考虑湿蒸汽特性的饱和蒸汽汽轮机建模与仿真

为分析湿蒸汽对饱和蒸汽汽轮机运行特性的影响,首先根据饱和蒸汽汽轮机内汽液两相流的流动特点,分析了汽轮机在变工况过程中由于流通部分压力、蒸汽湿度以及金属壁面与水膜间换热等因素引起的蒸汽流量变化;然后,以某型舰用核动力装置主汽轮机为例进行仿真实验,并计算得到了该型汽轮机在典型变工况过程中的输出功率、螺旋桨转速、高压缸出口压力等外特性参数,以及水膜动态蒸发凝结量、蒸汽挟带液滴流量、金属壁面换热引起的蒸汽凝结蒸发流量等内部参数的变化。该研究成果在核电站和船用核动力装置仿真方面有一定的参考价值,对饱和蒸汽汽轮机的性能分析、运行优化和控制策略研究有一定的指导作用。     

核反应堆紧急停闭后燃料元件的释热

本文用集中参数法导出反应堆紧急停闭时燃料元件释热率对时间变化的函数关系,在此基础上对其影响因素作一些初步分析。对反应堆事故作热工分析,需检验事故过程中燃料元件的热负荷、载热剂焓值及燃料元件温度的变化;应急冷却系统的设计需知道载热剂从堆内带出热量的速率。这些都与单位长度的燃料元件,单位时间内向载热剂释放的热量有密切关系。燃料元件释热率(q_L)就是单位长度的燃料元件,单位时间内向载热剂释放的热量。反应堆发生重大事故时,均实行紧急停闭,这种情况下,燃料元件释热率是一个随时间变化的量,找出它们的函数关系,便于对反应堆事故,例如失水事故、载热剂泵断电事故等进行理论分析,也便于研究停堆后的冷却问题。     

单个燃料元件热工水力三维数值模拟

针对在以往反应堆热工水力分析中采用一雏模型计算燃料元件径向传热及采用固定热流密度模拟包壳外壁热流量的情况,建立了运行条件下燃料元件及其周围冷却剂温度场和流场的三堆数值计算模型.考虑燃料元件功率的轴向分布和燃料芯块热传导率随温度的变化,运用标准k-e模型和壁面函数法模拟了冷却荆湍流流动和近壁区域粘性流动.经计算发现燃料芯...     

基于FAST方法的核动力装置非能动系统全局参数敏感性分析

为提高核动力装置非能动系统参数敏感性分析的精度和效率,实现更加精确的非能动系统热工水力行为分析、识别对系统运行有重要影响的因素,因此采用FAST方法以某型非能动余热排出试验系统的热工水力模型作为算例进行了全局参数敏感性分析研究。分析结果表明:电加热功率、冷凝器换热管污垢因子、热阱温度、热阱压力这4个参数对系统行为的影响较为显著,需在系统优化设计、运行管理过程中进行适当改进、监测。     

建设绿色、文明的核工厂

中核建中核燃料元件有限公司（以下简称公司）是中核集团下属骨干成员单位．是以核电燃料元件制造为主导产业,香料、金属锂钙、锂电池为非核主要民品．集科工贸一体化的国有大型企业：是我国最大的压水堆核电燃料元件生产基地。公司以建设本质安全、运行高效、绿色文明的核工厂为安全愿景．始终坚持“安全第一、预防为主、综合治理”的方针．建立了完整的核安全制度．强化核安全管理．加强环境保护。确保了公司持续、健康发展。     

磁性部件柜失效原因分析及改进措施

磁性部件柜是核动力装置重要的热控装置之一.由于原磁性部件柜是以自饱和磁放大器为基本元件,因而具有一定的缺陷.为了进一步提高核动力装置的安全可靠性,全面分析了原磁性部件柜失效的原因,提出了对磁性部件柜改进设计的原理和具体要求,最后给出了对各有关部件的改进措施.     

模糊控制理论在舰船制冷装置中的应用研究

以蒸发器和冷库作为被控对象,利用计算机进行了制冷系统模糊控制的研究.针对蒸发器过热度和库温控制问题设计了模糊控制器.在理论研究的同时,建立了制冷装置计算机控制和数据采集系统.在VisualBasic环境下开发了蒸发器过热度模糊控制程序.对比实验运行表明:利用模糊控制器和电子膨胀阀对蒸发器过热度和库温进行控制较之用热力膨胀阀控制,制冷剂流量调节范围大、过热度小、蒸发器面积利用率高、装置节能效果好.     

蓬勃发展的中核建中核燃料元件公司

中核建中核燃料元件公司隶属于中国核工业集团公司,始建于1965年,经过40年的奋斗,公司已发展成为以核电燃料元件制造为主导产业,香料、金属锂钙、锂电池为非核主要民品,集科工贸一体化的国有大型企业。公司是我国压水堆核电站燃料元件生产基地,从二十世纪九十年代初到2005年底,已累计向秦山一期、秦山二期核电站、广东大亚湾核电站、岭澳核电站、巴基斯坦恰希玛核电站等多座核电站制造并提供了2700多组高质量的燃料组件,     

“舰船装备维修性通用规范(核动力装置)”通过审查

由我院三系编制的“舰船装备维修性通用规范(核动力装置)”,于1991年6月9日通过了由海军标准办组织的专家审查。该规范对不同型号的舰艇核动力推进装置的维修性工作提出了统一要求。它既是装备订购合同中关于维修性要求的基本参照文件,也是核动力装置论证、研制、生产、使用及退役全寿命过程中维修性管理工作的基本依据,还可作为建立     

主汽轮齿轮机组及主要系统故障分析(Ⅰ)--准备时的主要故障

论述主汽轮齿轮机组主要部件及主要系统准备时的故障形式、特征、原因和处理对策.涉及的部件包括汽轮机、减速器、冷凝器、隔音联轴节、各种轴承, 涉及的系统包括调节控制保安系统、滑油系统、冷凝系统和辅助冷凝装置.     

NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

THE BRAZILIAN WAY

This article examines the positions held by Brazil under the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–present) on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes and on contentious issues in those areas. Under Lula's government, Brazil has wanted to mediate between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to consolidate its position as a strong negotiator and to benefit from the possible gains of this position in terms of greater participation in international institutions. It has also wanted to pressure nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations in order to reduce asymmetries in its relations with powerful nuclear weapon countries. At the same time, Brazil has tried to preserve its autonomy and flexibility to protect commercial secrets and preserve national security in relation to its own nuclear program.     

Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

Icons Off the Mark

In two landmark articles, longtime scholars Kenneth N. Waltz and Thomas C. Schelling have re-emphasized the utility of nuclear deterrence over nuclear nonproliferation (Waltz) and nuclear disarmament (Schelling). While the thrust of the articles is seemingly different, both are rooted in the same intellectual ground: an epistemology that assumes problem-free inferences, drawn from past experiences, are applicable in future scenarios; a foundational rooting in strategic rationality that entangles them in unsolvable contradictions concerning comparable risks of different nuclear constellations, namely deterrence versus proliferation and disarmament; and a bias in framing the empirical record that makes nuclear deterrence more conducive to security than nuclear disarmament. The common normative-practical denominator, then, is to let a nuclear weapon-free world appear both less desirable and less feasible than it might actually be.     

EXTRAORDINARY VISITS

North Korea has the bomb but not much of a nuclear arsenal. For fifty years, it pursued the plutonium path to the bomb in parallel with its pursuit of nuclear electricity. My visits to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex provided a window to its plutonium capabilities. After having made six visits to North Korea, Pyongyang surprised me during my seventh visit last November by showing me a small, modern uranium enrichment plant, which I was told was needed for its new indigenous light water reactor program. However, the same capabilities can be used to produce highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. Following a pattern of having made poor risk-management decisions during much of the past twenty years of diplomacy dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, Washington remains in a standoff with Pyongyang.     

The Moral Dimension of “Global Zero”

Regrettably, moral arguments are largely absent from the current debate on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, complementing politico-strategic thinking with ethical categories could significantly strengthen the abolitionist call. To fill the gap, this article analyzes the evolution of the nuclear ethics of the Roman Catholic Church and especially its position on nuclear deterrence. If this strategy was granted interim and strictly conditioned moral acceptance during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is today increasingly considered ineffective, an obstacle to genuine disarmament, and hence morally unjustifiable. In the new security context, the conditions for the Catholic Church's “interim nuclear ethics” have altered, and nuclear disarmament has become a feasible option and an alternative strategy to deterrence.     

Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Comments that Donald Trump made while campaigning to be U.S. president have raised concerns that his administration will pull back from U.S. alliance commitments and encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms. The new article by Frühling and O’Neil outlines an institutional framework that can be helpful in assessing the risks that Trump administration policies will lead to nuclear proliferation. An institutional perspective shows that important elements of U.S. security assurances will continue to function, and this reduces the chances that President Trump’s actions or statements will trigger proliferation by U.S. allies. The greatest risk to global non-proliferation efforts posed by a Trump administration in fact lies elsewhere, in the possibility that President Trump will seek to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.     

谈侦检车在处置核泄漏灾害事故中的应用

因海啸而引起的日本福岛核电站核泄漏危机,充分警示人类必须做好有效应对核泄漏事故的准备工作。核生化侦检车具有快速标定核辐射物质、确定辐射边界的功能,消防部队应研究、掌握和应用核生化侦检技术,积极做好应对今后有可能发生的核生化灾害事故的准备工作。     

TURKEY AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

As many states in the Middle East are considering whether to embark on nuclear power programs, there is an urgent need to develop confidence-building measures to reassure states in the region that the programs are peaceful. One possible path would be to consider multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle in order to foster nuclear cooperation between states in the region, instead of each state going it alone, which would likely increase suspicions and the risk of a cascade of nuclear proliferation. With its policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” strategic connection to the West, and long-standing experience in the nuclear field, Turkey would be well-placed to take the lead on such a nuclear confidence-building agenda. Over time and under the right political conditions, Turkey could initiate or participate in measures including cooperation on nuclear education, safety and security, research and development, and joint fuel cycle facilities such as a regional fuel fabrication center.     

Effects of Nuclear Technology Export Competition on Nuclear Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

While nuclear suppliers compete in markets, they simultaneously partner in other fields. This produces a delicate relationship between civilian nuclear programs and nuclear weapon proliferation. This study explores how export competition affects suppliers’ conditions of supply related to nuclear nonproliferation. We investigated three export cases (India, North Korea, and South Korea) and identified four effects that competition has on the conditions of supply related to nonproliferation. First, under highly competitive conditions, suppliers might hesitate to enforce the conditions of supply to avoid negotiation conflicts with recipients. Second, suppliers focus on politically and economically attractive recipients while mostly ignoring unattractive ones, perhaps allowing proliferation problems to fester out of view in marginal states. Third, suppliers can build consensus on the conditions of supply to avoid being the only party experiencing negotiation conflicts. Fourth, suppliers can constrain others from relaxing the conditions of supply to maintain economic benefits and nonproliferation norms. The first two effects accelerate proliferation while the last two promote nonproliferation. Although the extent of these effects can vary with changes in nonproliferation norms, they can contribute to our understanding of the relationship between nonproliferation and civilian nuclear programs.