日本在华遗弃化学武器的环境污染问题

简要介绍了日本在华遗弃化学武器弹药和毒剂的种类、所造成的环境污染与危害，以及《禁止化学武器公约》有关环境保护的规定。描述了遗弃化学武器的销毁处理过程，着重分析了挖掘过程、销毁处理的环境污染和销毁设施发生的部分事故，指出了废弃物最终处置的潜在环境污染问题。     

销毁处理遗弃化学武器中的环境影响评价

论述了销毁处理日本遗弃化学武器中环境影响评价。阐述了处理遗弃化学武器中环境影响评价的目的和依据，重点论述了遗弃化学武器挖，销毁建厂选址等过程需开展环境风险影响评价，大气环境影响评价，固体废物环境影响评价，地下水环境影响评价，地面水环境影响评价，生态环境影响评价，社会经济环境影响评价，环境噪声影响评价，环境健康影响评价以及公众参与等项目，工作内容和程序，同时提出了处理遗弃化学武器过程中环境影响评价应关注的几个问题。     

南京某地新发现日本遗弃化武紧急处理后续环境监测

对南京某地日本遗弃化学武器埋藏点实施处置后,作业场地的环境状况是关系到当地居民能否恢复正常的生产和生活、健康与安全的大事。为了掌握遗弃化武泄漏物对周围环境污染程度及其变化情况,对挖掘中弹坑的抛出土和作业区泥土中总砷含章进行了跟踪监测。     

对销毁遗弃化学武器技术指标的探讨

半个多世纪以来，日本遗弃化学武器对我国人民身体健康和安全及生态环境造成了极大的威胁，应安全彻底地加以销毁，销毁遗弃化学武器的技术指标是选择遗弃化学武器销毁处理技术的一个必要条件，就如何确定销毁遗弃化学武器的技术指标作了初步探讨。     

选择遗弃化学武器销毁技术的原则和程序

中日双方就日本遗弃化学武器的销毁问题开始磋商。根据《禁止化学武器公约》和中日两国政府《关于销毁中国境内日本遗弃化学武器的备忘录》的有关规定,应“最优选地确保人民安全和保护环境”。怎样选择销毁技术才能最有利于保障人员安全和保护生态环境已成为当前我们面临的一个重要问题。试就选择遗弃化学武器销毁技术的原则和程序等问题作一初步探讨。     

日本遗弃在华化学武器的鉴别研究

日本战败投降撤退时将大量的化学武器遗弃在中国境内，并未向中国做任何交代，这些化学武器在新中国成立后的社会主义生产和建设中陆续被发现，严重的危害和影响中国人民的生命安全和生态环境，为弄清事实真相，解决战争遗留问题，认真开展了对日本化学武器的鉴别研究，着重阐述了对日本遗弃在华化学武器主要是对日本化学弹药、毒烟筒和毒剂的鉴别方法和技术。     

侵华日军化学战的部署与遗弃化学武器

8月4日,中国齐齐哈尔市某开发公司一处工地施工时,挖出侵华日军遗弃的5个芥子气毒剂桶,泄漏的毒剂造成40多人中毒受伤住院治疗,其中1人死亡。这一事件并非偶然。类似日军遗弃化学武器造成毒剂泄漏伤人事件已在中国的10多个省发生,造成1000余人中毒伤亡。日军遗弃化学武器的严重后果是日本侵华战争造成的毒瘤。本文将从侵华日军化学战部署的角度,追溯日本遗弃化学武器的源头。     

等离子体销毁日本遗弃化学武器排放气体采集方法选择探讨

等离子体销毁日本化学武器是目前正在探索的新课题,销毁过程排放尾气采集方法是该课题中需研究的内容之一。在认真分析、综合比较的基础上,提出了适应等离子体销毁日本遗弃化学武器的排放尾气采集方法的看法及其须关注的问题。     

侵华日军遗弃化学武器处理困难之根源及现状

日本遗弃在华化学武器问题是中日两国间的重大历史遗留问题,也是关系到中国人民生命安危亟待解决的现实问题.第二次世界大战期间,侵华日军不但在中国战场上违背国际战争法规悍然使用了化学武器,战后还将大量的化学武器遗弃在中国领土之上,严重威胁中国人民生命财产和环境的安全.     

“恶魔”伤人，何时休矣！

据不完全统计,中国迄今遭受日本遗弃化学武器的直接伤害者已达2000余人。侵华日军战败后,将大量化学武器在中国各地掩埋、沉水。50多年来,日军一直没有提供遗弃化学武器的地点、数量和种类等情况,致使许多中国人遭受伤害。 随着中国经济建设、城镇建设的飞速发展,发现新掩埋点的可能性加大。更为严重的是,随着时间的推移,掩埋、沉水的毒剂弹将继续锈蚀乃至渗漏而引起土壤、水源的污染,其后果不堪设想。 国际上,对化学武器研制的限制和对现有化学武器销毁的形势令人担忧。     

防化研究院履约十年回顾

《禁止化学武器公约》生效10周年之际,简要回顾公约生效以来防化研究院参与的履约研究、核查接待、单一小规模设施建设、指定实验室建设、日本遗弃化武处理等各个方面的履约活动,以期总结经验,展望未来。     

INCAPACITATING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS

Military interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons has grown in recent years as advances in science and technology have appeared to offer the promise of new “non-lethal” weapons useful for a variety of politically and militarily challenging situations. There is, in fact, a long and unfulfilled history of attempts to develop such weapons. It is clear that advances are opening up a range of possibilities for future biological and chemical weapons more generally. The treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons make no distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” weapons—all are equally prohibited. Indeed, a sharp and technically meaningful distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” biological and chemical weapons is beyond the capability of science to make. Thus, interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons, and efforts on the part of various states to develop them, pose a significant challenge to the treaty regimes, to the norms against biological and chemical warfare that they embody, and, ultimately, to the essential protections that they provide. Preventing a new generation of biological and chemical weapons from emerging will take concerted efforts and action at the local, national, and international levels.     

论消防部队抢险救援现场的医疗急救

当前我国抢险救援工作面临着新的挑战。作为抢险救援的专业队伍,消防部队只有具备包括现场医疗急救在内的较强的综合能力和素质,才能更好地完成各类灾害事故、意外伤害的抢险救援任务。针对消防部队的特点,提出了抢险救援现场医疗急救的原则和对各类伤害现场进行医疗急救的对策。     

Keeping Nothing Secret: United Kingdom Chemical Warfare Policy in the 1960s

After renouncing an offensive chemical warfare programme in 1956, the UK Cabinet Defence Committee decided in 1963 to re-acquire a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. This article describes how the re-acquisition decision was engendered by a combination of novel research findings, changes in strategic thinking, new intelligence and pressures from NATO. Despite the 1963 decision, no new chemical weapons capability was acquired by the UK and information that Britain lacked a stockpile of chemical weapons was eventually leaked to the public, initiating a fierce debate between ministries over the significance of this leak. This paper argues that non-existent technology is equally problematic for government secrecy, and equally consequential for government action, as what exists. Furthermore, actors' different interpretations of what constituted a secret, point towards a more subtle understanding of secrecy than simply construing it as the hiding or uncovering of items of information.     

仿真在制导兵器试验与鉴定中的应用

制导兵器向信息化方向发展,对制导兵器试验与鉴定技术提出了新的要求.针对这些新要求,介绍了国外制导兵器仿真试验技术现状和方法,论述了仿真在制导兵器试验与鉴定中的作用,设计了制导兵器半实物仿真试验系统及其试验模式.得出结论认为,建立实际飞行试验与半实物仿真试验相结合的综合试验模式,是仿真技术在制导兵器试验与鉴定中应用的发展方向.     

论动物用于生物武器的新角色

文章通过对动物生物武器概念、特点的介绍,分析了利用基因技术改造动物源病原体,甚至动物本身作为生物武器的方式,提出了我国防御动物为主体的生物恐怖的建议.     

All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

ABSTRACT

The popular use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be understood to imply a relationship between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation insofar as it assumes that the separate weapons technologies can be usefully grouped into a single analytic category. This article explores whether WMD is actually a useful construct. It begins by reviewing the literature on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, including a recent study that sought to estimate the relationship between the pursuit and acquisition of these different weapons. It then explores some policy inferences that academics and policy makers may be tempted to draw from these studies, particularly regarding the Barack Obama administration's pursuit of deep nuclear reductions. It argues that many of these policy inferences are premature at best and misleading at worst. It concludes with a call for additional research into the causes and consequences of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and a call for scholars to remain cautious in their desire to draw premature policy implications from their studies in order to be “policy relevant.”     

Deterrence Beyond Downunder: Australia and US Security Guarantees since 1955

ABSTRACT

From 1944 to 1973 Australia attempted to acquire atomic weaponry. This ambition was driven by the desire to contribute to defending British interests in Asia, fears of invasion by China, Indonesia, and Japan, great-power war, and the belief that nuclear weapons were merely bigger and better conventional weapons, that they would proliferate, and that US security assurances lacked credibility. Although the pursuit of the bomb was eventually abandoned, this was not the result of US assurances. Rather, geopolitical changes in Australia’s environment meant that a major attack on the continent was unlikely to occur outside the context of a confrontation between the US, China, and the Soviet Union. This article argues that Australia may soon have to rethink its policies towards US extended deterrence and instead focus on developing its own deterrent.