国际军品贸易的现状与未来

随着美苏两极体制的解体,国际军品贸易领域出现了许多新的变化,深入研究国际军品贸易的市场特点、运行机制及发展趋势,对于发展我国军品贸易,加强我军现代化建设,为国防现代化建设积累更多的资金,有着极为重要的现实意义。文章在分析国际军品贸易市场的特点和发展趋势的基础上,对国际军品贸易市场的预测、国际军品贸易的政策、国际军品贸易的管理控制程序和军品生产技术引进对军工生产与武器出口的促进作用等方面作了较为全面的分析。     

军品贸易补偿的产生及演变

军品贸易补偿是当前军贸市场中的突出现象,自产生以来就和军品生产大国的内外政策有着千丝万缕的联系。可以说,军品贸易补偿绝不仅是一种经济行为,它的发展清楚地展现了一些军品出口大国争夺霸权的历史。文章从分析军品贸易补偿产生的背景入手,考察了它发生和发展、演变的全过程,指出了军品贸易补偿与军事援助的内在一致性,并在此基础上对军品贸易补偿的发展趋势作了展望。     

国际军事贸易市场军品交易的经济学特性

文章提出了国际军事贸易三个层次的特殊性,研究了军品三个阶段生命周期的军品价格与交易、军费预算与交易的关系,分析了军品需求价格弹性和需求预算弹性,并对军品替代效果和收入效果、军费开支和军费补贴进行了比较研究。     

世界军品贸易模式及贸易策略的分析

军品贸易就是指国际市场上进行的军事专用品的采购与销售行为,是国际贸易的特殊形式。广义的军品贸易包括了武器装备、弹药、军用零配件、军品生产需要的设备、军事训练器材和军事生产技术等;狭义的军品贸易包括军舰、飞机、导弹、坦克、火炮等武器装备系统。军贸作为国际贸易的特殊形式,在调整多边关系、平衡战略力量等方面发挥着特殊的作用,具有政治、经济、军事方面的重要意义。随着世界政治、经济环境的变化,军品贸易市场呈现新的特点和发展趋势,主要体现在:科索沃战争和伊拉克战争等局部战争对世界军品贸易的影响使得军贸市场上对高技…     

关于社会主义初级阶段军品贸易问题

承认军品是商品,进行军品贸易是我国近来军事经济理论研究和实践的一个重要突破。它对于社会主义初阶阶段军品贸易的发展具有重要的指导意义。军品贸易既包括军事专用品(如枪炮、坦克、飞机、军用技术等)的贸易,又包括军民通用品(如药材、被     

国际军品贸易发展态势

军品贸易是特殊的国际贸易,涉及国家关系、地区局势、国际规则、国防安全和政治形象等诸多方面,我国应在深入调查研究的基础上,对军品贸易进行更全面、科学地定位。     

从俄罗斯在叙军事行动看其对军品贸易的影响

俄罗斯是全球第二大军品供应国,军品贸易在俄罗斯政治中具有独特地位,是俄罗斯地缘政治中不可或缺的部分。俄罗斯在叙利亚军事行动前,军品贸易受到了西方制裁打压的影响。在叙军事行动,不仅为俄罗斯军品提供实战检验的机会,也为俄罗斯争取到军事技术合作的潜在盟友。     

中华人民共和国军品出口管理条例

中华人民共和国军品出口管理条例第一章总则第一条为了加强对军品出口的统一管理,维护正常的军品出口秩序,制定本条例。第二条本条例所称军品出口,是指用于军事目的的装备、专用生产设备及其他物资、技术和有关服务的贸易性出口。第三条中华人民共和国国家军品贸易管理...     

美、英、法、以的军品外贸与管理

(一) 军品贸易是国际商品贸易中的一个特殊部分。探讨军品外贸的管理,一方面应从国际贸易的一般原则出发,另一方面则应着重探讨其管理的特殊性。军品外贸可分为四类,一是可直接用于军事目的和武器制造的战略物资;二是军事技术;三是武器装备;四是军事投资和军事劳务。国际军品贸易就     

“9·11”后美国军火贸易的自由化趋势及其影响

军火贸易具有很强的政策性。它与一国的政治、经济、军事和外交都有着密不可分的关系。作为世界上惟一的超级大国,美国不仅经常对其他国家的军火贸易设置壁垒、横加干预,而且对自身的军火出口也给予了严格的的限定。比如,美国《军品出口控制法》强调:“当军品销售与美国外交政策、对外援助计划的目的、军事需求的范围和特点以及所接受国的经济和财政能力一致时,才授权美国政府开展军品销售。”长期以来,美国借口某些发展中国家“侵犯人权”、“缺少民主”、“支持恐怖主义”而拒绝与它们发展军品贸易关系。但是,“9·11”事件发生后,美国以打击恐怖主义为名,积极对外出售武器装备、提供军事援助和军事培训,使美国的军火贸易呈现出更加自由化的新趋势。     

Potential and actual arms production: Implications for the arms trade debate

In this paper I develop indices and rankings of potential and actual arms production for about one hundred and fifty countries for data pertaining to the early to mid‐1990s. The countries’ ranked indices are then compared. I find evidence that countries that can produce arms (potential) do produce arms (actual). I also compare the current findings to findings published nine years ago, pertaining to potential and actual arms production in developing nations for the early 1980s. A number of countries then having the potential to produce arms have, in fact, become major arms producers ten years later. The results presented in this paper carry policy implications for the arms trade debate: shall policymakers continue to focus on arms supply restriction and continue to ignore the increasing capacity of developing nations to self‐supply their arms demand?     

The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

Military Interventions in Civil Wars: Protecting Foreign Direct Investments and the Defence Industry

ABSTRACT

This study extends existing scholarship on the influence of corporate/industry investments on the onset of military interventions in civil wars challenging prior null findings. It proposes a state-centric theoretical framework and argues that researchers have to differentiate between the protection and the advancement of corporate/industry interests. Random-effect logit models in combination with UCDP data on interventions from 2001 until 2009 corroborate the hypothesis that the protection of existing foreign direct investments, as well as the protection of prior arms trade, increase the willingness of a state to intervene militarily in a civil war.     

Arms export controls and emerging domestic producers†

The possibility of domestic production raises a difficulty for arms export control measures, since embargoes, by raising the effective price of imports, increase the incentive for domestic production. We address this issue by developing a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market We compare three arms export regimes involving the exporters of high‐technology arms, with a particular focus on the effect of emerging domestic production: laissez‐faire trade, the uncoordinated regulation of exports and a producer cartel consisting of coordinated regulation. The main conclusion is that the possibility of domestic production significantly changes the nature of these stylized export regimes.     

A model of the international arms market∗

Sales of arms are a significant component of international trade and raise a range of pressing policy issues. After a short review of the market, this paper provides a formal model of the trade which allows for competing forward‐looking suppliers whose welfare depends on both the economic benefits from the sales and the security repercussions of recipient behaviour. The recipient's behaviour depends on its military capability, a function of the stock of arms it has acquired. We first examine a myopic recipient, whose behaviour depends on current stocks, then a forward looking recipient for whom questions of the time‐consistency and the credibility of supplier threats to embargo or promises to resupply become crucial. Finally we examine the impact of supplier cooperation of the sort currently being discussed in the UN Security Council.     

India–Africa defence cooperation against the backdrop of the ‘Make in India’ initiative

Although India is a major importer of defence equipment, it has also been manufacturing defence equipment for some of its needs. The Government of India’s ambitious ‘Make in India’ initiative for the defence sector aims to achieve self reliance in defence equipment production. This essay explores the opportunities for bilateral arms trade between India and Africa, as a new facet of India-Africa defence cooperation. It covers India’s arms export policy, policy reforms in India’s defence sector, and the opportunities for Indian and African defence markets.     

The economic effects of international trade in armaments in the major western industrialized and developing countries†

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.     

The benefits and costs of the UK arms trade

A benefit‐cost framework and the associated evidence is used to evaluate UK arms exports. Two issues are examined in detail. First, trade externalities; and second, a case study of the problems and costs of maintaining the UK submarine industrial base without exports.     

French Arms Exports and Intrastate Conflicts: An Empirical Investigation

The aim of this article is to evaluate how French Major Conventional Weapons (MCW) exports impact on the conflict intensity of recipient countries. The recent increase in French arms exports seems to contradict the French political discourse on the promotion of regional stability. We run zero-inflated ordered probit model in order to analyze the role of the arms trade on the intensity of civil conflicts in 144 countries from 1992 to 2014, using SIPRI and UCDP/PRIO data. Our results suggest that French MCW exports tended not to exacerbate intrastate conflicts during this period. This finding is robust to changes in the empirical framework. We propose two lines of explanations: France seems to be prone to choosing partners that respect human rights and selling more ‘defense-oriented’ MCW than the rest of the world.