基于效果的网络中心战模型研究

基于效果的网络中心战是利用物理域内分布式传感器网络、指挥控制网络和武器平台网络.通过网络内部以及网络之间信息域中高质量的信息共享,实现军事人员认知域态势感知共享和部队自同步,是信息时代的一种新兴的作战样式,体现了"兵力分散,效果集中"的信息化战争的作战思想.通过分析基于效果的网络中心战,建立了基于效果的网络中心战体系结构模型和未来军事行动中实施该理论的任务进程模型,对我军未来信息化作战条件下联合作战的实施具有一定的指导意义.     

美军：像“宗教狂热”一样追捧网络战

据美防务专家评估，美军目前共有3000-5000名信息战专家，5万-7万名士兵涉足网络战，再加上原有的电子战人员，美军的网战部队人数应该在88700人左右，而这也意味着美军网战部队人数已经相当于7个101空降师，而且这一数字还将随着网络司令部的组建而得到进一步的激增。     

防空体系反制网电攻击的UML与Petri网模型

网电攻击装备的出现,给传统防空体系带来全面严峻的新威胁。通过分析"舒特"系统,得到网电攻击3种典型作战样式:物理摧毁、电子攻击和网络攻击,分别从物理层次、能量层次和网络层次探索了防空体系反制网电攻击策略。为描述防空体系反制网电攻击的对策、作战结构、作战步骤等问题,分别建立了统一建模语言(UML)和Petri网模型,从理论上初步探索了防空体系反制网电攻击的对策,具有一定的理论与现实意义。     

当事人

蒋景会沈阳军区某高炮团团长"封网古董"变身"用网达人"以前,蒋团长是官兵们口中的"老古董",因为他一上任就规定:全团官兵不准玩网络游戏,一经发现,通报批评。他的"充分"理由是:网络是柄双刃剑,用不好就会伤了自己。在一次儿子学校组织的父子网络战术游戏对抗中,15局全输的败绩"震醒"了他:不少战争类网游中的战术动作、战略思想     

美以“震网”行动浅析

"震网"行动是世界上首次通过虚拟空间对现实世界实施的攻击破坏,标志着网络空间作战从概念阶段正式进入实战化时代。本文深入分析"震网"行动作战背景,剖析其"战略预置、桥接渗透、精确毁瘫、釜底抽薪"的作战准备及作战经过,并结合我国实际,总结梳理了加强我网络空间安全建设的几点启示。     

民兵军事知识讲座 第十九讲 争锋网络化战场——电子计算机网络对抗(下)

网络“病毒”战 一提起计算机病毒,几乎每个计算机用户都会心有余悸。实际上,计算机病毒是人为编制的一段计算机程序,它隐蔽在正常的程序中,具有自我复制和扩散的功能。之所以称之为“病毒”,是因为它像生物病毒一样能使计算机“感染”,一旦“病毒”侵入网络中某一台计算机,它就有可能通过网络传染给所     

基于平均可工作概率的星间链路整网抗干扰性能评估方法

导航战条件下的全系统自主导航运行是卫星导航系统星间链路建设的重要目标之一。对星间链路在导航战情况下的工作性能进行准确评估具有非常重要的意义。星间链路的整网抗干扰性能与单星抗干扰能力、星间信号体制、建链策略、网络体制等多种因素均有关系,比较复杂,从而为其准确评估带来很大困难。为准确评估导航战条件下星间链路的整网抗干扰性能,对影响星间链路整网抗干扰性能的各种因素进行分析,并在此基础上对整网抗干扰性能评估场景进行建模设计。提出了以干扰场景遍历条件下的平均可工作概率为指标的星间链路抗干扰性能评估方法,定义了可用率评估指标体系,从而使准确、定量评估星间链路整网抗干扰性能成为可能。     

计算机网络对抗及其装备发展

计算机网络攻防对抗(或称网络战)是指采用计算机“病毒”或计算机网络渗透等手段,攻击军、民用信息基础设施中的计算机及其网络,以及对这种攻击进行防护的行动;主要形式是以破坏和保护计算机网络为目的的网络攻防战,和以窃取重要情报为目的的网络间谍战。从军事角度看,网络对抗是人类继陆、海、空、天战之后的又一种全新形式的战争,是21世纪信息战的重要作战样式。     

网络中心战--21世纪的作战概念

概述了美国海军提出的网络中心战概念,介绍了由信息网、探测网、作战网和指挥网四个虚拟网组成的网络中心战作战结构,以及由CEC(cooperativeengagementcapability),Link16和IT 21(informationtechnologyforthe21stcentury)技术组成的技术结构,综述了实现网络中心战的一些难点问题。     

网战武器：锋芒渐露的新杀手

2006和2008年，美国两次举行代号为“网络风暴”的大规模网战演习，2009年6月又成立了世界上首个网军司令部，从而拉开了信息网络领域军事竞争的序幕。今年3月，全球最大的网络搜索引擎公司谷歌和全球最大的网络域名注册公司“GoDaddy”相继高调宣布：因遭到来自中国“军方背景”的网络攻击及不满中国政府“严格的网络管理”而退出或消减在华业务。     

IS STUXNET PHYSICAL? DOES IT MATTER?

Cyber-weapons are software and software, at least intuitively, is non-physical. Several authors have noted that this potentially renders problematic the application of normative frameworks like UN Charter Article 2(4) to cyber-weapons. If Article 2(4) only proscribes the use of physical force, and if cyber-weapons are non-physical, then cyber-weapons fall outside the purview of Article 2(4). This article explores the physicality of software, examining Stuxnet in particular. First, I show that with a few relatively uncontroversial metaphysical claims we can secure the conclusion that Stuxnet is physical. In particular, there exist instances of Stuxnet that are both located in space and causally efficacious, and this is very strong evidence for their being physical. Second, I argue that the question of physicality is actually irrelevant for the moral evaluation of an attack like Stuxnet because of its undeniably physical effects. Finally, I argue that some features of Stuxnet should make us optimistic about the prospects for discrimination and proportionality in cyberwarfare.     

毛泽东军事思想对古代兵学文化的传承与发展

毛泽东军事思想植根于中国古代兵学文化的土壤,它的战争观、军事伦理价值观、战争谋略法等思想,与中国古代社会"仁战"、"义战"、"以民为本"、"以奇制胜"、"以礼治军"等战略方法、战略思想一脉相承,同时也是对古代兵学文化的创造性发展,是中国革命战争实践、马列主义军事思想和古代兵学文化相结合的产物。     

常规袭击下指挥所生存能力分析

在现代战争中,指挥所是作战部队的核心设施,其生存能力对战争进程和战争胜负有着根本性的制约作用,也成为敌方的首要攻击对象。当前,指挥所的生存能力已经成为各级指挥员极其关注的问题。针对指挥所面临的威胁,分析制约其生存能力的因素,找出有效的应对之策,对作好军事斗争准备将有着重要意义。从指挥所可能面临的常规袭击环境出发,探讨了影响指挥所生存能力的因素,建立了各种袭击模式下的生存能力模型,并应用模拟的方法对指挥所生存能力进行了定量分析,并结合定性分析得出了有益的结果。     

Feeding Bread to the Luddites: The Radical Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Guerrilla Warfare

This study examines the war that the United States has waged since September 2001 as a global counterinsurgency. Placing the war against al-Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency also presents implications for doctrine, interagency coordination and military cultural change. The first part of the article offers a distilled analysis of al-Qaeda and its associated networks. The second section examines the US military in the context of the Western way of war, with the attendant military-cultural impediments to adapting to an enemy who embraces a very different approach to war. The third section aims to define and describe the nature of the war that America and its coalition partners are trying to wage. The concluding section offers the most value as it refines and distills the work of several international security and military thinkers to arrive at some imperatives for successfully prosecuting this type of war to its end.     

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.     

防空反导网络化作战发展研究

网络中心战是信息时代重要的作战形式,可将战场信息优势转化为决策优势,是信息技术在军事领域应用的必然选择,网络中心战在防空反导领域的应用也称为防空反导网络化作战.主要跟踪研究了国内外网络中心战的最新进展和发展趋势,分析了网络化作战的特点和关键技术,针对我国防空反导武器系统的现状,提出了防空反导网络化作战的发展建议.     

Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”

ABSTRACT

I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically confused. The fact of the matter is that wars need not necessarily be authorized by some higher authority (such as a king, president, or parliament) in order to be justified, and this moral fact does not need to lead to chaos and anarchy. Accordingly, the criterion of legitimate authority cannot be relied on to delegitimate individual war, private war, guerrilla war, or even terrorism. Finally, I consider some other defenses of authorization and demonstrate that the “authorization” these accounts defend is either not needed for justification or already provided by other just war criteria or, indeed, entirely fictitious.     

OTHER-THAN-INTERNET (OTI) CYBERWARFARE: CHALLENGES FOR ETHICS,LAW, AND POLICY

Almost all discussions of cyberwarfare, other cyber-attacks, and cyber-espionage have focused entirely on the Internet as the chief means of damage – the Internet as a ‘vector,’ using a term from the theory of infectious diseases. However there are a variety of means, some of which have already been used, that involve cyber-exploitation using vectors other than the Internet. Malware can be installed in the integrated circuits of computers and servers, but also in any devices attached to them – thumb drives, CDs, printers, scanners, and so on. One can also use various forms of electromagnetic radiation at a distance of meters or more to exfiltrate data or to infiltrate corrupt data. I call this large and diverse family of unwanted interference with the functioning of information processing systems other-than-Internet (OTI) attacks on information systems. Stuxnet, and probably the 2007 Israeli corruption of Syrian air defenses, were OTI attacks. Such OTI techniques are more difficult to develop than creating malware, requiring electronic manufacturing facilities or novel technologies, and are thus accessible only to larger corporations and technologically sophisticated countries. Particularly vulnerable would be countries (like the United States and Europe) whose information processing devices are mainly produced outside of the country. Once exploitations via the Internet become harder to perpetrate, OTI exploitations are certain to grow dramatically, eventually requiring equipment for critical uses to be expensively fabricated in (and transported using) secure facilities; expensive detection measures will have to be instituted. This will create challenges for policy, law, and ethics, as well as greatly increasing the cost of many electronic devices.     

公安现役部队非战争军事行动训练面临的挑战与对策

当前,边境安全形势复杂、训练理念陈旧、部队勤训矛盾突出、训练内容与安排不合理、训练保障能力有限等主客观因素,制约着公安现役部队非战争军事行动训练的开展,对公安现役部队形成非战争军事行动战斗力构成了挑战。树立科学的非战争军事行动训练指导思想与理念,创新训练方法和手段,优化训练内容,加强教员队伍建设和训练基地建设,是改进非战争军事行动训练的有效对策。     

巡航导弹的优缺点分析及光电对抗方法研究

受到科学技术发展的推动和战争形态变迁的牵引,20世纪90年代以后,巡航导弹再度登上高技术局部战争的舞台,充分展示了强大的低空突防和远距离精确打击能力,实战中发挥了巨大作用。巡航导弹的使用对战场重要目标构成了巨大威胁,并改变了作战样式,成为空中打击的主战力量。介绍了巡航导弹的强点与弱点,并提出了光电对抗的方法。