空间维护技术科学试验任务仿真推演系统

<正>本项目2005年立项,2014年6月通过成果鉴定,2014年12月获军队科技进步一等奖。"空间维护技术科学试验任务仿真推演系统"主要开展了仿真推演系统总体设计、系统研制与集成、试验任务仿真推演与分析、模型校核与验证等研究,突破了分布式异构协同仿真综合集成、多航天器卫星导航信号并行生成与闭环实时仿真等关键技术,实现了基于异构软硬件平台的模型、模拟器动态集成和协同仿真,构建了全数字和半实物相结合的仿真推演系统,为任务提供了集成验证环境。研究主要取得以下成果:1首次提出并实现了基于仿真推演系统的多航天装备多任务协同新模式,将仿真推演贯穿于先期概念研究、方案论证、总体设计、系统研制、飞行试验、未来应     

STK三维战场态势研究与实现

三维战场态势推演广泛运用于部队各项演训活动中,提升了作战指挥决策的准确性和科学性。着力研究基于STK软件以陆战场为主的战场三维态势展现方法,重点对三维地形地貌、军事模型、模型运动等关键技术进行研究和运用,仿真了陆空协同立体攻击、栅格化信息网络构建等战场实景。仿真结果在教学、训练、演习活动中都得到了具体运用,其中涉及到的技术原理和方法能够为制作、推演战场三维态势提供参考和依据。     

末段高低两层协同反导火力分配模型研究

火力分配是末段高低两层反导作战的重要环节,分配方案的优劣、分配效率的高低将对反导作战效能产生重要影响。在深入分析末段协同反导作战基础上,提出了火力分配原则,并建立了末段协同反导作战火力分配模型。引入惩罚函数简化模型,并采用MPDE算法对模型进行求解。通过仿真分析,验证了模型的合理性和算法的有效性,并得出末段协同反导火力分配一般规律。     

方案评估动态推演模型设计

指挥机关制定战斗方案后,使用仿真方法进行评估已经成为部队验证方案或计划可行性的重要手段。但目前对于仿真系统的关键引擎动态推演模型如何构建尚没有细致的研究,可参考性、操作性不强,本文系统地探讨了动态推演模型的构建,分析了动态推演在方案评估过程中的作用,设计了军事概念模型,给出了关键步骤的操作、算法、及关键技术,利用该动态推演模型可以构建各种用途的动态推演系统,模型及系统提供指挥员进行战斗方案评估的新的手段,能有效提高我军对方案定量分析的能力。     

登陆作战推演方案评估模型研究

依据作战仿真推演及登陆作战过程特点,基于作战推演方案评估框架,制定针对登陆作战想定的推演方案效能评估指标体系;提出结合主观权重、客观熵权的TOPSIS方法,构建了组合熵权TOPSIS作战推演方案评估模型;基于登陆作战想定,通过仿真推演试验验证了作战方案评估模型的合理性,结果表明,该模型对登陆作战仿真推演方案的效能评估可行有效,克服了复杂性、主观性不足等问题,为仿真推演作战评估提供了新的方法思路。     

基于复杂网络的陆空协同作战体系效能评估方法

针对陆空火力打击作战的体系对抗问题,对体系效能评估方法进行了归纳梳理,分析阐述了协同作战背景下的协同作战体系效能评估的重要意义。基于复杂网络理论提出一种协同作战体系效能的综合评估模型,研究基于OODA作战环和改进功能依赖网络结合的动态效能评估方法,通过构建OODA环和改进功能依赖网结合的复杂网络评估模型,以实现陆空联合火力打击协同作战的动态仿真评估。     

合成分队火力分配协同决策模型研究

针对合成分队火力分配效率和科学性不高的问题,采用协同决策思想对合成分队火力优化分配方法进行了研究。针对合成分队的作战特点提出了3种模型:建立了攻击力量类型相同的多种准则的火力分配模型,建立了攻击力量类型不同的基于双层规划的火力分配模型,建立了具有上级指定任务的分队内和分队间的火力协同分配模型,并对相关模型进行了实例仿真验证。提出的这3种模型能够解决合成分队在火力分配中的协同决策问题,可提高作战指挥决策的实时性和科学性。     

基于多Agent战术行动自主协同仿真系统

将多Agent技术引入到战术行动自主协同作战模型仿真和评估研究中。首先参考美军"任务式指挥"指导思想和诸多协同理论,提出战术行动自主协同作战模型,在分析多Agent建模技术的基础上,构建了基于多Agent战术行动自主协同仿真系统,给出了战术行动自主协同作战过程的推演,最后以一个案例验证了战术行动自主协同作战模型的可行性。     

面向典型任务的有人/无人机协同效能评估

有人/无人机协同作战是C4ISR体系下的一种重要形式。本文以有人/无人机协同执行典型任务为研究背景,针对构建可靠、全面的有人/无人机协同效能理论评估方法的问题展开深入研究。首先分析了未来有人/无人机的协同模式和运用规则;然后采用协同系统综合指数模型,在单机能力模型的基础上,提出了一种有人/无人机编队协同效能评估方法;最后基于Xsim仿真系统平台在典型任务下,通过针对确定机型的多种编队组合仿真推演,将协同效能仿真结果与理论计算结果进行分析对比,协同效能排序的一致性验证了该理论评估方法具有一定的可靠性与可用性。可以预见,未来战争有人/无人机的协同作战将被广泛应用。     

协同满意度的舰艇编队协同防空作战效能评估

针对舰艇编队防空火力协同合作“效果”的度量问题,引入协同满意度的定义,建立了基于协同满意度的舰艇编队协同防空作战效能模型.利用语言变量和二元语义,给出了舰艇编队防空火力协同满意度评价方法,从而解决了编队防空火力协同合作“效果”的评估问题.最后通过一个实例验证了模型的有效性和实用性.     

China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force’

Once dismissed by many outside observers, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone an impressive transformation over the past two decades, emerging as one of the world’s premier air forces. As it continues to modernize, it is focused on becoming a ‘strategic air force.’ PLAAF strategists suggest this means it should play a decisive role in protecting Chinese national interests, field modern capabilities commensurate with China’s standing as a major power, and enjoy the institutional status befitting its role as a ‘strategic service,’ an important consideration given the historical dominance of the ground force in China’s military.     

美陆、海、空、天2010年及以后发展构想综述

对美陆、海、空三军２０１０年规划、２０１０年联合构想、美航天２０２０年规划、海军２０３５年、空军２０２５年进行了全面总结,系统归纳了美军新的能力和作战概念,对了解和借鉴美军事技术革命以来的成果和规划我军２０１０年及以后发展规划有重要参考价值。     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands

ABSTRACT

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.     

The practice of strategy: South African defence in stasis

The article concerns the strategy development processes of the South African Department of Defence in South Africa. It intends to identify the probable causes of the observed failure of the South African National Defence Force to develop appropriate departmental policy and military strategy. Military strategy comprises force development, force employment, force deployment and the coordination of these elements in pursuit of national, grand-strategic objectives. (See Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-first Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, November 2006, 103). Of these four constructs, the article concerns itself only with the first two. The article analyses two complementary approaches to strategy formation: a resource-driven, inside-out model and an interests-driven, outside-in method. The article concludes that the Department is preoccupied with the inside-out method to the lasting detriment of the declared strategic intent of the defence policy.     

空间信息支援下作战飞机空战效能评估方法

空战是空军的基本作战手段,研究空间信息支援下的空战效能对明确空军装备的需求,搞好空军装备和航天装备体系的规划论证与顶层设计具有重要的现实意义.对空间信息支援下的我方战斗机空战效能进行了分析,建立了效能评估模型,并利用算例进行计算,对计算结果进行了对比分析.     

Peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation: The unique case of the U.S. Air Force and Battlefield Air Interdiction

ABSTRACT

Military doctrine assures a nation’s survival. Yet even when faced with a security threat that requires change, militaries rarely innovate but instead adhere to old doctrines that enhance autonomy, reduce uncertainty and claim resources. Existing theories cannot explain an important case of peacetime military innovation when the U.S. Air Force adopted Battlefield Air Interdiction to support the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. A revised theory of peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation resulting from external and internal threats explains not only why innovation occurred with Battlefield Air Interdiction but also why such successful cases are so rare.     

Challenges of institutional coordination in complex defense acquisition programs: the case of the Republic of Korea’s F-X program

Decision-making in defense acquisition programs in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been problematic, especially in highly advanced complex systems. The highly disputed force modernization program for the ROK Air Force’s fifth-generation fighter, dubbed the Fighter eXperiment, went through extreme turbulence during the type selection phase. The gist of the turbulence became evident through poor institutional coordination within the defense acquisition authorities that eventually forced them to rescind the decision generated from their own yearlong efforts, thus basically shooting themselves on the foot. The paper highlights the background of the program and reviews the institutional elements that influenced the decision-making process, and conclude that the absence of an effective coordination mechanism has made decision-making in complex defense programs even more troublesome.     

An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession

This article explores a perennial theme in the literature of strategic studies: the relationship between military theory and the military profession. It begins with a conceptual analysis of this relationship. It then investigates what military theorists themselves have had to say about the utility of their craft. It concludes by assessing the actual influence of military theory on selected individuals and institutions. The individuals are George S. Patton, Jr., and Ulysses S. Grant. The institutions are the United States Army and the United States Air Force in the late twentieth century. The fundamental finding is suggested in the title: military theory can indeed be quite useful in the maturation of military commanders and in the development of martial institutions, but it is not always necessary and by no means perfect. It should thus be studied assiduously but used with caution.     

Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018

ABSTRACT

Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.