Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict,resistance and co-existence

Abstract

An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed movements in post-conflict settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop in wartime. This political identity is itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by the political ideology, practices and institutions established by the rebel organisation, but also by the relationship with the state and its political institutions. Far from functioning in a vacuum or isolated, rebel groups, especially when operating as alternative providers of governance, build multi-layered networks of relations with the state, the pre-existing traditional society institutions as well as with other domestic and international political actors. The study focuses specifically on two complex armed groups, Hezbollah and Hamas, relying on primary sources as well as in-depth fieldwork on these groups’ socio-political institution (In this case field work refers to both in-depth direct observation of the groups’ social networks and political infrastructures as well direct interviews and meetings with key stakeholders involved in the administration of those activities. The time-frame for the field work spans between 2008 and 2013). The research tracks their multiple interactions with the state through grassroots activism, institutional politics and governance. Despite their considerable differences, at their cores, both organisations operate in a liminal space between open war and fragile post-conflict setting; between grassroots activism and institutional politics; between armed resistance and political accommodation; and between competition and cooperation with the state. As such, they represent useful starting points to begin deconstructing and problematising existing dichotomies still prevalent in studying both rebel governance and rebel-to-political transitions, including the binary state-non-state opposition. In doing so, the analysis highlights the importance of taking into account the often hybrid and multi-layered political legacies adopted by armed groups during wartime and their impact in shaping their political trajectories as well as the potential roles for these groups in post-conflict settings.     

Politics in the shadow of the gun: revisiting the literature on ‘Rebel-to-Party Transformations’ through the case of Burundi

Abstract

This article provides a critical review of ‘rebel-to-party transformation’ scholarship. It shows how three flawed assumptions have underpinned much of the literature: (1) an ideal-typical differentiation between rebel group and political party as distinct by their use or rejection of violence; (2) the analysis of armed conflict as breakdown of ‘normal’ politics, and the study of ‘rebel-to-party conversions’ as a gradual, natural shift from violence back to politics; (3) a failure to integrate the study of rebel legacies into an examination of broader authoritarian legacies. These assumptions have clouded our understanding of politico-military organizations in conflict-torn societies, which combine social protest, armed rebellion, political violence, and party politics throughout their history. Drawing on the ‘no peace, no war’ and ‘armed politics’ paradigms, this article revisits these assumptions through the case of Burundi.     

Rebels & Legitimacy; An Introduction

Abstract

This introduction to the double special issue on the theme of rebels and legitimacy aims to set out the parameters for the discussion. It looks at legitimacy as a concept and at legitimation as a process. To date most of the literature on legitimacy has focused on the state. However, rebel groups such as insurgents, terrorists, warlords and guerrillas have all had claims, and continue to claim, legitimacy as well. How and when are these rebels seen as legitimate actors? Existing suggestions of rebel legitimacy focus heavily on state models of social order and the social contract. This first contribution discusses how to conceptualize legitimacy and how to make it operational. A two-pronged approach, borrowing heavily from Max Weber, is proposed. Legitimacy is investigated based on beliefs and belief systems about what is considered legitimate. This is combined with practices whereby legitimacy is enacted, copied and emulated by the population the rebels claim to represent.     

All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy

Abstract

Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.     

The challenge and meaning of justice in northern Uganda

Even though the peace talks in northern Uganda have faltered, attempts at negotiations between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army are continuing. The current rapprochement between the two sides is the most significant move towards peace in the twenty-year civil war in northern Uganda. Even though the war has been extreme in its brutality, it is little known of outside the region—with reports on the conflict often portraying a protective government pitted against a crazed rebel group. But the issues are much more complex. The article examines the history of abuses and atrocities committed by both sides; the wider implications of the conflict for the north; why the rest of Uganda are seemingly disinterested in the conflict; and the politics behind why northern civil society have little trust in the Ugandan government or the International Criminal Court (ICC). The current prospect of peace has also stirred up the debate around justice and the forms of justice for victims of both rebel and government atrocities. And this is where the biggest cleft between the northern civil society and officialdom (government and international NGOs) resides. The article further examines the implications of the ICC's work in Uganda, and why there has been such widespread hostility towards it from northern civil society. The article also asks if—beyond the end of fighting and terror—peace will really mean that northern Uganda can finally partake in the prosperity the rest of the country has almost taken for granted.     

Legitimacy and the Politics of Recognition in Kosovo

Abstract

How do contemporary secessionist movements gain international recognition of their claims to self-determination? I argue that international recognition is forthcoming when a sufficient number of states believe a claim to self-determination ought to be accepted. That is, states recognize claims to self-determination when they perceive them to be legitimate. To convince outsiders of the legitimacy of their claims, separatist movements invoke resonant norms and symbols in a moral economy that structures decision-making. I contrast this argument with prevailing explanations of recognition dynamics. To illustrate the argument, I examine the diplomacy surrounding Kosovo’s independence bid and unilateral secession.     

Rebel movements in the DRC

Despite a generally valiant effort on the part of the United Nations (UN) since 1999 to bring peace and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the country continues to be destabilised by rebel forces. These armed movements pose a constant threat to the fragile transition in the DRC, and security in the country is continuously undermined. This article examines rebel forces in the DRC from two perspectives. Firstly, it examines such movements as a manifestation of sub-national terrorism. Secondly, it examines armed movements from the perspective of so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’. The view taken in this article supports the scholarly insight and argument that in countries such as the DRC, armed movements and militias are filling power vacuums that are the result of the inability and lack of military capacity of weak states to fight these movements effectively. Specifically, the eastern and north-eastern parts of the DRC have been major conflict zones where sub-national terrorists employ terror as a strategy. In this context, the DRC is severely affected by terrorism – a phenomenon in the DRC that is intimately linked to the failure to effect sustained development and to consolidate accountable and effective governance.     

The effect of foreign state support to UNITA during the Angolan War (1975–1991)

ABSTRACT

State support for foreign rebel groups has become more salient, yet it remains unclear how this affects armed conflict. This paper therefore analyses the effect of foreign government assistance and does so in the typical case of the Angolan War (1975–1991). It argues that South African and United States support greatly helped the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) wage a large and sustained insurgency campaign but was ultimately insufficient to overthrow the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government because it enabled the incumbent government to obtain similar foreign assistance and because the level of aid awarded to UNITA fluctuated strongly, preventing it from engaging in meaningful long-term planning.     

Initiating a cooperative denuclearization effort with North Korea

ABSTRACT

As the United States and North Korea pursue negotiations on a “denuclearization” agreement, the two countries should consider initiating cooperative measures as a way to build confidence and encourage finalization of a complete agreement. Based on lessons from the initial engagements carried out under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), initial cooperation should focus on safety and security, training, and infrastructure elimination. By offering to implement these initiatives now while negotiations are underway, the United States could gain additional insights into North Korean intentions. These early initiatives could be proposed without compromising the US maximum-pressure campaign on North Korea by using the current authorities of the CTR program and carefully designing specific exemptions that may be required for any agreed measures. If North Korea is truly interested in pursuing disarmament efforts, the initial cooperative projects would enable them to begin reaping potential benefits while negotiations continue with sanctions still in place. These initial proposals could also be expanded to include additional international partners such as Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan. Such programs and initiatives would support and supplement longer-term strategies to address North Korean weapons-of-mass-destruction challenges.     

End of the cycle: assessing ETA’s strategies of terrorism

ABSTRACT

In May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives.     

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

In April 2012 a number of former rebels who had been integrated into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) mutinied and formed the Movement of March 23, better know as the M23 rebel group. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has been mediating between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group since 2012, without much success. In August 2013, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued a communiqué after its 33rd Summit of Heads of State and Government, stating that while it commends the ICGLR efforts, the talks have become protracted and a deadline needs to be set. The summit also called for an urgent joint ICGLR–SADC summit to address the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In addition to this development, the chair of the ICGLR is to be rotated in December 2013, when President José Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola replaces President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. To date, the mediation has been headed by Uganda and this has raised concerns over the credibility of the ICGLR-led process, since Uganda has been accused of supporting the M23 rebellion in a report released in November 2012 by the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. One could question whether the Angolan leadership will bring anything new that could have an impact on the crisis. Many expect that the perceived neutrality that Dos Santos could bring to the negotiations may be a positive step towards reviving the talks that have all but stalled at this point. Another issue of interest is whether the joint ICGLR–SADC summit could instil new life into the mediation process.     

Country survey XVIII: The two Koreas' defence economy

In this paper we change the structure of the basic conflict model. This makes it possible to found an economic theory of war and peace. Apart from few exceptions there exist no peace equilibria in the related literature of conflict theory. The aim of the paper is to fill this gap, because most parts of the world live in peace. Further we show that negotiations are possible to avoid a war. The main result is that war breaks out only if the distribution of resources and/or the effectiveness of weapons is sufficiently unequal.     

CONTRIBUTORS

ABSTRACT

Narratives about Brazil's nuclear program are distorted by supporters and critics alike. In Brazil, the national nuclear infrastructure is undergoing a period of expansion, with plans to build new nuclear power plants and industrial-scale fuel production facilities. While Brazil's leaders herald the nuclear sector as a triumph for indigenous science and technology, foreigners view the nuclear program as a dangerous legacy of the military regime. This discrepancy becomes even more apparent in discussions about the ongoing construction of Brazil's first nuclear powered submarine. Brazil's military touts the submarine as a symbol of political status, economic growth, and military might. But from abroad, the military's involvement in nuclear development is considered unnecessary, worrisome, and even irresponsible. These narratives—often incomplete or selective—have polarized discussions about Brazil's nuclear submarine program and caused considerable political antagonism during safeguards negotiations. This article works to dispel myths, highlight legitimate concerns, and explain historical perspectives that shed light on some difficulties that can be anticipated in future negotiations.     

Insurgent courts in civil wars: the three pathways of (trans)formation in today’s Syria (2012–2017)

As part of research on the meso-foundations of conflict, the field of ‘rebel governance’ examines political institutions that regulate the affairs of civilians in wartime as well as their relations with armed actors. Judicial institutions play an important role in this and research has shown that they are widespread among both historical and current insurgencies. However, usually these bodies have been analysed in the context of one hegemonic faction like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Afghan Taliban. What is missing so far is an analysis of different pathways of (trans)formation of rebel courts. As exemplified by the three case studies of judicial institutions in Eastern Ghouta, Idlib and Aleppo, these are shaped by the distribution of power between ‘same-side’ groups, yielding unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar constellations. The analysis is located on the meso or movement level of insurgent social structures, complementing research on the micro and macro levels.     

The Zimbabwe people’s revolutionary army military operations in Makonde district and the attack on Salisbury’s fuel storage tanks, 1965-1979

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army operations in Mashonaland West province with particular reference to Makonde District during the country’s war of liberation. Despite the growing literature on ZAPU and ZPRA in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation there is little that has been written concerning the operations of ZPRA guerrillas in Mashonaland provinces. Guided by evidence drawn from secondary and primary sources the article further asserts that ZPRA adopted a four pronged strategy in Makonde District. This strategy in part was hinged on the politicization of the population on the one hand and annihilation of the enemy forces, attrition and manoeuvre warfare on the other. Again, the article argues that ZPRA guerrillas attempted to capture Salisbury (Harare) in order to conquer the Rhodesian Security Forces’ centre of gravity. It was hoped that the capture of the capital city would Makoni District was of strategic significance to the conduct of ZPRA operations and arguably hastened Ian Smith’s decision to attend the Lancaster House Conference negotiations that led to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.     

The Post-wartime Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi: A Facade Transformation of Rebel Movement to Political Party

Since the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD’s) accession to power following the 2005 elections in Burundi, governance setbacks were of great concern and constantly criticized throughout the post-wartime. This study contributes to the understanding of how legacies of wartime shape post-war trajectory of a former rebel movement by analysing the relationship between main post-2005 features of CNDD-FDD and some key elements of its history. There is substantial evidence showing that the CNDD-FDD leadership, lacking political will for real changes, has continued during the post-wartime its armed movement practices from the maquis era, leading to the conclusion of a facade transformation of CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party.     

Slow failure: Understanding America’s quagmire in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

The United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations.     

Gunflints from Drottningen af Swerige (1745) and Concordia (1786)

Abstract

In the present paper, two gunflint assemblages from well-dated Scandinavian shipwrecks in Scottish waters are characterized and discussed. This attribute analysis has two main aims, namely to discuss the gunflints themselves and extract information relevant to the understanding of the historical period during which they were produced, used, and deposited, and to develop a methodology for the characterization, identification, comparison and discussion of gunflint assemblages.     

THE USE OF REGIONAL DIAMOND TRADING PLATFORMS TO ACCESS CONFLICT ZONES

Rough diamonds are one of the easiest minerals to extract from a war zone. Their high value to weight ratio means that a significant investment can be suitably concealed to evade detection. This attribute generally makes researchers assume that diamond smuggling from war zones to international trading centers is impossible to control—that the illicit diamond trade is like a river, which when confronted with an obstacle, will always find an alternative channel. This is true for the multitudes of African middlemen who smuggle varying amounts of diamonds across porous borders. International dealers who purchase diamonds from war zones are, however, much more constrained in their business and must rely on a limited number of routes to access rebel territory. These dealers almost always use operating platforms in a reasonable geographical proximity to the war zone to facilitate access to rebel groups, transfer cash to diamond buying operations, physically remove diamonds from the buying zone and organise their onward transfer to the legal international market. The multitude of networks that could deal with one particular rebel group and their infinite number of international hideouts is constricted to a bottleneck in these regional diamond trading platforms, without which access to rebel groups is either impossible or becomes a highly costly affair. This paper will consider the principle regional mechanisms by which diamond dealers organise, finance, orchestrate and conceal their business dealings with African rebel groups. Conflict diamond dealers interviewed by the author expressed economic rather than political motivation for their business activities, and in this context this paper will analyse why they have chosen regional operating platforms that conform to regional political alliances.