The snowball phenomenon: the US Marine Corps,military mythology and the spread of hybrid warfare theory

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the book by Ofer Fridman and seeks to situate the strategic debate on hybrid war in the context of debate on the US involvement in Iraq. It points to intellectuals from the Marine Corps having a significant role in the initial development of the hybrid warfare concept at a time of some reservation in US military circles over COIN strategy as this was set out in the field manual FM3-24. Thereafter, the hybrid war concept rapidly spread and became a conceptual device used to explain Russian strategic intentions in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine in 2014.     

From rivals to partners: AirSea Battle and the US air force–navy relationship

AirSea Battle (ASB) has generated significant publicity, controversy, and debate among scholars, analysts, commentators, and observers of US defense strategy. However, a research gap exists concerning formal analysis of the impact of the operational concept on the relationship between the US Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN). The impact of the ASB operational concept on the USAF–USN relationship is examined across the issue areas of strategy, budgets, weapons procurement, and training. These four issue areas represent important areas of historical conflict and competition between the Air Force and Navy. The conclusion is that ASB is ushering in a new era of Air Force–Navy partnership that advances the inter-service dynamic from “jointness” toward integration. The emergent USAF–USN partnership therefore represents a significant development in US defense politics and defense strategy.     

The Joint Chiefs of Staff,the atom bomb,the American Military Mind and the end of the Second World War

ABSTRACT

The decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.     

美“海军一体化火力控制--制空”能力发展现状与启示

美“海军一体化火力控制－制空”（ NIFC－CA）是美军海上盾牌防御体系概念的重要组成部分。该体系经过多年的发展已初见成效。首先，对美“海军一体化火力控制———制空”的基本概念及内涵进行了阐述，对其主要组成CEC、E－2D预警机、宙斯盾系统及标准－6舰空导弹在防御体系中的功能进行了分析；然后，介绍了美NIFC－CA的6种主要指挥控制模式，并对其协同指挥决策模式进行了分析，得出了指挥决策分布处理的特点；最后，总结了美NIFC－CA发展对我海军海上防御力量发展建设的启示。     

Tarnishing victory? Contested histories & civil–military discord in the U.S. Navy, 1919–24

ABSTRACT

As the First World War came to an end, the U.S. Navy's leadership engaged in a bitter fight over the “lessons” of the war. Admiral William S. Sims and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels fought against each other's irreconcilable positions. Sims argued that the Navy Department's inexpert civilian secretary had hamstrung mobilisation, impeded the anti-submarine campaign, and ostracised capable officers in favour of friends upon whom he bestowed medals. Daniels countered that his administration had masterfully responded to the crisis of war. The Navy's record, Daniels insisted, could best be summarised as “a great job greatly done.” Only disloyal nit-pickers could find fault in its accomplishments. The Sims-Daniels controversy raged in congressional hearings, the press, and in partisan histories written by the protagonists. The heart of the dispute and its uncertain resolution rested in radically different understandings of American civil–military relations, naval heroism, and the determinants of victory.     

The American way of war in Africa: the case of Niger

ABSTRACT

Increasing attention paid to US casualties in far-flung places such as Tongo Tongo, Niger, and headlines claiming ‘secret wars’ have fueled discussion about American military’s involvement in Africa. Though the continent has been a part of the American way of war since the beginnings of the US – consider the early combat actions of US Marines in Tripoli –, current African conflicts are challenging our understanding of war and approaches to winning it. This article examines the ways America seeks to achieve its ends in Africa with a particular focus upon the last 10 years of US counter-terrorism and stability operations in Niger and the Sahel Region. The author proposes unifying American, Allied, and partner efforts through a strategy of Active Containment.     

“These aren’t the SLOC’s you’re looking for”: mirror-imaging battles of the Atlantic won’t solve current Atlantic security needs

ABSTRACT

Discussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force.     

The Changing Nature of Legitimate Authority in the Just War Tradition

ABSTRACT

The legitimate authority principle has become reduced to the issue of state authority. In its current formulation, the state has the sole authority to wage war, and because non-state actors, by their very definition, cannot satisfy this principle, their use of force is inherently unethical. This does not reflect the reality that non-state actors are increasingly engaging in the use of force, sometimes legitimately. As a result, the legitimate authority principle can and should look beyond the state. This article navigates a terrain in which non-state actors engage in the use of force, and in which revisionist just war thinking proposes that the concept of legitimate authority is irrelevant to thinking about the ethics of war. It proposes a principled approach to the inclusion of some non-state actors under the rubric of legitimate authority. This approach draws upon the historical development of the legitimate authority principle and incorporates the factors important to early writers on the subject.     

Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War

Recent tensions between Russia and the United States have sparked debate over the value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One controversy surrounds the extent to which NATO raises the risk of war through entrapment—a concept that scholars invoke to describe how states might drag their allies into undesirable military conflicts. Yet scholars have advanced different, even conflicting arguments about how entrapment risks arise. I offer a typology that distinguishes between the mechanisms through which entrapment risks allegedly emerge on the basis of their institutional, systemic, reputational, and transnational ideological sources. I use the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to illustrate how the purported mechanisms of entrapment fare in elucidating that conflict. In analyzing why entrapment risks emerge, and thinking counterfactually about The 2008 War, I argue that scholars need to disentangle the various mechanisms that drive both alliance formation and war to make sure that entrapment risks do indeed exist.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues.     

Israeli counter‐insurgency strategy and the war in South Lebanon 1985–97

Little has been written about attempts to alter the domestic political systems of these countries, even though this was central to the missions. The latter two cases were selected as extremes on a ‘degree of difficulty’ scale. In Somalia there was basically no governing structure; the US had to build one in order to end the starvation caused by civil war. In Panama the US took over a government in place and had an alternative national leader; the problem was to change the existing state system. The cases reveal a stress on short‐run security issues over long‐term political questions.     

Bringing it all back home: Hollywood returns to war

This essay looks at two Hollywood films Black Hawk Down and We Were Soldiers as reflective of a more general popular mood in the US that accompanied Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ and the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In part this mood was a militaristic one, though this can also be seen as a rather belated response by Hollywood to invest moral purpose in the US military following an earlier spate of hostile Vietnam war films. The two films examined are different in form: Black Hawk Down is a combat film about extraction while We Were Soldiers is unusual for a US Vietnam war film for investing moral purpose in both the US combat troops as well as the Vietnamese enemy. Overall it is possible to conclude that both films contribute to a kicking by Hollywood of its earlier Vietnam war ‘syndrome’ which is likely to have wider cultural and political repercussions.     

‘Just another border incident’: The Rann of Kutch and the 1965 India–Pakistan War

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.     

Holmes’ front: constructing a new face of battle for America’s Civil War

ABSTRACT

In his seminal study of the changing nature of warfare between Agincourt and the Somme, military historian John Keegan proposed that future historians might consider combatants’ emotions in their assessments of the impact and nature of conflict. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of the history of emotions as an analytical approach, but rarely, if ever, is this directed toward the study of military history, far less the history of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. This paper examines America’s civil war (1861–1865) as a case study of the ways in which an emotional history approach might illuminate not the physical experiences of but rather the immediate and longer-term reactions to counter-insurgency conflict through a focus on one specific individual, the future Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. It proposes that Holmes, whilst not a man of the ranks, nevertheless can reveal the wider ramifications of civil war and its emotional impact, both individually and culturally. As a relatively limited internecine war, one not fought by professional armies but by volunteer forces, America’s civil war highlights the ways in which the soldier’s response points us toward the kind of emotional revolution that has, to date, mainly been located within the European nations.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

The inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in weaponry

Thomas Schelling argues that armed adversaries face an inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in their weaponry, geography and military organizations. Inherent propensity is the idea that there are characteristics embodied in the weapons that push adversaries toward peace or war, independent of the goals of the decision‐makers, the political disagreement between adversaries, and misperceptions about mutual resolve and hostility. We theoretically illustrate inherent propensity in conventional and nuclear arms settings using Lanchester and Intriligator war models. Our work extends the Intriligator‐Brito model, identifies when the competing Richardson and Intriligator‐Brito views of the relationship between arms races and war are correct, illustrates the stabilizing/destabilizing effects of alliances, and highlights the importance of arms quality control in the US‐USSR relationship.     

Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict

The end of the Cold War led some commentators to question the relevance of Clausewitz's thought in a strategic environment where low-intensity conflict (LIC) would predominate. On the contrary, however, Clausewitz's understanding of the intensity of warfare, and its relationship with the political environment of any given time, makes his thinking compatible with changing historical circumstances. The current War on Terror, for example, can be comfortably accommodated within Clausewitz's concept of war. However, a move away from Clausewitz in US doctrine has been coupled with a rejection of LIC in favour of the erroneous notion of ‘operations other than war’. Consequently, such doctrine lacks the clarity required for its proper dissemination.     

How do wars end? A multidisciplinary enquiry

ABSTRACT

The cessation of military confrontations rarely coincides with the end of war. Legal and political matters continue after the last shot has been fired, civilians driven from their homes try to rebuild their houses and their lives, veterans need to adapt to their new role in civil society, and the struggle to define the history and the significance of past events only begins. In recent years, in particular, the changes in the character of contemporary warfare have created uncertainties across different disciplines about how to identify and conceptualise the end of war. It is therefore an opportune moment to examine how wars end from a multidisciplinary perspective that combines enquiries into the politics of war, the laws of war and the military and intellectual history of war. This approach enables both an understanding of how ‘the end’ as a concept informs the understanding of war in international relations, in international law and in history and a reconsideration of the nature of scientific method in the field of war studies as such.     

War and peace in contemporary India

ABSTRACT

This Special Issue looks at the importance of institutions and the role played by international actors in crucial episodes of India’s strategic history. The contributions trace India’s tryst with war and peace from immediately before the foundation of the contemporary Indian state to the last military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999. The focus of the articles is as much on India as it is on Pakistan and China, its opponents in war. The articles offer a fresh take on the creation of India as a regional military power, and her approach to War and Peace in the post-independence period.