Book reviews

The Nuclear Question by Michael Mandelbaum. London: Cambridge University Press, 1979. ix + 277pp. £12.50.

Le Désir d'Europe: L'Introuvable Défense Commune by Andre Brigot and Dominique David. Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense national; Les Sept Epées, Cahier No. 16. Paris, 1980. 142pp. + bibl.; no index.     

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

In April 2012 a number of former rebels who had been integrated into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) mutinied and formed the Movement of March 23, better know as the M23 rebel group. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has been mediating between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group since 2012, without much success. In August 2013, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued a communiqué after its 33rd Summit of Heads of State and Government, stating that while it commends the ICGLR efforts, the talks have become protracted and a deadline needs to be set. The summit also called for an urgent joint ICGLR–SADC summit to address the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In addition to this development, the chair of the ICGLR is to be rotated in December 2013, when President José Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola replaces President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. To date, the mediation has been headed by Uganda and this has raised concerns over the credibility of the ICGLR-led process, since Uganda has been accused of supporting the M23 rebellion in a report released in November 2012 by the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. One could question whether the Angolan leadership will bring anything new that could have an impact on the crisis. Many expect that the perceived neutrality that Dos Santos could bring to the negotiations may be a positive step towards reviving the talks that have all but stalled at this point. Another issue of interest is whether the joint ICGLR–SADC summit could instil new life into the mediation process.     

The Challe Plan: Vain Yet Indispensable Victory

On April 23, 1960, General Maurice Challe left Algiers and his position as Commander in Chief there, having achieved a rapid military victory over the rebellion within Algeria. As an airman at the head of an essentially ground force engaged since 1954 in counter-insurgency warfare, he had within 16 months gained the military success everyone deemed indispensable. It proved a vain victory though over an enemy already made irrelevant by rapid developments on the national and international political stage. The enemy, Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), was a two-tiered organization. In accordance with revolutionary doctrine, the military branch, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), supported the political arm, the Organisation Politico-Administrative (OPA), and in this case all operated both inside Algeria and in exile. The strength of the FLN over the course of the conflict had shifted externally to Algeria, particularly under Houari Boumedienne's leadership in Tunis. The major portion of the ALN its Tunisian sanctuary had gradually renounced the costly support of its internal units and chosen to wait in exile for further developments. The freshly formed Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA), also in Tunis, had managed to obtain international recognition, and with this development the war within Algeria lost its decisive character. From an operational perspective though, the Challe Plan belongs to the list of military successes. Four years into a fight of limited tactical and strategic accomplishments, Challe, through his imagination and energy, was able to achieve victory within his short assignment with the resources at hand. Just how he accomplished this feat, as we shall see, is a fascinating example of a successful ‘small war’.     

Abd el-Krim's guerrilla war against Spain and France in North Africa: An adventure setting for screen melodramas

The Riffian rebel leader Mohammed Abd el-Krim Al-Khattabi (1882–1963) became an important early guerrilla leader by successfully initiating extensively organized resistance in the Moroccan Rif against Spanish and French imperial power in the early 1920s. The Rif War triggered a wave of adventure films since the 1930s. This article will look at some of these, especially Sergeant Klems (1971) and The Wind and the Lion (1975), and suggest that they can be seen in terms of the wider impact of screen Orientalism derived from the iconic film Lawrence of Arabia (1962) directed by David Lean. The article will show that these films promoted what it terms a colonial gaze by underlining many stereotyped cinematic clichés relating to the Islamic cultural area and Abd el-Krim's revolt that stretch back to the early history of cinema.     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina

This article assesses Bernard Fall’s concept of Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina between 1953 and 1958. It also investigates differences in the conceptualization of Revolutionary Warfare between Fall and proponents of French military doctrine known as la guerre révolutionnaire. The last component of the article considers limits of Fall’s influence on counterinsurgency doctrine.     

(Re-)emergent orders: understanding the negotiation(s) of rebel governance

Abstract

The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict – seemingly such a ‘disordering’ process. With the recent increase in the examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel movements in their attempts to cement their control.     

Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War

In 1951, the French created a special unit in Indochina, the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), to deal with the unconventional side of Vietminh strategy. Its initial purpose was to destroy Vietminh subversion of the rural population and not to harass Vietminh units. The GCMA developed an efficient process of swiftly taking control of large zones in the Vietminh rear areas through the use of native contact Special Mission teams. These infiltrated the population, gathered intelligence, and established guerrilla bands. This process enabled the GCMA to increase its strength dramatically through this specialised native recruitment to 14,000 men during the latter half of 1953. An important lesson from this experience is that the isolated teams were militarily weak and thus vulnerable to any concerted Vietminh offence. Counterinsurgency thus cannot be successful without an effective coordination between conventional and unconventional forces to counter this vulnerability.     

Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014

This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia’s military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the ‘surge’ initiated under President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil’s intellectual framework for counter-insurgency. Specifically, this article will explain how the protracted engagement with counter-insurgency has shaped the Colmil’s understanding of the nature of the conflict, as well as its attitudes towards its adversary, civil authority and the instrumentality of force. An understanding of the Colmil’s strategic tradition can also help to explain their apprehensions about the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC-EP.     

The Telefunken Affairand the internationalisation of the Algerian War, 1957–59

Between 1957 and 1959 the West German company Telefunken and the Bonn government became prime targets in the French army's campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) efforts to establish communications networks. To the French military, the prevention of sales of Telefunken equipment to the FLN or its allies constituted a matter of strategic importance. To the Germans, it was an act of economic protectionism that exposed France's continued misgivings of Germany. The problem exerted a considerable strain between Paris and Bonn, and even threatened to harm German-Arab relations. The Telefunken affair thus highlights the Algerian war's international ramifications. It further reveals the responsibility of the French military in the internationalisation of that war.     

Argentina and the Bomb

Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda, by John Mueller. Oxford University Press, 2009. 336 pages, $27.95.

Les armes nucléaires: Mythes et réalités [Nuclear Weapons: Myths and Realities], by Georges Le Guelte. Actes Sud, 2009. 390 pages, [euro]25.     

Detection of a Markovian target with optimization of the search efforts under generalized linear constraints

This paper deals with search for a target following a Markovian movement or a conditionally deterministic motion. The problem is to allocate the search efforts, when search resources renew with generalized linear constraints. The model obtained is extended to resource mixing management. New optimality equations of de Guenin's style are obtained. Practically, the problem is solved by using an algorithm derived from the FAB method. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 117–142, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10009     

Book review

Jacques Fontanel, Les dépenses militaires et le désarmement, Editions Publisud, Paris, 1995, 136 pages.

Jean‐Paul Hébert ’Production d'armement — Mutilation du systéme français’, Paris 1995 La documentation française, 221 pages.     

The Hunt for Martín Caballero

While the success of Colombia's fight against illegal armed groups, led by Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia – ejército del pueblo (FARC-EP), is generally lauded as evidence of the effectiveness of both COIN doctrine and security assistance, the configuration of Colombia's counter-insurgency effort remains largely unstudied. This article will explain the success of one of those campaigns carried out principally by the Colombian marines (Colmar) in an area of northern Colombia known as the Montes de María. Contingent factors shaped the success of this campaign, beginning with the fact that the Montes de María forms an area where insurgents, relative late comers to the region, found it difficult to put down deep roots. However, operations to eradicate them were complicated by the inexperience of the Colmar, and by constraints placed by Colombia's Constitutional Court on COIN methods modeled on those successfully applied by the British in Malaya and Kenya. Therefore, Colmar officers initiated their five-year campaign by building up a base of popular support in the towns and targeting insurgent logistical networks. This bought time to strengthen the Colmar's combat and intelligence capabilities, and take the offensive that eventually isolated and killed the leader of the FARC in the Montes de María, Martín Caballero. Unfortunately, the failure of the Colombian government to follow up the Colmar victory by installing a regional and local governments viewed as legitimate by the population, and to resolve long standing land tenure issues, has meant that, so far, the Colmar looks to have delivered a tactical victory in a strategic vacuum.     

Politics in the shadow of the gun: revisiting the literature on ‘Rebel-to-Party Transformations’ through the case of Burundi

Abstract

This article provides a critical review of ‘rebel-to-party transformation’ scholarship. It shows how three flawed assumptions have underpinned much of the literature: (1) an ideal-typical differentiation between rebel group and political party as distinct by their use or rejection of violence; (2) the analysis of armed conflict as breakdown of ‘normal’ politics, and the study of ‘rebel-to-party conversions’ as a gradual, natural shift from violence back to politics; (3) a failure to integrate the study of rebel legacies into an examination of broader authoritarian legacies. These assumptions have clouded our understanding of politico-military organizations in conflict-torn societies, which combine social protest, armed rebellion, political violence, and party politics throughout their history. Drawing on the ‘no peace, no war’ and ‘armed politics’ paradigms, this article revisits these assumptions through the case of Burundi.     

Basic scheduling problems with raw material constraints

One of the achievements of scheduling theory is its contribution to practical applications in industrial settings. In particular, taking finiteness of the available production capacity explicitly into account, has been a major improvement of standard practice. Availability of raw materials, however, which is another important constraint in practice, has been largely disregarded in scheduling theory. This paper considers basic models for scheduling problems in contemporary manufacturing settings where raw material availability is of critical importance. We explore single scheduling machine problems, mostly with unit or all equal processing times, and L_max and C_max objectives. We present polynomial time algorithms, complexity and approximation results, and computational experiments. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

The British government and the end of French Algeria, 1958–62

Unlike France, Britain viewed the Algerian conflict from 1958 to 1962 primarily as a colonial war. The British government regarded Algérie française as an anachronism, which France would have to relinquish one day. Though Britain was no stranger to ‘dirty’ colonial wars, as simultaneous operations against EOKA nationalists in Cyprus continued to prove, it was not averse to displaying a certain smugness at having averted the kind of mess Algeria seemed to represent. Britain's interest in the latter stages of the Algerian conflict centred on four major areas: Perceptions of colonial warfare; de Gaulle's Algeria policy; Algeria and Britain's view of France in Europe and NATO; Negotiating the ceasefire and ending the conflict.     

Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict,resistance and co-existence

Abstract

An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed movements in post-conflict settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop in wartime. This political identity is itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by the political ideology, practices and institutions established by the rebel organisation, but also by the relationship with the state and its political institutions. Far from functioning in a vacuum or isolated, rebel groups, especially when operating as alternative providers of governance, build multi-layered networks of relations with the state, the pre-existing traditional society institutions as well as with other domestic and international political actors. The study focuses specifically on two complex armed groups, Hezbollah and Hamas, relying on primary sources as well as in-depth fieldwork on these groups’ socio-political institution (In this case field work refers to both in-depth direct observation of the groups’ social networks and political infrastructures as well direct interviews and meetings with key stakeholders involved in the administration of those activities. The time-frame for the field work spans between 2008 and 2013). The research tracks their multiple interactions with the state through grassroots activism, institutional politics and governance. Despite their considerable differences, at their cores, both organisations operate in a liminal space between open war and fragile post-conflict setting; between grassroots activism and institutional politics; between armed resistance and political accommodation; and between competition and cooperation with the state. As such, they represent useful starting points to begin deconstructing and problematising existing dichotomies still prevalent in studying both rebel governance and rebel-to-political transitions, including the binary state-non-state opposition. In doing so, the analysis highlights the importance of taking into account the often hybrid and multi-layered political legacies adopted by armed groups during wartime and their impact in shaping their political trajectories as well as the potential roles for these groups in post-conflict settings.     

Rebels & Legitimacy; An Introduction

Abstract

This introduction to the double special issue on the theme of rebels and legitimacy aims to set out the parameters for the discussion. It looks at legitimacy as a concept and at legitimation as a process. To date most of the literature on legitimacy has focused on the state. However, rebel groups such as insurgents, terrorists, warlords and guerrillas have all had claims, and continue to claim, legitimacy as well. How and when are these rebels seen as legitimate actors? Existing suggestions of rebel legitimacy focus heavily on state models of social order and the social contract. This first contribution discusses how to conceptualize legitimacy and how to make it operational. A two-pronged approach, borrowing heavily from Max Weber, is proposed. Legitimacy is investigated based on beliefs and belief systems about what is considered legitimate. This is combined with practices whereby legitimacy is enacted, copied and emulated by the population the rebels claim to represent.