Does Income Inequality Derive the Separatist Terrorism in Turkey?

Separatist terrorism has been a severe problem for Turkey since the mid-1980s. The conventional wisdom contends that economic deprivation in southeastern Turkey is the fundamental reason for the long-running battle against the Kurdish rebels. Considering that there is limited empirical literature on the roots of terrorism in Turkey, yielding conflicting results about the claim that the main cause of terrorism is deprived economic conditions, this study aims to answer whether there is a causal relationship between income inequality and separatist terrorism in Turkey. To this end, the Global Terrorism Data Base for the period of 1973–2006, two Theil indices of pay inequality as proxy for income inequality, and the vector autoregression and Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) methods are utilized. The results support the early findings that income inequality, a particular focus in this paper and an essential indicator of economic deprivation, is not a main cause of escalation of separatist terrorism in Turkey.     

An Ideological Response to Combating Terrorism – The Singapore Perspective

The article examines alternative strategies to combating the scourge of terrorism beyond military approaches. There is now more realization, especially after the difficulties experienced in Iraq today, that an innovative multi-pronged mix of methods is needed to combat international terrorism. The paper looks at an ideological response towards combating terrorism by looking at the Singapore experience. The Singapore government recognizes the importance of an ideological response as an integral part of counterterrorism measures. Terrorism occurs when opportunity, motivation and capability meet. The prevention of terrorism requires the elimination of at least one of these three factors- motivation- often driven by ideology. The paper will look at direct and indirect initiatives undertaken in Singapore to combat terrorism and will also look at the Muslim community in Singapore's response to the threat to Singapore society. Lastly, the article will examine some lessons learnt from the Singapore experience in applying an ideological approach in combating terrorism as well as some recommendations of what more can be done to move forward.     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?

Military units on missions abroad face, among other challenges, terrorism. Terrorists are hard to recognize since they operate non-uniformed. Detection of terrorists in the area of operation can best be done by winning the trust of the local population, who can provide information. However, since the military rotates its units regularly, it is hard to build up a trusting relationship with the local population. Other players in the field of international operations are civil aid organisations. They remain in the area for a lengthy period of time, and often build up trusting relationships with the local population. Trust between civil aid organisations and the military is a triple edged sword, as it enables co-operation: the civil aid organisations get the protection they need from the military, the military gets the information it needs through civil aid organisations and the local population is supported in rebuilding society by repressing terrorism.     

Terrorism in West Africa: Real,emerging or imagined threats?

This essay locates the West African region in the context of the post-9/11 discourses on terrorism and counter-terrorism, particularly as it relates to the global war on terror. It identifies and analyses the issues and challenges that flow from the integration of West Africa into hegemonic transnational/globalised security arrangements, and the ways in which the emerging state (militaristic) and globalised security framework could reinforce or, paradoxically, undermine regional, intranational human and environmental security in one of Africa's most troubled regions. It critically examines the possibility of a terrorist threat in the region and analyses the global stakes involved in integrating West Africa into the global war on terror. On this basis, it concludes that zero-sum, militarist, globally driven solutions may fail to address the historical, political, and socio-economic roots of a possible terrorist threat in West Africa.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

Terrorism research: should we focus on the opponent or on our own people?

In terrorism research, three different sources of information and data exist: the terrorists and their environment; the incidents; and the population. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research that is concerned with, or relies on, any of the mentioned sources. An in-depth understanding of the methodological issues that come with these sources is important to correctly interpret results from scientific studies. It is highlighted how the different scientific approaches add to a holistic view of terrorism as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the double-edged sword of information in the field of terrorism is discussed. From these deliberations, guidance concerning the future work of both scholars and decision-makers can be deducted.     

Words and Their Connotations

<正>A distinctiona is often made in talking about the meaning of a word between its denotation and its connotation;both of them concern the relation of a word to the world.I am going to considerone fundamental aspect about word meaning:the connotation of word.     

Defense–Growth Causality: Considerations of Regime-Switching and Time- and Country-Varying Effects

This paper develops a panel smooth transition vector autoregressive model to investigate the economic growth–defense causality. This model simultaneously resolves the estimation problems of endogeneity, heterogeneity, and nonlinearity. Empirical results support that the causality is bidirectional, nonlinear, time- and country-varying. Economic growth has a negative impact on military spending and vice versa. The larger the HDI, the smaller the negative causality. Evidently, the increase in the level of country development can reduce the negative impact of military outlays on economic growth. Reducing the ratio of military spending to GDP is beneficial for countries with low HDI scores; however, moderately increasing the share of military expenditure is favorable for countries with extremely high HDI scores. Policy authority needs to set optimal education, health, and economic development shares of GDP for purchasing a maximum economic growth rate.     

Military deployment and international terrorism: do location and mission type matter?

Extant literature documents a relationship between military deployment and the risk of an international terrorist attack against citizens of the deploying country. It appears that deployment significantly increases the possibility of terrorist actions in the home country. In particular, if country A decides to send troops to nation B, then citizens of the former country are more likely to fall victim of an attack carried out by a terrorist organisation originating from the latter country. Contributing to this line of literature, we further refine this relationship by distinguishing between regions where the troops are sent as well as by introducing differences between types of deployment. Our results indicate that missions to Asia and the Middle East are more dangerous than missions to other regions as reflected by the terrorist threat in the home country. Robustness tests do however show that the significance of the location variable Asia is predominantly attributed to the mission to Afghanistan. As for types of deployment, only ad hoc missions seem to increase the risk of an attack, whereas no significant results are found for other missions such as operations under UN and NATO flag. Leaving out the missions to Iraq and Afghanistan however also increases the danger resulting from missions by fixed coalitions. Our results find however no evidence that ‘wearing a blue helmet’ increases the probability of a terrorist attack at home.     

Fund Transfers – African Terrorists Blend Old and New: Hawala and Satellite Telecommunications

Attempts to disrupt the flow of funds through Africa used to finance terrorism have been hindered by terrorists utilizing satellite telecommunications in conjunction with hawala, an ancient system of fund transfers based on trust. This arrangement leaves few records for tracing transactions, a task made even more difficult by the general paucity of investigators trained in the languages commonly used for hawala. Acquiring personnel with the appropriate linguistic skills is one of the steps agencies can take to reduce the terrorist financing that occurs through this unique blend of an ancient system with modern technology.     

Grand Strategy and the Graveyard of Assumptions: Britain and Afghanistan, 1839–1919

This article comprises a reply to those who seek to use the British historical experience in Afghanistan in order to draw parallels with current operations in that country. It argues that, while the conceptual and physical response to the issue of Afghanistan on the part of Empire policy-makers during the period 1839–1919 was characterised by periods of indecision and mistaken assumptions, their grasp of strategic principles allowed the formulation of a series of Afghan policies that would serve to protect and indeed enhance British interests in the region for over a century and which stand in stark contrast to the seemingly incoherent Afghan strategy articulated by the current British government.     

National interests and the power of ‘language’: West German diplomacy and the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975

Based on newly released documents from the German foreign ministry archives, this article investigates Bonn's goals, strategies and negotiation tactics at the Conference on Security and Development in Europe (CSCE). By focusing in particular on the multilateral preparatory talks in 1972/73 when the general Conference framework was negotiated and national and alliance positions were determined, it will be shown that (1) the Federal Republic of Germany was the key Western player at the CSCE, and (2) its policies were largely driven by national, Deutschlandpolitik interests – although on the surface the emphasis was always on a multilateral approach and a united Western (EPC/NATO) position. Furthermore, this article will reveal the significance of the ‘politics of language’ in West German diplomacy; and offer some wider reflections on the importance of language and its symbolism in international relations.