changes to US force posture and grand strategy, American coercive statecraft should be theorised along a broader strategic continuum encompassing the full range of conflict.