Power,polarity, and prudence: the ambiguities and implications of UK discourse on a multipolar international system

What do UK policymakers mean when they say that Britain’s strategic environment is returning to “multipolarity”? In realist international theory, polarity is a specific causal concept; the number of powers capable of balancing even the most capable other state(s) in the international system (“poles”) is taken to determine the system’s stability. Does the post-2017 appearance of polarity references in British security policy documents therefore reflect some unexpected UK renaissance of realist thought? Or is something else going on, as recent work by Ben Zala suggests? This article will demonstrate that, while UK official usage of the “multip–” word has indeed flourished recently, the term is actually being used in a more elastic, less bounded way than realism prescribes in order to generate other kinds of political effect. Specifically, “polarity” (and its “multi-” prefix) is used to characterise the behaviour of those major states that oppose Western-preferred international order, to elide Britain’s own relative power/status tensions, and to capture an expansive laundry-list of perceived international dangers. The article then discusses five ways in which a shift in polarity could negatively affect Britain; important consequences that merit preparatory contemplation, yet that an imprecise, catch-all understanding of “multipolarity” too readily obscures.     

Case Study Commentary and Analysis: The Moral Sword of Damocles

Case summary, by James Cook (Case Study Editor):

In the final issue of the 2015 volume of the Journal of Military Ethics, we published a case study entitled “Coining an Ethical Dilemma: The Impunity of Afghanistan’s Indigenous Security Forces”, written by Paul Lushenko. The study detailed two extra-judicial killings (EJKs) by Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel in an area stabilized and overseen by a US-led Combined Task Force (CTF). To deter further EJKs following the first incident, the CTF’s commander reported the incidents up his chain of command and used the limited tools at his disposal to influence local indigenous officials directly. Apparently, the ANP unit took no notice. In his commentary on the case study, Paul Robinson considered moral compromise in war more generally. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, for instance, have encountered not just EJKs but also sexual abuse of minors, killing of non-combatants, kidnapping, torture, and widespread corruption. What should the soldier on the ground do if indigenous personnel violate Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) with impunity? Refusing to serve will not right or prevent moral wrongs, while staying on to fight the good but futile fight will mire the soldier in moral compromise. “?… [S]oldiers faced with this dilemma have no good options. The systemic failings surrounding them mean that it is probable that nothing they do will help”. In a concluding note, I suggested that while an individual soldier may indeed have no good options, as Paul Robinson suggests, that soldier’s military and nation at large are obliged to do what they can. At least, they must keep to the moral high ground so as not to give indigenous security forces an excuse to misbehave, and determine the nature of crimes such as EJKs: are they outlaw acts or in fact endorsed by the indigenous culture and perhaps even government? Below Colonel Dave Barnes, himself a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom, analyzes Paul Lushenko’s case study at “?…?the local, tactical level: If a commander is in this situation – where her unit witnesses an EJK or other war crime – what should she do?”     

In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the grips of nations

Security Intergovernmental Organizations, here illustrated by NATO, persist in a “permitted interval” of internationalization, i.e. permitted by its member-states. On the one hand, they are seldom or never permitted to vanish due to member-states' vested interests in retaining them as tools of statecraft, even if their original purposes have become redundant. On the other hand, there is an internationalization ceiling that they must respect: they should not become too autonomous and thereby no longer be suitable as member-state tools. In spite of post-Cold War reform, interviews carried out at NATO Headquarters (HQ) in the late 1980s compared to interviews in 2012 display that a continuous pulling and hauling of forces of internationalization and renationalization have taken place around NATO HQ. The only instance of clear internationalization can be observed in the proactive diplomacy of Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen. There is stiff opposition to the internationalization of abolishing the Military Committee/International Military Staff among minor and South European states, and there is no waning in states' attempts to micro-manage the International Staff. Only external shocks can overcome resistance to internationalizing reform.     

Concept costing for defence projects: the problem and its solution

It is intrinsic to the nature of military competition that the unit acquisition costs of defence systems rise generation by generation. Traditional “bottom‐up” methods of cost‐estimating cannot meet the increasing demands for extensive studies of many options before commencing design and, while “top‐down” estimating techniques are an improvement, in particular by reducing the time required for preparing estimates, they also are inadequate to meet current requirements. A new method has been devised, therefore, further developing “top‐down” methods using Bayesian techniques to make best use of the available information, whether certain or uncertain, and its accuracy established by example.     

The danger of “hybrid warfare” from a sophisticated adversary: the Russian “hybridity” in the Ukrainian conflict

The term “hybrid warfare” is a new one that the West began to use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats. Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis, most Western authors attributed “hybrid threats” mostly to non-state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of “hybridity” in the modern battlefield when practised by a powerful state actor. Russian “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine has already been seen as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods, that have been complemented with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic and information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term “hybrid” is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although “hybrid threats” can come both from state and non-state actors, the Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use all forms of warfare.     

The impact of manufacturer rebates on supply chain profits

Manufacturer rebates are commonly used as price discount tools for attracting end customers. In this study, we consider a two‐stage supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, where a single seasonal product faces uncertain and price‐sensitive demand. We characterize the impact of a manufacturer rebate on the expected profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. We show that unless all of the customers claim the rebate, the rebate always benefits the manufacturer. Our results thus imply that “mail‐in rebates,” where some customers end up not claiming the rebate, particularly when the size of the rebate is relatively small, always benefit the manufacturer. On the other hand, an “instant rebate,” such as the one offered in the automotive industry where every customer redeems the rebate on the spot when he/she purchases a car, does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Computing bounds for the optimal value in linear programming

Consider a standard linear programming problem and suppose that there are bounds available for the decision variables such that those bounds are not violated at an optimal solution of the problem (but they may be violated at some other feasible solutions of the problem). Thus, these bounds may not appear explicitly in the problem, but rather they may have been derived from some prior knowledge about an optimal solution or from the explicit constraints of the problem. In this paper, the bounds on variables are used to compute bounds on the optimal value when the problem is being solved by the simplex method. The latter bounds may then be used as a termination criteria for the simples iterations for the purpose of finding a “sufficiently good” near optimal solution. The bounds proposed are such that the computational effort in evaluating them is insignificant compared to that involved in the simplex iterations. A numerical example is given to demonstrate their performance.     

“What is dear to you?” Survey of beliefs regarding protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism

Up to the present, there is only very little research on how the population perceives terrorism and its threats, even though support from the population is crucial for effective counterterrorism. By eliciting beliefs and subjecting them to content analyses, six factors were found that determine the protection worthiness of a target in the people's view: the potential damage to “people,” “symbolism,” “economy,” “politics,” “nature,” and “image/publicity.” These empirically found factors are in line with factors specified by terrorist target selection models. They differ in the strength of their cognitive representation among participants and, thus, their subjective importance to the people. The first three factors are shared among all participants, whereas the latter ones could only be found in a part of the participant sample. People's judgments of the targets' protection worthiness differ substantially from their judgments of the targets' attractiveness to terrorists, even though the same factors seem to be involved. This study offers an insight into the people's mental model about protection worthiness of targets. Together with classical risk analysis and knowledge about terrorists, these results can form a basis for setting up a holistic scheme for critical infrastructure protection.     

Great-power Responsibility,Side-effect Harms and American Drone Strikes in Pakistan

In International Relations (IR), the actions of great powers are usually assessed through their direct effects. Great powers are generally considered to be responsible for the consequences of their actions if they intentionally caused them. Although there is discussion on “double-effects” and “side-effect harms” in the realms of philosophy and political sociology, these largely remain absent from the field of IR. This article bridges that gap by clarifying a set of yardsticks through which side-effect harms of great powers’ actions can be evaluated, including “capacity”, “historical precedent”, “voluntarism” and “unintentional causality”. These yardsticks are deduced through the Theory of Special Responsibilities, which combines elements of Constructivism and the English School. The theoretical framework presented is then applied to the case of American drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. A number of terrorists in FATA have relocated elsewhere within Pakistan to escape these strikes, subsequently harming individuals in new locations. The article asks: who bears responsibility for the harm brought to civilians by these dislocated terrorists? Analysis from the perspective of the theoretical framework, constructed and applied here, suggests that even if the US may claim not to have directly intended such an outcome, it still shares some responsibility for the harm to innocent civilians.     

“Respect” as a personal attribute in the British Army

This article describes the results of research into the social phenomenon of “respect” as framed by junior members of the British Army, as part of a wider study into the Values and Standards of the British Army. This research was interview based, using qualitative analysis software to detect, manage, and draw conclusions from the qualitative data recorded in those interviews. The data indicated that the primary situation in which “respect” was visualised by the participants was the unit context, and that it comprised a combination of three different strands: respect for rank or “hierarchical respect,” “professional respect” for a person's military competence, and “personal respect” for an individual's character, personal behaviour, and attributes. The overall respect that an individual is given arises from the combination of these three areas. “Respect” as a concept was, in the soldiers’ characterisation, something that had to be earned (except for the “given” represented by rank) and was not stable: a person's fund of respect could go up or down in social value. Respect was also linked to trust: the more respect a person had, the more they could be trusted. Although the unit context was the primary one for discussing their framing of the concept of respect, many of the participants reported a wider dimension in which every human being deserves a basic level of respect simply for being human, and this level could not be forfeited.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.     

Implementing defence policy: a benchmark-“lite”

Most countries put significant amounts of time and effort in writing and issuing high-level policy documents. These are supposed to guide subsequent national defence efforts. But do they? And how do countries even try to ensure that they do? This paper reports on a benchmarking effort of how a few “best of breed” small- to medium-sized defence organisations (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) deal with these issues. We find that most countries fail to link goals to resources and pay limited attention to specific and rigorous ex-ante or post-hoc evaluation, even when compared to their own national government-wide provisions. We do, however, observe a (modest) trend towards putting more specific goals and metrics in these documents that can be – and in a few rare cases were – tracked. The paper identifies 42 concrete policy “nuggets” – both “do’s and don’ts” – that should be of interest to most defence policy planning/analysis communities. It ends with two recommendations that are in line with recent broader (non-defence) scholarship on the policy formulation-policy implementation gap: to put more rigorous emphasis on implementation (especially on achieving desired policy effects), but to do so increasingly in more experiential (“design”) ways, rather than in industrial-age bureaucratic ones (“PPBS”-systems).     

An approach to the allocation of common costs of multi-mission systems

Many Naval systems, as well as other military and civilian systems, generate multiple missions. An outstanding problem in cost analysis is how to allocate the costs of such missions so that their true costs can be determined and resource allocation optimized. This paper presents a simple approach to handling this problem for single systems. The approach is based on the theory of peak-load pricing as developed by Marcel Boiteux. The basic principle is that the long-run marginal cost of a mission must be equal to its “price.” The implication of this is that if missions can cover their own marginal costs, they should also be allocated some of the marginal common costs. The proportion of costs to be allocated is shown to a function of not only the mission-specific marginal costs and the common marginal costs, but also of the “mission price.” Thus, it is shown that measures of effectiveness must be developed for rational cost allocation. The measurement of effectiveness has long been an intractable problem, however. Therefore, several possible means of getting around this problem are presented in the development of the concept of relative mission prices.     

A priori error bounds for procurement commodity aggregation in logistics planning models

A complete logistical planning model of a firm or public system should include activities having to do with the procurement of supplies. Not infrequently, however, procurement aspects are difficult to model because of their relatively complex and evanescent nature. This raises the issue of how to build an overall logistics model in spite of such difficulties. This paper offers some suggestions toward this end which enable the procurement side of a model to be simplified via commodity aggregation in a “controlled” way, that is, in such a manner that the modeler can know and control in advance of solving his model how much loss of accuracy will be incurred for the solutions to the (aggregated) overall model.     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.     

On the relationship between the force ratio and the instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio for some lanchester-type models of warfare

A “local” condition of winning (in the sense that the force ratio is changing to the advantage of one of the combatants) is shown to apply to all deterministic Lanchester-type models with two force-level variables. This condition involves the comparison of only the force ratio and the instantaneous force-change ratio. For no replacements and withdrawals, a combatant is winning “instantaneously” when the force ratio exceeds the differential casualty-exchange ratio. General outcome-prediction relations are developed from this “local” condition and applied to a nonlinear model for Helmbold-type combat between two homogeneous forces with superimposed effects of supporting fires not subject to attrition. Conditions under which the effects of the supporting fires “cancel out” are given.     

Uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimates of operational readiness and reliability in a two-state system

This paper obtains the uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimates of two indices of performance of a system which alternates between two states “up” or “down” in accordance with a Markov process. The two indices are (1) operational readiness, which measures the probability that the system will be up when needed; and (2) operational reliability, which measures the probability that the system will be up during the entire time of need. For the purpose of obtaining these estimates, two types of observations are considered: (a) those which reveal only the state of system at isolated time-points, and (b) those which continuously record the duration of the “up” and “down” times of the system.     

Flexible capacity strategy in an asymmetric oligopoly market with competition and demand uncertainty

This article studies flexible capacity strategy (FCS) under oligopoly competition with uncertain demand. Each firm utilizes either the FCS or inflexible capacity strategy (IFCS). Flexible firms can postpone their productions until observing the actual demand, whereas inflexible firms cannot. We formulate a new asymmetrical oligopoly model for the problem, and obtain capacity and production decisions of the firms at Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to verify that cross‐group competition determines the capacity allocation between the two groups of firms, while intergroup competition determines the market share within each group. Moreover, we show that the two strategies coexist among firms only when cost differentiation is medium. Counterintuitively, flexible firms benefit from increasing production cost when the inflexible competition intensity is sufficiently high. This is because of retreat of inflexible firms, flexibility effect, and the corresponding high price. We identify conditions under which FCS is superior than IFCS. We also demonstrate that flexible firms benefit from increasing demand uncertainty. However, when demand variance is not very large, flexible firms may be disadvantaged. We further investigate the effects of cross‐group and intergroup competition on individual performance of the firms. We show that as flexible competition intensity increases, inflexible firms are mainly affected by the cross‐group competition first and then by the intergroup competition, whereas flexible firms are mainly affected by the intergroup competition. Finally, we examine endogenous flexibility and identify its three drivers: cost parameters, cross‐group competition, and intergroup competition. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 117–138, 2017     

Unpacking the various meanings of redundancy: from refining the concept to military planning

The authors engage in the debate over waste in military force structure planning by rigorously deconstructing the concept of “redundancy.” First, a typology of redundancy is constructed that provides a common framework for identifying variety among redundant structures. These are labeled “true redundancy,” “expanded capacity,” “portfolio diversification,” and “mission overlap.” Further, a number of mechanisms are identified that produce these types of structures, and show the conditions under which planners may utilize redundant structure in the search for optimization. In sum, the article provides refined concepts for analysts and planners to identify when redundancy is deleterious or beneficial.