From show of force to naval presence,and back again: the U.S. Navy in the Baltic, 1982–2017

This article discusses roles and missions of the United States Navy with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea. That particular sea has gained renewed political and military attention following Russia's resurgent and increasingly hybrid-offensive foreign policy. Baltic nations, uncertain of what the future holds, ought to look at sea power and maritime missions in the Baltic, as well as US naval presence in Europe, to draw lessons for future posture.     

Choosing the Right Sidekick: Economic Complements to US Military Grand Strategies

ABSTRACT

Scholars and practitioners of grand strategy agree that the use of military force should be supplemented by appropriate economic policies. However, strangely few accounts of economic complements to military grand strategies have been presented in recent discourse on US grand strategy. This paper takes a first step to fill this information gap. I first assess the role that could be played by economic measures under two types of grand strategies – one focusing on the balance of power and the other emphasising influence and order. Second, I introduce what I call ‘the influence-capability dilemma’ and discuss tradeoffs in adopting certain economic policies in order to help the US sustain pre-eminence in the international system. Third, I discuss how the US should address this dilemma of economic means in dealing with the rising China.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

“Leading from behind”: neoclassical realism and operation Odyssey Dawn

In March 2011, President Barack Obama ordered US air and naval forces to commence Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya to impose a no-fly zone. The decision by the Obama Administration to intervene in a limited and supporting role in Libya is an important development in US foreign policy. Operation Odyssey Dawn presents scholars with a valuable opportunity to analyze and explore how US foreign policy is made and what roles domestic politics and elite perceptions play in decisions to use force. The author argues that neoclassical realism is a useful and compelling theoretic framework with which to analyze Operation Odyssey Dawn. While the Administration intervened in response to perceived external-level threats to US national interests, salient intervening domestic-level variables and elite perceptions shaped and guided the tenor and scope of the operation.     

The Crowe Memorandum,the Rebalance to Asia,and Sino-US Relations

Many contemporary academics and policy analysts have revisited the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914 to predict what may await China and the United States in the twenty-first century. However, few, if indeed any, have specified in what sense this comparison can be made. This paper attempts to fill this gap with a detailed analysis of the strategic parallels between the Anglo-German rivalry then and the China–US competition now through the lens of the Crowe Memorandum. The author argues that the basic parallel between the rise of Germany and the rise of China lies in the challenges they posed or pose to the dominant maritime power and system leader – Great Britain then and the United States today. This parallel also explains the similarity between the Triple Entente initiated by Great Britain prior to 1914 and the Rebalance to Asia launched by the United States in 2011. Furthermore, as in the case of the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914, the most crucial problem underlying the mounting China–US competition in recent years has been America’s deepening apprehension about the development of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and naval capabilities. This development, from the US perspective, is threatening to deprive the US of its most crucial instrument to influence the strategic equilibrium on the East Asian littorals. Based on the lessons of the Anglo-German rivalry prior to 1914, the essay also examines the potential for mitigating, if not eliminating, the mounting competition and misgivings between China and the United States.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues.     

Rising Tide,Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development

Abstract

This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.     

Clustering in defence-related procurement: the case of a Belgian naval construction cluster

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the importance of closer co-operation in defence-related procurement. Led by the decision that Belgium will lead the procurement of 12 Mine CounterMeasures Vessels (MCMV), the case of a potential Belgian naval construction cluster is discussed. The feasibility of a potential cluster is investigated by looking at key elements of a successful naval construction cluster, the Dutch naval construction cluster, and comparing those key elements to the current Belgian situation. Forming a sustainable Belgian naval construction cluster will be difficult. Most of the procurement process of the MCMVs is set on a European tender. In the long run, due to the absence of both a launching customer and leader firms, no party is able to carry the cluster with investments and knowledge spill-overs. In order to keep public support for large defence-related investments, clustering around the MCMV integration system and proactive cluster support is recommended.     

Effective attacks in the salvo combat model: Salvo sizes and quantities of targets

This article considers two related questions of tactics in the context of the salvo model for naval missile combat. For a given set of targets, how many missiles should be fired to produce an effective attack? For a given available salvo size, how many enemy targets should be fired at? In the deterministic version of the model I derive a simple optimality relationship between the number of missiles to fire and the number of targets to engage. In the stochastic model I employ the expected loss inflicted and the probability of enemy elimination as the main performance measures and use these to derive salvo sizes that are in some sense “optimal.” I find that the offensive firepower needed for an effective attack depends not only on a target's total strength but also on the relative balance between its active defensive power and passive staying power. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Trafalgar tokens

Abstract

To mark the bicentenary of the battle of Trafalgar, this paper looks at some of the tokens presented to those who played a significant part in this great naval action.     

美军“作战信息中心”的概念、内涵及启示

自20世纪中叶，美军舰载指挥控制系统中频繁出现一个词“CIC（ Combat Information Center）”，由此，CIC作为舰艇中枢神经，几乎成为美军各型舰艇的标准配置。国内很多技术人员和参考书籍将CIC翻译成“作战情报中心”，这容易引起很多误解。注意CIC用词“Information”，不是“Intelligence”，一词之差、谬之千里，应该译为“作战信息中心”。侧重于对CIC的内涵进行剖析，试图揭示其内在的发展规律。 CIC的演化过程中蕴涵着美军在装备发展过程中的各种试错、实践、经验和教训，美军装备建设的严谨、求实和科学的成份，特别是其技术进步的持续性和连贯性，值得借鉴和思考。     

US grand strategy and the origins of the developmental state

ABSTRACT

Scholars have credited a model of state-led capitalism called the ‘developmental state’ with producing the economic miracles of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This article examines how the developmental state was shaped by the Cold War. US grand strategy focused on accelerating economic development among allies that were under the greatest threat from Communist China and North Korea. American aid agencies became involved in the process of state-building in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and supported economic planning. I verify this claim by contrasting US policies on Taiwan with US policies in the Philippines, which faced a weaker Communist threat.     

The United States and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in East Asia: Connecting Coercive and Non-Coercive Uses of Military Power

Abstract

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is increasingly important for East Asian militaries, but there is little scholarship on how HADR relates to broader national strategies. This article considers US involvement in HADR in East Asia in relation to changing conceptions of national power. HADR is frequently described as use of ‘hard’ military assets to further soft power goals. Looking at recent US experiences, this article shows that HADR also serves instrumental ends linked to traditional military objectives. Rather than considering power as ‘soft’ or ‘hard’, it argues that HADR illustrates connections between non-coercive and coercive uses of military power.     

A model for geographically distributed combat interactions of swarming naval and air forces

This article describes the Distributed Interaction Campaign Model (DICM), an exploratory campaign analysis tool and asset allocation decision‐aid for managing geographically distributed and swarming naval and air forces. The model is capable of fast operation, while accounting for uncertainty in an opponent's plan. It is intended for use by commanders and analysts who have limited time for model runs, or a finite budget. The model is purpose‐built for the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, and supports analysis of the following questions: What happens when swarms of geographically distributed naval and air forces engage each other and what are the key elements of the opponents’ force to attack? Are there changes to force structure that make a force more effective, and what impacts will disruptions in enemy command and control and wide‐area surveillance have? Which insights are to be gained by fast exploratory mathematical/computational campaign analysis to augment and replace expensive and time‐consuming simulations? An illustrative example of model use is described in a simple test scenario. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 562–576, 2016     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

A Re-assessment of the Japanese Armaments Production During World War II*

Abstract

This paper examines the nexus between the Japanese strategy and economic–industrial mobilization during the period 1937–1945. From 1937 to December 1941, the country was engaged in a land war of attrition in China. This war requested an immense amount of resources and was associated with armaments procurement strategy with emphasis in the army. However, the Japanese strategic vision assumed that the state was strong enough to engage in one land war against China and in a naval war in the Pacific simultaneously. The basis of Japanese strategy was a utopia. Making things worse, the naval war in the Pacific was conducted against the most industrialized powers in the world [the US and the British Empire (Britain, Australia, India, etc.)]. Finally, the internal Japanese industrial mobilization was associated with immense errors in armaments production (absence of economies of scale and scope, limited raw materials, etc.). Under these circumstances, the defeat was an expected outcome.     

AFRICOM: hard or soft power initiative?

The United States (US) Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched in 2007, ostensibly to foster African security. Rather than focusing on traditional military operations, AFRICOM also embraces non-military activities such as humanitarian aid and African development. This begs the question as to what type of power (hard or soft) the US intends to wield through AFRICOM. Several US official statements have emphasised the soft power attributes of this military project. To this end, this article seeks to respond to two fundamental questions. First, is AFRICOM a soft power project? Second, how, if at all, has AFRICOM enhanced perceptions of the US in Africa? The article concludes that sceptical and negative perceptions of AFRICOM inhibit its soft-power objective of winning the hearts and minds of the African people.     

To free or not to free (ride): a comparative analysis of the NATO burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania

ABSTRACT

The recent rise in the defence budgets among the NATO members reawakens the free-riding dilemma. This article provides an analysis of the defence spending of two new member states, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Based on the free-riding theory, we explain why some of the new NATO members decide to increase their defence budgets (Lithuania), and others do not (Czech Republic). In contrast to the majority of works which focus either on the US as the biggest spender or on the “old” members of the Alliance, we explain under what circumstances some of the small European states who became new NATO members started to increase their defence budgets even though they do not have to, and the literature suggests that free-riding is easier. In the process, we identify three crucial factors that in?uence the decision-making process in this regard: the level of threat perception, economic situation, and the US pressure.     

Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles

Abstract

If all violence is intended to achieve political effects, what is distinctive about escalation in irregular war? Indeed, what is irregular war? To answer such fundamental questions this analysis employs the principles of strategic theory in an attempt to offer a theoretical and practical framework that will facilitate an appreciation of the subsequent contributions to this special issue. The assessment seeks to articulate how the escalation process in conditions of so-called irregular war might be conceptualized and, via examples, illustrate how certain broad observations may be held to be true. Ultimately, though, the argument emphasizes that the process of escalation cannot be distinctive or follow predictable patterns given that all wars are unique to their time and place and will be affected in their conduct by the contingent forces of passion, chance and reason.