Mexico: a model for success

In Mexico, a 40 year period of political stability and economic advancement, hailed for its high rates of growth in income per capita, rapid urbanization, and impressive gains in indicators of health and education, seemed to come to a halt in the early 1980s. Since the early 1970s, fertility has declined sharply in chronological association with a new population policy and the implementation of a national family planning program. If in 1940 there was no apparent reason for the Mexican state to have much interest in limiting fertility, such was no longer the case by 1970. The General Law of Population that had been passed in 1947 was laced with the expansionist ideology that dominated demographic issues for more that a century; its pro-natalism had been reinforced by health regulations prohibiting the sale and use of contraceptives and by a penal code that made abortion a crime. Between 1970 and 1981 the total fertility rate fell by about 39%. Since 1975, change in contraceptive practice accounts for the bulk of the measured fertility decline. Between 1976 and 1982 there was a 66% increase in contraceptive prevalence. The government's involvement in family planning activities helped to: 1) develop an effective contraceptive distribution system; 2) circulate extensive information, education, and communication publicizing fertility and images of the small family; and 3) mobilize health practitioners in public institutions to counsel and persuade their clients to accept and practice contraception. The emerging debate over population policy in Brazil may well prefigure debates in other Latin American countries; the recent democratization in Brazil is the vocalization of a demand from women's groups and the left for government provided family planning services. Overall, Mexico's willingness to take the long view tackle the birth rate issue head on is likely to remain an exception in Latin America.     

Initiatives in Africa

Since the 1st oil crisis in 1973, the economies of sub-Saharan Africa have barely kept pace with their burgeoning populations. Women in Sub-Saharan Africa give birth more often than women in any other region of the world, with an average of more than 6.5 live births each. The region's natural increase average 2.5% a year in the 1960s, 2.7% in the 1970s, and in the mid-1980s, it is 3.1% per annum--a rate that will double the regions population in 22 years. National leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa were slow to consider population policy as a key component of the social and economic development effort. The neglect of population issues is reflected in the limited scope of public or private family planning programs in the sub-continent. Donor countries and institutions play an important role in developing the information base by providing technical training to government staff, supporting research, and disseminating information to a broad spectrum of political actors. Some examples of policy reconsiderations in Nigeria, Zambia, Liberia, and Niger are given. These countries are starting to give active consideration to population policies to reduce fertility and high rates of population growth by expanding family planning services, raising the age of marriage, improving the status of women, providing family-life education, and incorporating economic incentives for smaller families into the provision of social services. The highly centralized nature of African governments dictates that the acquiescence of the governmental elite must be obtained before any policy can take hold. Overall, high population growth rates in combination with a stagnating social and economic development effort throughout the region have provided the catalyst for a new look at Sub-Saharan Africa population policy. The ability of African nations to implement policies that reduce fertility is more open to question; no African nation has as yet done so, and the socioeconomics factors contributing to high fertility remain strong.     

The politics of population

This article suggests some of the principal factors behind the decisions by an increasing number of countries deciding that the achievement of their national objectives required a policy for population, and the way that they are likely to work out. By 1983, 35 developing countries had an official policy to reduce their population growth rate, and in 34 others, the government supported family planning activities--usually for reasons of health or as a human right. The number is remarkable given the many compelling reasons that governments have for not attempting anything so difficult as to modify demographic trends. The future results of population programs, in social and economic terms, are very difficult to quantify, thus defying cost-benefit analysis of the desirability of investing resources in this area, rather than in something else. There are also powerful political reasons why a government might well hesitate before embarking on a policy to reduce the nation's fertility. At the very least, it implies government interference in the most private and personal of human relations, an invasion of human rights, and a disturbance of the traditional patterns of society and behavior. For many countries that are pursuing a policy to limit population growth, the decision has been taken only after the grievous consequences of not having such a policy have already become manifest. The critical question is how soon a government will make the connection among political disobedience, economic and social distress, and the population explosion, and adopt a population policy. Although the number of developing countries that have officially proclaimed a strongly pro-natalist population policy is relatively small, many have Marxist governments. Overall, governments have several strategies at their disposal: 1) improving the accessability and the quality of the service; 2) promoting population education and family planning motivation (with the assistance of the media, folk art, and personal persuasion); and 3) applying a judicious mixture of incentives and disincentives.     

Looking ahead in India

India and China contain more than 40% of the world's population, yet in India it is painfully clear that the political commitment necessary to tackle India's greatest problem is not there in full measure. India's present per capita income is less than $300, and nearly 65% of the people live below the poverty line. The average Indian woman produces 5 children; even if the Indian government's efforts to reduce family size to 2 children is successful by the year 2040, India will have a population of 2.5 billion. The possibility that India will succeed in reducing average family size to 2 children appears remote. 30 years ago, India became the 1st developing country to formally make family planning a matter of national policy. In the early years of the national family planning programs, practitioners had access mostly to sterilization and condoms. Over the years, theIndian government persuaded the US and other western donors to give $2 billion to population control programs. Still, the population continues to grow annually at the rate of 2.1%. Government statistics reflect the ups and downs of national population control policies; thenumber of new family planning users increased from 4.3 million in 1974-1975 to 12.5 million in 1976-1977, due largely to a dramatic increase in vasectomies. Tge number of new contraceptive users fell to 4.5 million after the "emergency" was lifted in 1977. The present Indian generation is far more receptive culturally as well as sociologically to the concept of population control than most other developing countries. What is needed now is renewed political committment by the Gandhi adminiostration. India cannot afford to replicate the Chinese way of tackling overpopulation without inflicting human abuses and without undermining its painstakingly cultivated democratic system.     

UNFPA and population assistance

International population assistance in the UN is a relatively recent development; it is only since 1966 that a broad-based technical assistance program in population was authorized by the General Assembly. The desire of developing country members for accelerated economic growth ultimately brought about a change in the views on population. In 1967, the Secretary General established a trust fund for population activities, later renamed the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). 3 principles have guided UNFPA work since its inception: 1) national sovereignty in population matters is to be resspected and adhered to at all times, 2) individuals and couples are to be provided the information and services necessary to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, and 3) population goals and policies are integral parts of socioeconomic defelopment. The areas of assistance by the UNFPA consist of 1) family planning, 2) communication and education, 3) population dynamics, 4) basic data collection, 5) population policy formulation and implementation, and 6) special programs such as those for women and the aging population. In 16 years, the UNFPA has received about $1.4 billion for transfer to developing countries as population assistanceand has financed 4373 population projects in 149 countries and territories. The relation between the US government and UNFPA is tenuous and likely to remain so as long as the US cannot resolve its own domestic controversies over famly planning, foreign population assistance, abortion, which, ironically, is legalin the country. There will always be some sort of domestic controversy over population; the UN has overcome domestic difficulties by framing the arguments properly within the demographic, social, economic, ecological, and political concerns of countries and applying the fundamental principles of national sovereignty, freedom of individual choice, and the link of population and development,to reconcile differences.     

The impact of political instability on the economic growth of ECOWAS member countries

This study contributes to the literature on political instability and economic growth by specifically investigating the impact of political instability on the economic growth of member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). West Africa is regarded as the riskiest sub-region within the African continent. To achieve this objective, this study employed panel data techniques (fixed effects and generalised method of moments) on a sample of 15 ECOWAS member countries for the period 2005–2012. The findings from the analyses showed that terrorism, poor governance, social unrest, youth unemployment, death rate and natural resource rent have negative relationships with economic growth. The findings and policy implications deduced from this study could not have been any timelier considering the recent escalation of instability in West African countries and their fragile growth prospects.     

Indian and Chinese espionage

India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.     

The nexus between military expenditures and economic growth in the BRICS and the US: an empirical note

This empirical note re-examines the causal linkages between military expenditures and economic growth for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and that for the USA during the period 1988–2012. Results of Granger causality tests show that military expenditures influence economic growth in the USA, economic growth influences military expenditures in both Brazil and India, a feedback between military expenditures and economic growth in Russia, and no causal relation exists between military expenditures and economic growth in China and South Africa. The findings of this study can provide important policy implications for the BRICS countries and also for the USA.     

The soft power of migration – a hard task for the European union

The article studies the range of problems that have emerged due to the growing immigration from Muslim countries into the European Union (EU). While describing the functions of immigrants' communities, the authors focus on their political role in the receiving states. The study of the historical development of government–diaspora relations in three cases (the UK, France, and Germany) shows that Muslim communities' political influence does not reflect their economic and cultural role, which in the future might threaten the EU security, unless these countries develop a new approach to an “acculturation” policy.     

The artful use of national power: Portuguese Angola (1961–1974)

In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances.     

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT WITHIN A CONTESTED LAND: THE CASE OF KASHMIR

This paper considers the case of Kashmir to examine the relation between the people of the contested land (Indian-occupied Kashmir) and one of the nation states claiming it (India, in this case) in a game-theoretic framework. The motivation for this paper was whether it was possible to rationalize the lack of democratic space in Kashmir, relative to other states in India (especially since the founding fathers of the country had announced such democratic practices to be the guiding principles of the new nation) and at the same time, a highly rigid stance of the Indian Government on the Kashmir issue. An otherwise standard political economic model is used to capture how the way in which citizens determine their allegiance to one or the other nation state (India or Pakistan) can, in turn, affect the nation state's (India's) policies towards the contested land. I conclude that if the Indian Government perceives allegiance of the citizens to be determined primarily by partisan preferences of the citizens, not so much by their preferences for policies, then the government rationally concentrates on minimizing its disutility due to deviations from its ‘most-favorite' policy. This understanding rationalizes the policies of the Indian Government towards Kashmir. More importantly, it points towards areas that need consideration for any peace-making process to take-off.     

Does Military Spending Really Matter for Economic Growth in China and G7 Countries: The Roles of Dependency and Heterogeneity

This study revisits the causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in China and G7 countries (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA) by focusing country-specific analysis for the period 1988–2010. The panel causality analysis, which accounts for both cross-country dependency and heterogeneity across countries, is employed in this study. Our results find evidence of the neutrality hypothesis for Italy, France, and Germany, the military spending–growth detriment hypothesis for both Canada and the UK, and one-way Granger causality running from economic growth to military spending for China. Furthermore, we find a feedback between military spending and economic growth in both Japan and the USA. Thus, our results do not support that one size fits all.     

POOR PERFORMERS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

World political events since 9/11 have refocused attention in the development, foreign and security policy spheres on ‘poor performing’ countries, owing to the possible threat that some countries pose to the international community. These countries, referred to by the World Bank as low-income countries under stress (LICUS), are both countries that lack a certain minimum of effective governmental authority and countries that have sufficient effective governmental authority but fail to use it for purposes of development. There is a pronounced global interest in integrating poor performers into the world community and its structures. The stress here is on using development co-operation and to identify meaningful points of departure for co-operation with poor performers.     

Seeking a stable future: perspectives on population policy. The legal approach: women's rights as human rights

As it has grappled with issues of population policy, the international community has emphasized that women's reproductive rights are human rights. Scholars have also acknowledged that the right to reproductive health care exists within the scope of international human rights treaties and conventions and that gender equality, nondiscrimination, and freedom from government interference in marriage and family life are also guaranteed. Further protections extend to counseling and health information and referral. The Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development continues this trend by emphasizing the importance of human rights for attaining population and development objectives, calling on governments to focus their efforts on improving the quality of life for individuals, and endorsing the notion that reproductive rights are universal human rights. Reproductive health care options are also influenced by sovereign laws that restrict availability of contraception, sterilization, or abortion. However, universal rights and unrestricted access must be complemented by other factors controlled by domestic laws to guarantee reproductive choice. Such laws cover issues like marriage age, divorce, marital property, child support, maternity benefits, day care, sex discrimination, eligibility for insurance, confidentiality, spousal consent, rape, and sexual abuse. Countries must modify restrictive national laws and promote laws protecting women's rights.     

How do sources of traditional legitimacy constrain popular uprisings? The case of the Kingdom of Swaziland

ABSTRACT

Research concerning authoritarian stability and peace usually investigates co-optation and repression. Recently, several studies argue that traditional legitimacy is also important for stability in monarchies. However, existing research rarely considers how legitimacy constrains rebellions and help the royal family to stay in power. Hence, this article explores the causal links between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of uprisings. The study investigates the relationship with a case study of the Kingdom of Swaziland. In line with my expectations, I find a causal relationship between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of popular uprisings. First, the royal family actively uses traditional legitimacy to justify their rule. Second, the Afrobarometer indicates that the Swazi people trust the King more than citizens in other African countries trust their head of state. Third, opposition actors have limited opportunities to mobilize the broader population against the monarchy. Fourth, traditional legitimacy dampens ongoing protests and thereby hinders their escalation into popular uprisings or political violence. Repression is clearly an important explanation for limited rebellion in Swaziland, but this article shows that also traditional legitimacy sources play a role.     

Resource rents,institutions, and violent civil conflicts

Natural resources have been blamed for inducing slow growth and sparking civil conflicts and violence. This paper first develops a model to account for the hazard of armed civil conflicts as a manifestation of the natural resource curse, which is mediated by the quality of both economic and political institutions. We then use recently published data on institutional quality and natural resource rents to measure the potential impact of the resource curse on violent civil conflicts using a panel of data for over 100 countries in the period 1970–2010. Our model explicitly accounts for the role of good economic and political institutions in deterring the recourse to violence as well as the extent to which they might weaken the resource rents effect.     

The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

Military Spending and Growth: The Role of Institutions

Recent literature on whether military spending affects economic growth argues that the relationship may be a conditional one. We add to this literature by considering the role that ‘good institutions’ play in the effect of military spending on growth. Using data from a sample of over 100 countries from 1988 to 2010, our analysis suggests that the effect of military spending on growth is generally negative or zero at best, and this effect is mitigated in the presence of good economic and political institutions.     

影响现代大学治理的教育政策环境分析

政策环境是政浆活动的平台,当环境发生变化时,就会对决茕系统产生一定的刺激作用。大学作为社会大系统中的一个子系统,其治理必然会受到政治、经济、文化等相关数育政策环境因素的影响。其中,社会政治民主化、市场经济的开放多元化,大学内部文化力量的渗透以及西方大学治理理念的影响,对我国现代大学治理的调适性转变和发展有着深远的意义。