‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?

The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that Jonathan's growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a major role in the president's sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.     

Consociationalism for Weaklings,Autocracy for Muscle Men? Determinants of Constitutional Reform in Divided Societies

Why have some countries adopted consociational constitutions after civil wars, while others have not? This contribution analyses the advent of constitutional provisions and their rationale in the five deeply divided societies that adopted the most ‘radical’ constitutional reforms in 2001–10 (Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal and Sudan). In places where norm-diffusing external actors played a major role in ending an intra-state war, constitutional change was particularly profound. It appears that strong outside mediators have followed a blueprint approach to constitutional engineering in post-war societies with power sharing as a guiding principle, more often than not of the consociational type. There is reason to believe that the strong outside involvement in turn depends on a relative weak bargaining position of sitting governments.     

The Hunt for Martín Caballero

While the success of Colombia's fight against illegal armed groups, led by Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia – ejército del pueblo (FARC-EP), is generally lauded as evidence of the effectiveness of both COIN doctrine and security assistance, the configuration of Colombia's counter-insurgency effort remains largely unstudied. This article will explain the success of one of those campaigns carried out principally by the Colombian marines (Colmar) in an area of northern Colombia known as the Montes de María. Contingent factors shaped the success of this campaign, beginning with the fact that the Montes de María forms an area where insurgents, relative late comers to the region, found it difficult to put down deep roots. However, operations to eradicate them were complicated by the inexperience of the Colmar, and by constraints placed by Colombia's Constitutional Court on COIN methods modeled on those successfully applied by the British in Malaya and Kenya. Therefore, Colmar officers initiated their five-year campaign by building up a base of popular support in the towns and targeting insurgent logistical networks. This bought time to strengthen the Colmar's combat and intelligence capabilities, and take the offensive that eventually isolated and killed the leader of the FARC in the Montes de María, Martín Caballero. Unfortunately, the failure of the Colombian government to follow up the Colmar victory by installing a regional and local governments viewed as legitimate by the population, and to resolve long standing land tenure issues, has meant that, so far, the Colmar looks to have delivered a tactical victory in a strategic vacuum.     

Warning whom,for which response?

In June 2000, the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted the Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX), with its two technical structures, namely the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC). MARAC is tasked with collecting and analysing data for the early detection and prevention of conflicts and crises. It currently consists of the Central Structure located at the ECCAS Executive Secretariat in Libreville (Gabon) and 31 Decentralised Correspondents spread throughout the ten member states of ECCAS. This article assesses the performance of MARAC in the light of its assigned objectives. Bearing in mind the peace and security challenges facing the central African sub-region, the central argument of this article is that while the establishment of MARAC is commendable, it flowed more from the logic and context of the establishment of similar mechanisms on the African continent during the same period than from any displayed capacity and/or readiness on the part of ECCAS to implement the recommendations due to emanate from such a structure.     

Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security’

Building upon a far-reaching reform movement carried out during the administration of Andres Pastrana (1998–2002), the Colombian military emerged in the Alvaro Uribe first term (2002–06) as a powerful, flexible organization capable of implementing a national strategy for successful counterinsurgency. Sweeping organizational change was accompanied by advances in operational art and tactics, as well as the promotion of new leadership tested in combat. A growing maturity in civil–military relations enabled national advances in democratic politics, economic progress and state integration, the latter to a degree unprecedented in Colombian history.     

Guns for Butter? Empirical Evidence from China

Abstract

This study examines the causal nexus between defence spending and education expenditure in China using the bootstrap Granger full-sample causality test and sub-sample rolling window estimation. The full-sample result indicates that there is no causality between defence spending and education expenditure. By adopting a time-varying rolling window approach to revisit the dynamic causal relationships, this article identifies a negative unidirectional causality running from education expenditure to defence spending. The finding suggests that it is the education expenditure crowds out defence spending in China rather than reverse. No causality is demonstrated from defence spending to education expenditure, indicating that an increase in military spending will not crowd out expenditure on education. The results could be partly explained by that the education expenditure in China is below the requirement of corresponding economic growth, urging for more financial budget. Whereas the findings support a negative trade-off between defence and education expenditures, they refute the theory of ‘guns for butter’.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

Preserving defense technologies: A strategy for economic conversion†

This paper presents a model for converting legacy defense production facilities into private‐sector economic resources. Specifically, this paper will examine as a case study the first successful conversion of a former U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons production installation, including reasons for its success, its costs and benefits, and lessons for public policy. It is envisioned that this model may be useful for mitigating local economic hardship resulting from defense “downsizing” and for privatizing production capacities critical for national defense.     

‘A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations’

A key organizational challenge for all modern militaries is instituting an effective command-and-control (C2) structure for joint operations. China has been a relative latecomer to joint operations, with a persistent weakness in joint C2. Reforms launched in early 2016 sought to overcome this challenge by establishing a permanent two-level joint C2 structure. Although not a ‘tipping point’ that will lead ineluctably to stronger operational effectiveness, this reform is nonetheless an important milestone in an evolutionary process towards better PLA joint operations. The result could be added operational challenges for several of China’s neighbors and the United States.     

The Shi Lang,a vehicle for regional change?

In a succession of disclosures over the summer of 2011, the People's Republic of China acknowledged the near completion of its first aircraft carrier and the initiation of a carrier building program. These revelations have come at a time of increased tension in the South China Sea on top of the wider worries in the region concerning China's overly assertive stance and the pace of its military modernization. This perspective will examine why the status of the vessel and the program have now been made public, in addition to surveying the wider implications this upgrade to Chinese maritime capabilities will have on the stability of the region over the coming years. However, this paper concludes that there is, at present, no reason for the sensationalism nor the threat‐mongering seen in many media outlets, of late. Hastily drawn conclusions based primarily on realpolitik fail to understand the nuances of this issue.     

‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence

This article suggests that there is a paradigm crisis in the sub-field of cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence is evolving slowly and unpromisingly as a strategic tool in both theory and practice, mostly due to the ill-fitting theoretical framework and underlining assumptions it borrows from the absolute-nuclear-deterrence context. Therefore, this article suggests replacing the accepted yet inadequate paradigm of absolute deterrence with a better-fitting restrictive-cumulative-deterrence paradigm that draws on the Israeli approach to deterrence, introducing it into the cyber domain. The article further criticizes the current discourse in the field, including some ‘common knowledge’ (mis)understandings of cyberspace and the ways it affects the possibility of deterrence.