The ‘African COP’

The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) had been anticipated as the ‘African COP’, not only due to the African venue but also due to the opportunity it would afford African countries – with South Africa at the helm – to steer the debate on a global climate change regime. With the conference now over, lobby groups, international organisations, negotiators, observers and commentators alike have been taking stock of its outcome. Despite the litany of developmental and security implications of climate change, COP17 got underway with little hope that much might actually be achieved. In light of the discouraging condition of the global economy, with leading developed economies suffering financially, states were hardly in a mood to be making concessions that would impact their fiscal health. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached. Questions remain, however, about the significance of the outcome of the African COP for the world at large, but ultimately also for Africa.     

The African Renaissance: Myth,Vital Lie,or Mobilising Tool?

“From Somalia to Angola to the streets of Hillbrow, Africa is on the moue creating its own models. It is this Africa that Clinton and his policy-makers should be looking at and seeking to understand, rather than condemning the continent to being a deoiant example of a Western model whose only hope lies in falling victim to globalisation.”     

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

Dangerous Demographics? The Effect of Urbanisation and Metropolisation on African Civil Wars, 1961–2010

Whether urbanisation promotes or inhibits the risk of civil war is disputed: while case studies usually support the former, quantitative investigations have found either the latter or no significant correlation at all. I argue that this contradiction is due to a conceptual and operational over-aggregation of urbanisation, ignoring its intrastate variation. I claim that a high relative concentration of the urban population and political, economic and social institutions in the largest city – so-called metropolisation – can increase both the motivation for and the feasibility of rebellion in a country. Triangulating case study evidence with a quantitative cross-national time series design, I show that metropolisation significantly and robustly increases the risk of governmental conflict in particular and hence civil war in general.     

They protect us,but are they using protection? The potential impact of HIV on the South African Police Service

The drivers of HIV/AIDS in the South African Police Service (SAPS) and impact of the disease on this workforce are neglected areas of research. Existing evidence suggests that while the occupational risk for contracting HIV is low, there are factors associated with the profession that, if left unmanaged, place police officers at risk of contracting HIV. This study's two aims are to identify the potential pathways of HIV infection within policing services and determine the probable impact of HIV/AIDS on SAPS. Through a systematic literature review on HIV/AIDS within police services, and by analysing selected SAPS human resource data, the causal pathways and impact of HIV/AIDS on police services are explored. The study finds that police officers (particularly male officers) are likely to be highly susceptible to HIV infection as a result of risky sexual behaviours born out of occupational characteristics such as high levels of stress, difficult working conditions, living away from home and interactions with sex workers. The problem is exacerbated by the ‘macho’ culture that often prevails among police officers. HIV/AIDS interventions within SAPS must focus on sustained behaviour change. Further, HIV programmes must equip officers with the knowledge and awareness to avoid engaging in high-risk sexual practices that may compromise their health and the effectiveness of the policing service.     

A blunted spear: the failure of the African National Congress/South African Communist Party revolutionary war strategy 1961–1990

Following a classic Maoist revolutionary war strategy, with both Guevarian and Giapist elements, the African National Congress (ANC) attempted to overthrow, through revolutionary violence, the apartheid government of South Africa. This struggle, which began in 1961 and was eventually suspended in mid-1990, witnessed the general failure of the ANC strategy: for all intents and purposes – and despite all claims to the contrary – the ANC and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (‘Spear of the Nation’) failed to overthrow of the South African state by force, the purpose for which it was intended. The strongest indication of this was that the ANC was never able to establish (Phase One of revolutionary war) effective internal underground structures of any duration within South Africa. This much was clear when the ANC was unbanned in 1990, but was recognised long before: in October 1986, the ANC stated that ‘despite all our efforts, we have not come anywhere near the achievement of the objectives we set for ourselves’. The ANC's ‘use’ of the UDF structures inside South Africa, in this sense, was not the same thing as establishing effective internal ANC/MK structures in the way that they intended. The ANC/South African Communist Parry (SACP) also underestimated continuously the ability of the government to react strongly and viciously to the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’: at least part of the blame for this underestimation lay with the promotion of the armed struggle over all other activities. In eidle, the ANC/SACP were unable to reach back effectively into the country to lead a revolution. In the end, the apartheid regime was defeated not by guerrilla action or by revolutionary overthrow, but through the mass action of millions of South Africans.     

African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?

ABSTRACT

Traditionally the African concept of security concept has been dominated by land-based conflicts with little attention being paid to maritime threats and the protection of the maritime environment. With the rapid escalation of piracy on the East Coast, the African Union (AU) was compelled to develop a joint strategy to address its changing African Maritime Domain (AMD). This was achieved by the AU’s Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) in 2014, culminating in the adoption of a binding maritime security and safety charter in Lomé in 2016. The Lomé Charter should ideally focus the general provisions of AIMS 2050 so that Africa, as a continent, can take responsibility for security and economic empowerment of the AMD. This article considers various maritime security documents against the backdrop of an African context for understanding maritime security, in order to evaluate whether the Lomé Charter, as a manifestation of AIMS 2050, will realise its aspirations. Focussing on security is not sufficient and too much emphasis is placed in the Lomé Charter on restriction rather than development. Strong political will and leadership is required to facilitate implementation, identifying common security concerns to ensure better cooperative and collective strategies in a diverse implementation environment.     

Fund Transfers – African Terrorists Blend Old and New: Hawala and Satellite Telecommunications

Attempts to disrupt the flow of funds through Africa used to finance terrorism have been hindered by terrorists utilizing satellite telecommunications in conjunction with hawala, an ancient system of fund transfers based on trust. This arrangement leaves few records for tracing transactions, a task made even more difficult by the general paucity of investigators trained in the languages commonly used for hawala. Acquiring personnel with the appropriate linguistic skills is one of the steps agencies can take to reduce the terrorist financing that occurs through this unique blend of an ancient system with modern technology.     

The German wars of liberation 1807–1815: The restrained insurgency

In the Age of Napoleon, ‘small wars’ and ‘revolutionary war’ were closely connected. There were, however, different strands of this phenomenon: speaking professionally, conservative officers condemned small wars as an irregular regression to previous less disciplined forms of warfare. The Prussian state continually tried to discipline and regulate spontaneous risings. Yet the irregular character of small wars offered the opportunities for a less complex way of fighting, thus enabling the arming of the ‘people’ to fight. Individual undertakings, such as Ferdinand von Schill's doomed campaign in 1809, were designed to spark off a general popular uprising. But they were cheered by many and supported by few. Meanwhile, Neidhardt von Gneisenau conceived guerrilla-style Landsturm home-defence forces, which were designed for an irregular people's war. These concepts were put into practice in the ‘war of freedom’ – or ‘war of liberation’ – in 1813. Eventually both the mobilisation and the tactics remained regular, however, despite the emphatic appeal to a national ‘people's war’.     

An Unlikely Alliance: Portuguese and South African Airpower in Angola, 1968–1974

The war that Portugal was obliged to fight in Africa began in 1961 and immediately stretched the resources of its armed forces. Nowhere was this thinness more apparent than in policing the vast territory of Angola. The east and southeast of Angola were particularly vulnerable, as the area was a vast, sparsely populated region characterised by enormous featureless plains or chanas covered in tall grass and broken by an extensive river system and mountainous forests. The only military solution to policing these immense spaces was aviation and specifically the helicopter that could carry troops into battle, protect them with a gunship and bring them home when the operation was concluded. The immediate problem for the Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa or FAP) in Angola and elsewhere was a scarcity of helicopters. The solution was an alliance with South Africa, which had a strong inventory of Alouette IIIs, to help in policing the east. This move was likewise in the interest of South Africa, as its threat came from Zambia through south-eastern Angola. This article examines the strategic and tactical development of this unusual, cross-cultural alliance and the symbiotic relationship that resulted in destruction of the enemies of both in Angola.     

The rising unit cost of defence equipment — The reasons and the results

This paper constructs a conceptual model for the selection of defence equipment providing best value for money. It then shows how the unit cost of the chosen equipment increases between one generation of equipment and its successor because of developments in the perceived threat, the available technology and industrial productivity, and demonstrates that unit cost increases can arise from a logical and rational procurement policy and are not necessarily caused by technological chimeras and military vainglory. The resulting persistent rise in unit cost is unlikely to be significantly slowed by any of the counter‐measures yet proposed.

The paper then discusses the policies which nations have adopted to accommodate past increases in unit cost, and the options which confront any nation at the point when it can no longer afford to re‐equip a particular element of its armed forces.