自觉抵制“军队非党化、非政治化”与“军队国家化”错误思潮

坚持党对军队的绝对领导,必须自觉抵制“军队非党化、非政治化”与“军队国家化”的错误思潮。‘‘军队非党化、非政治化’’与“军队国家化”的观点,违背了我军成长发展的历史逻辑,违背了中国的现代化进程,违背了中国政治发展的规律,违背了我们党的政治属性,违背了中国的国家利益和人民利益。坚持党对军队的绝对领导是建设小康社会、实现国家长治久安的根本保障。     

邓小平革命功利主义伦理观初探

毛泽东同志指出:“我们是无产阶级的革命的功利主义者,我们是以最广最远为目标的革命的功利主义者,而不是只看到局部和目前的狭隘的功利主义者”.在新的历史条件下,邓小平同志将革命功利主义诉诸建设有中国特色社会主义的伟大实践,坚持、丰富和发展了毛泽东的革命功利主义伦理思想,形成了独特的革命功利主义伦理观.一、以人民利益为本位,人民利益高于一切,是邓小平革命功利主义的奠基石邓小平的革命功利主义继承了中国传统的民本思想,奠基在无产阶级政党为人民群众的最大利益而奋斗的宗旨基础之上.它主张,以人民利益为本位,人民利益高于一切,为最广大的人民群众谋取最大利益.作为党和国家的领导人,邓小平本人处处以党的利益、国家的利益、人民的利益为重,为党和人民的事业奋斗终身,他多次深情地说过:“我是人民的儿子”.这突出体现在他集中亿万人民意志、代表人民根本利益开辟了一条建设有中国特色社会主义的伟大道路.     

中国军力评估：科技强军的精兵之路

中国国防建设的主要目的是维护国家主权、安全利益、领土完整以及国家和平发展。为此,中国实施防御性的国防政策。防御性国防政策起源于中国的国家发展战略、外交政策和历史文化传统,战略上坚持后发制人的原则。尽管中国与域内有关国家存在领土主权纠纷和海洋权益争端。但中国坚持和平解决问题的立场．并表示今后不以武力侵略他国或威胁他国．也不参与军备竞赛。     

经济模式诱惑精心编织的“陷阱”——读《大战略之战：整体战》

人类历史上的两次世界大战都发生在分裂为两个互相对立的工业生产强国集团之间，尽管二战期间也有象中国这样的落后国家反对外来侵略势力的因素，但并没有从总体上改变这两次世界大战乃强国之间争夺世界霸权的基本性质。二战以来．强国之间在国家利益和体现其各自利益的意识形态上仍然尖锐对立．     

美海军三次介入台海危机

继1999年12月20日澳门回归祖国之后,对中国的国家主权和海洋利益来说,最重要的问题是台湾问题。在我们解决台湾问题的斗争中,美国的作用十分关键。从历史看,台湾海峡一有风吹草动,美国就出动第七舰队进行武力威慑。     

论坚持党的领导和坚持人民至上的高度统一——学习《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》

《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》中提到中国共产党百年奋斗的十条历史经验,分列第一位和第二位的是坚持党的领导和坚持人民至上。坚持党的领导,因为党是领导中国人民各项事业的核心力量;坚持人民至上,因为人民是党执政兴国的最大底气。以史论结合的研究方法洞察这两条经验,明确认识到坚持党的领导和坚持人民至上的高度统一性,这种统一发端于党和人民利益的根本一致。     

美国会武力介入台海军事冲突吗?

近期由于美国推行强权政治和霸权主义连连得手,对我国台湾回归造成很大影响,但如果认真分析一下中美利益的冲突,美国武力干涉台湾军事斗争的可能性很小。 台湾问题是中国内部事务,已被世界各国承认,美国武力干涉,师出无名,会陷入政治被动。 台湾问题是中国共产党在解放全中国时一个历史遗留问题,它不同于国际上的殖民地问题,不同于国际性事     

中国空间安全形势

随着中国在太空领域的不断崛起,太空地位不断提升的同时,也面临着各种各样的挑战,这些挑战既有源自传统政治领域的大国阻挠,也有来自外太空的人类共同威胁。为了应对这些威胁和挑战,保护中国的太空利益和国家利益,我们需要从多方面着手,多管齐下,以维护日益重要的中国国家太空利益。     

从利益认同到价值认同－－加强思想政治教育实效性的必要途径

利益认同是思想政治教育的基础 ,价值认同是思想政治教育的目标。从利益认同到价值认同 ,既有历史的证明 ,又有现实的需要 ,而且符合当代西方个体需要层次理论的合理成分和马克思的社会价值理论 ,是我军思想政治教育历史经验的科学总结 ,既有完成个体健全人格塑造作用 ,也可达到共同目标实现的功能。     

台湾海峡的不对等利益与中国的战略选择

美国和中国在台湾海峡拥有不对等的利益。中国领导人视台湾为中国领土,因此有强大的民族主义和安全动机来谋求统一。相比而言,美国在台湾的安全利益则局限于名义之上,华盛顿试图对中国大陆使用武力进行威慑以维护其地区安全的承诺。     

Britain and Hiroshima

Most historical accounts of the atomic bombings of Japan show little interest in Britain's explicit authorization for the attacks. Meanwhile, the few historians who have attempted to explain it rely on a unitary, rational actor model of the British state that is misleading. This article demonstrates that high-ranking British officials became anxious early on about the strategic consequences of a peremptory use of the new weapon. Therefore, especially over the course of 1944 they sought to engage Washington on the linked questions of the bomb's wartime use and its postwar control. However, these officials' initiatives were rebuffed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who paved the way to the bombings based on a fervent desire for Anglo-American integration, and on a dim understanding of the bomb's revolutionary potential.     

反商业贿赂立法的国际经验及其启示

旨在以世界的眼光观察中国的问题,借鉴国际经验,解决中国问题。不仅介绍了美国、德国和日本的反商业贿赂立法,而且对《联合国反腐败公约》——联合国向世界推荐的反腐败指南的相关规定做了详细介绍。在此基础上,提出了一些可资我国借鉴的立法经验。     

Multilateral defense cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region: Tentative steps toward a regional NATO?

Some U.S. military leaders have asserted that the United States, Japan, Australia, and India and the Republic of Korea are developing multilateral defense cooperation to deter aggression and uphold norms much like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has in Europe. Frequent military exercises and China’s threats to freedom of navigation (FoN) and North Korea’s nuclear missiles comprise the motive force for such cooperation. However, cooperation thus far has been trilateral and minimal, given divergent national interests and dispersed geopolitical locations. Cooperation among Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States is increasing given the threat, but ROK’s public opinion is divided about Japan. Australia, Japan, and India have increased cooperation with the United States but are reluctant to conduct FoN operations with the United States to challenge China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. If China becomes more aggressive and blocks FoN or seizes territory, development toward an Asian NATO is possible.     

TIME-VARYING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH KOREA-UNITED STATES AND JAPAN-UNITED STATES MILITARY ALLIANCES UNDER CHINESE THREAT: A PUBLIC GOOD APPROACH

This paper investigates the nature of two military alliances under Chinese threat. The findings are as follows: First, South Korea does not consider China a significant threat while Japan and the United States have recognized China as a serious threat since the 1990s and the 2000s, respectively. Second, the relationship between South Korea and the United States is a true military alliance for all time periods, but the nature of the alliance has changed since the 1970s. Third, although Japan began to form an alliance relationship with the United States in the 1990s, Japan is considered a more significant ally by the United States. This paper implies that, should China provoke a military confrontation, it might be difficult to deduce a common solution among the three countries because of the different response to military threats from China.     

Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation

ABSTRACT

To an observer, Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons can appear confused and contradictory. The only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons is variously described as a pacifist and non-nuclear nation and as a proliferation threat. These widely varied and conflicting conclusions are understandable given that conflicting messages are sent by senior figures. However Japan’s stance is in fact a coherent, if not uncomplicated, response both to its security needs and to domestic public opinion. However, the security provided by US extended nuclear deterrence underlines and enables this approach. The key policies and decisions were taken in both Washington and Tokyo between China’s first nuclear test (1964) and Japan’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1976). How the United States came to offer this additional security guarantee to Japan and how Japan came to rely upon it underscore this complex stance and are crucial to understanding a longstanding and ongoing security arrangement and source of stability and security in northeast Asia.     

Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a ‘Cyber Power’: From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace

Japan has been overlooked as a ‘cyber power’ but it now becoming a serious player in this new strategic domain. Japanese policy-makers have forged a consensus to move cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create more centralized frameworks for cybersecurity, and for Japan’s military institutions to build dynamic cyberdefense capabilities. Japan’s stance has moved rapidly toward the securitization and now militarization of responses to cyber challenges. Japan’s cybersecurity stance has bolstered US–Japan alliance responses to securing all dimensions of the ‘global commons’ and extended its defense perimeter to further deter but potentially raise tensions with China.     

Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After

The pattern of civil–military interaction in India is informed by the notion that civilians should refrain from involvement in operational matters. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to the defeat against China in 1962. In its aftermath, the belief that the debacle occurred because of civilian interference took hold. Thereafter, politicians restricted themselves to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military. The Indian ‘victory’ in the subsequent war with Pakistan was seen as vindicating this arrangement. This essay argues that the conventional reading of the China crisis is at best misleading and at worst erroneous. Further, it contends that the subsequent war with Pakistan actually underscores the problems of civilian non-involvement in operational issues. The historical narrative underpinning the norm of civilian abstention is at the very least dubious.     

Does Military Spending Really Matter for Economic Growth in China and G7 Countries: The Roles of Dependency and Heterogeneity

This study revisits the causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in China and G7 countries (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA) by focusing country-specific analysis for the period 1988–2010. The panel causality analysis, which accounts for both cross-country dependency and heterogeneity across countries, is employed in this study. Our results find evidence of the neutrality hypothesis for Italy, France, and Germany, the military spending–growth detriment hypothesis for both Canada and the UK, and one-way Granger causality running from economic growth to military spending for China. Furthermore, we find a feedback between military spending and economic growth in both Japan and the USA. Thus, our results do not support that one size fits all.     

新疆少数民族大学生学习心理状况调查研究

本研究以"中国大学生学习性投入调查问卷"(NSSE-China)为工具,对新疆8所高校的少数民族大学生的学习动力、学业成就期望、专业兴趣、学习快乐感、学习意义感进行了实证研究,总体揭示其在学习心理状况上的表现情况。结果显示:新疆少数民族大学生的学习动力并不乐观;学业成就期望有待提高;专业兴趣并不理想;学习快乐感和意义感有待进一步改善。本研究针对以上问题对进一步改善新疆少数民族大学生学习心理状况提出具体建议。     

The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has again emerged as a topic of both contemporary and historical interest in the age of what has been called a global counterinsurgency. However, little attention is being paid to the historical lineage of a COIN doctrine that is being rediscovered and promoted by an enthusiastic group of military intellectuals and commanders as the basis for US Army and Marine Corps doctrine. This article argues that historical claims for COIN success, based on courting popular gratitude by improving economic conditions, are at best anchored in selective historical memory, when not fantasy fabrications. The first argument of this article is that COIN does not constitute a distinct form of warfare, but merely a sub-set of minor tactics. Second, ‘hearts and minds’, so-called population-centric warfare, has seldom been a recipe for lasting stability. Rather, historically counterinsurgency succeeded when it has shattered and divided societies by severely disrupting civilian life. In fact, COIN is a nineteenth century legacy of empire whose uniqueness and impact was mythologized in its own day, and that is unlikely to prove a formula for strategic success in the twenty-first century.