De Gaulle,the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian war

Rejecting the orthodoxy of French diplomatic historiography that de Gaulle was the founder of a new French independence and effected a revolution in French diplomacy after freeing himself from the Algerian yoke in 1962, this essay argues that de Gaulle sought from 1958 to make Algeria a central plank of his diplomatic strategy. That strategy sought to transform the relationship with Algeria in order forit to become the key to a neo-colonial French community, the basis for French leadership in Europe and the foundation of a new relationship of equality with Britain and the United States. However, largely as a result of de Gaulle's own making this policy failed to materialise.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

sor networks, and gives the fe

introduce the clustering algorithm. New algorithm improves the query efficiency。wireless sensor network, routing; rumor routing, clu     

Strategy,Fleet Logistics,and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 1943–1944

In modern warfare at and from the sea, logistics are crucially important to the implementation of strategy and conduct of operational campaigns. Between August 1943 and March 1944, a British joint service mission led by Major-General John Lethbridge travelled to North America, the Pacific, and India to study the organisation, equipment, and methods necessary for coming offensive operations against Japan. The British obtained valuable information from the Americans and connected with those countries of the British Empire most directly involved. The Lethbridge Mission's progress and findings informed evolving Admiralty planning for supporting naval forces to be sent to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in pursuance of British wartime strategy.     

The Telefunken Affairand the internationalisation of the Algerian War, 1957–59

Between 1957 and 1959 the West German company Telefunken and the Bonn government became prime targets in the French army's campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) efforts to establish communications networks. To the French military, the prevention of sales of Telefunken equipment to the FLN or its allies constituted a matter of strategic importance. To the Germans, it was an act of economic protectionism that exposed France's continued misgivings of Germany. The problem exerted a considerable strain between Paris and Bonn, and even threatened to harm German-Arab relations. The Telefunken affair thus highlights the Algerian war's international ramifications. It further reveals the responsibility of the French military in the internationalisation of that war.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Nuclear weapons,existential threats,and the stability–instability paradox

Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.     

Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front, 2001–2006

Analytical focus on military operations in Iraq continue to overshadow analysis of the war in Afghanistan as it enters its sixth year. It is now possible to discern several clearly-delineated periods of coalition counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. What is the nature of the war and how has it evolved? Has there been success so far in Afghanistan?     

‘Winston has gone mad’: Churchill,the British Admiralty,and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power

As Chancellor of the Exchequer during the late 1920s, Winston Churchill was at the center of British strategic decision making about how to respond to the naval challenge posed by Japan's rise as a rival sea power. Churchill downplayed the likelihood of war with Japan. The leadership of the Royal Navy disagreed: they saw Japan as a dangerous threat to the security of the British Empire. Examining this dispute between Churchill and the Admiralty highlights the awkward political, economic, and strategic tradeoffs confronting British leaders between the world wars.     

Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014

This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia’s military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the ‘surge’ initiated under President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil’s intellectual framework for counter-insurgency. Specifically, this article will explain how the protracted engagement with counter-insurgency has shaped the Colmil’s understanding of the nature of the conflict, as well as its attitudes towards its adversary, civil authority and the instrumentality of force. An understanding of the Colmil’s strategic tradition can also help to explain their apprehensions about the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC-EP.     

New Evidence on the Original Setup of the ‘Tilbury Group’, Formerly in the Tower of London

Abstract

An argument is presented that Valentine Green’s mezzotint engraving ‘Queen Elizabeth at the Head of her Army at Tilbury-Fort, A.D. 1588’ (1792) was inspired by the late 18th-century life-sized group of three figures representing the same subject that was formerly on show at the Tower of London. The mezzotint presented in Acta Historica Reginarum Angliae is the only known image of the original pre-1828 setup of the display, showing the figure of the queen in a skirt-like piece of armour that has since been re-identified as King Henry VIII’s tonlet armour.     

Traffickers,terrorists, and a ‘new security challenge’: Russian counternarcotics strategy and the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade

The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the massive expansion of drug use and trade in Russia. The country now has one of the largest populations of injecting drug users in the world and has become the largest single-country market for Afghan heroin. In 2003 the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade was created to coordinate a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy appropriate to the scale of this threat. The service continues to face a number of challenges in its early stages of development. However, it has made considerable advances in improving responses to large-scale organised crime and in building international cooperation.     

Forging the Anglo‐American global defence partnership: Harold Wilson,Lyndon Johnson and the Washington summit,December 1964

This article investigates the initial phase of the relationship between the Harold Wilson government and the Lyndon Johnson administration. Despite the generally held view that relations between these two countries were neither warm or close or that Wilson was more anxious to establish a close partnership with the United States than Johnson was with Britain, the article will show that this view is rather superficial. On the contrary, it was the Johnson administration which lacked confidence in dealing with the Wilson government for several reasons. The British leadership fought its corner very well, and used Britain's ability to play a world role as a means of influencing the USA. Indeed, no other single Western ally was equal to the USA, and thus a close relationship with the USA did not necessarily mean that the other country had to have equal power and strength to the USA.     

Eight Lost Years? Nixon,Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977

The years following the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 have generally been seen as a period of neglect in US non-proliferation policy. While joining recent scholarship questioning this, the article also shows that the policies that emerged from the Nixon–Ford years were the product of a broad range of factors that constrained both the United States’ ability and willingness to build an effective non-proliferation regime. These included the Nixon administration’s initial skepticism regarding the NPT, as well as the global dispersion of power away from the US, combined with the continued importance of anti-Soviet containment.     

Hardening the Hard,Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and China’s Regional Strategy

There is a growing view that the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy in recent years is increasingly assertive. This article attempts to make better sense of this perceived more forceful Chinese diplomacy. It argues that Chinese regional behavior is more profitably understood through the lens of a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects. One is a tougher and more uncompromising approach toward issues that China regards as concerning its core interests. The other is a more flexible and cooperative position toward interests that, while significant, are of secondary importance.