Spatial pricing and product allocation in online retailing

Spatial pricing means a retailer price discriminates its customers based on their geographic locations. In this article, we study how an online retailer should jointly allocate multiple products and facilitate spatial price discrimination to maximize profits. When deciding between a centralized product allocation ((i.e., different products are allocated to the same fulfillment center) and decentralized product allocation (ie, different products are allocated to different fulfillment centers), the retailer faces the tradeoff between shipment pooling (ie, shipping multiple products in one package), and demand localization (ie, stocking products to satisfy local demand) based on its understanding of customers' product valuations. In our basic model, we consider two widely used spatial pricing policies: free on board (FOB) pricing that charges each customer the exact amount of shipping cost, and uniform delivered (UD) pricing that provides free shipping. We propose a stylized model and find that centralized product allocation is preferred when demand localization effect is relatively low or shipment pooling benefit is relatively high under both spatial pricing policies. Moreover, centralized product allocation is more preferred under the FOB pricing which encourages the purchase of virtual bundles of multiple products. Furthermore, we respectively extend the UD and FOB pricing policies to flat rate shipping (ie, the firm charges a constant shipping fee for each purchase), and linear rate shipping (ie, the firm sets the shipping fee as a fixed proportion of firm's actual fulfillment costs). While similar observations from the basic model still hold, we find the firm can improve its profit by sharing the fulfillment cost with its customers via the flat rate or linear rate shipping fee structure.     

Optimal pricing and inventory control policy in periodic‐review systems with fixed ordering cost and lost sales

This paper studies a periodic‐review pricing and inventory control problem for a retailer, which faces stochastic price‐sensitive demand, under quite general modeling assumptions. Any unsatisfied demand is lost, and any leftover inventory at the end of the finite selling horizon has a salvage value. The cost component for the retailer includes holding, shortage, and both variable and fixed ordering costs. The retailer's objective is to maximize its discounted expected profit over the selling horizon by dynamically deciding on the optimal pricing and replenishment policy for each period. We show that, under a mild assumption on the additive demand function, at the beginning of each period an (s,S) policy is optimal for replenishment, and the value of the optimal price depends on the inventory level after the replenishment decision has been done. Our numerical study also suggests that for a sufficiently long selling horizon, the optimal policy is almost stationary. Furthermore, the fixed ordering cost (K) plays a significant role in our modeling framework. Specifically, any increase in K results in lower s and higher S. On the other hand, the profit impact of dynamically changing the retail price, contrasted with a single fixed price throughout the selling horizon, also increases with K. We demonstrate that using the optimal policy values from a model with backordering of unmet demands as approximations in our model might result in significant profit penalty. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Quantity discount pricing policies for heterogeneous retailers with price sensitive demand

Although quantity discount policies have been extensively analyzed, they are not well understood when there are many different buyers. This is especially the case when buyers face price‐sensitive demand. In this paper we study a supplier's optimal quantity discount policy for a group of independent and heterogeneous retailers, when each retailer faces a demand that is a decreasing function of its retail price. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game whereby the supplier acts as the leader and buyers act as followers. We show that a common quantity discount policy that is designed according to buyers' individual cost and demand structures and their rational economic behavior is able to significantly stimulate demand, improve channel efficiency, and substantially increase profits for both the supplier and buyers. Furthermore, we show that the selection of all‐units or incremental quantity discount policies has no effect on the benefits that can be obtained from quantity discounts. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Vertically restrictive pricing in supply chains with price‐dependent demand

We examine the behavior of a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized supply chain under price‐dependent, stochastic demand. We model a retail fixed markup (RFM) policy, which can arise as a form of vertically restrictive pricing in a supply chain, and we examine its effect on supply chain performance. We prove the existence of the optimal pricing and replenishment policies when demand has a linear additive form and the distribution of the uncertainty component has a nondecreasing failure rate. We numerically compare the relative performance of RFM to a price‐only contract and we find that RFM results in greater profit for the supply chain than the price‐only contract in a variety of scenarios. We find that RFM can lead to Pareto‐improving solutions where both the supplier and the retailer earn more profit than under a price‐only contract. Finally, we compare RFM to a buyback contract and explore the implications of allowing the fixed markup parameter to be endogenous to the model. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006.     

On the effectiveness of returns policies in the price‐dependent newsvendor model

We study in this paper the price‐dependent (PD) newsvendor model in which a manufacturer sells a product to an independent retailer facing uncertain demand and the retail price is endogenously determined by the retailer. We prove that for a zero salvage value and some expected demand functions, in equilibrium, the manufacturer may elect not to introduce buybacks. On the other hand, if buybacks are introduced in equilibrium, their introduction has an insignificant effect on channel efficiency improvement, but, by contrast, may significantly shift profits from the retailer to the manufacturer. We further demonstrate that the introduction of buybacks increases the wholesale price, retail price, and inventory level, as compared to the wholesale price‐only contract, and that the corresponding vertically integrated firm offers the lowest retail price and highest inventory level. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Locational tying of complementary retail items

We study a selling practice that we refer to as locational tying (LT), which seems to be gaining wide popularity among retailers. Under this strategy, a retailer “locationally ties” two complementary items that we denote by “primary” and “secondary.” The retailer sells the primary item in an appropriate “department” of his or her store. To stimulate demand, the secondary item is offered in the primary item's department, where it is displayed in very close proximity to the primary item. We consider two variations of LT: In the multilocation tying strategy (LT‐M), the secondary item is offered in its appropriate department in addition to the primary item's department, whereas in the single‐location tying strategy (LT‐S), it is offered only in the primary item's location. We compare these LT strategies to the traditional independent components (IC) strategy, in which the two items are sold independently (each in its own department), but the pricing/inventory decisions can be centralized (IC‐C) or decentralized (IC‐D). Assuming ample inventory, we compare and provide a ranking of the optimal prices of the four strategies. The main insight from this comparison is that relative to IC‐D, LT decreases the price of the primary item and adjusts the price of the secondary item up or down depending on its popularity in the primary item's department. We also perform a comparative statics analysis on the effect of demand and cost parameters on the optimal prices of various strategies, and identify the conditions that favor one strategy over others in terms of profitability. Then we study inventory decisions in LT under exogenous pricing by developing a model that accounts for the effect of the primary item's stock‐outs on the secondary item's demand. We find that, relative to IC‐D, LT increases the inventory level of the primary item. We also link the profitability of different strategies to the trade‐off between the increase in demand volume of the secondary item as a result of LT and the potential increase in inventory costs due to decentralizing the inventory of the secondary item. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

A nonlinear continuous time optimal control model of dynamic pricing and inventory control with no backorders

In this paper, we present a continuous time optimal control model for studying a dynamic pricing and inventory control problem for a make‐to‐stock manufacturing system. We consider a multiproduct capacitated, dynamic setting. We introduce a demand‐based model where the demand is a linear function of the price, the inventory cost is linear, the production cost is an increasing strictly convex function of the production rate, and all coefficients are time‐dependent. A key part of the model is that no backorders are allowed. We introduce and study an algorithm that computes the optimal production and pricing policy as a function of the time on a finite time horizon, and discuss some insights. Our results illustrate the role of capacity and the effects of the dynamic nature of demand in the model. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Dynamic inventory management with cash flow constraints

In this article, we consider a classic dynamic inventory control problem of a self‐financing retailer who periodically replenishes its stock from a supplier and sells it to the market. The replenishment decisions of the retailer are constrained by cash flow, which is updated periodically following purchasing and sales in each period. Excess demand in each period is lost when insufficient inventory is in stock. The retailer's objective is to maximize its expected terminal wealth at the end of the planning horizon. We characterize the optimal inventory control policy and present a simple algorithm for computing the optimal policies for each period. Conditions are identified under which the optimal control policies are identical across periods. We also present comparative statics results on the optimal control policy. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

Dynamic pricing in a trade-in program with replacement and new customers

Trade-in programs have been widely adopted to enhance repeat purchase from replacement customers. Considering that a market consists of replacement and new segments, we study the joint and dynamic decisions on the selling price of new product (hereafter, “selling price”) and the trade-in price involved in the program. By adopting a vertical product differentiation choice model, we investigate two scenarios in this paper. In the base model, the manufacturer has sufficiently large production capacity to fulfill the customer demand. We characterize the structural properties of the joint pricing decisions and compare them with the optimal pricing policy under regular selling. We further propose a semi-dynamic trade-in program, under which the new product is sold at a fixed price and the trade-in price can be adjusted dynamically. Numerical experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the dynamic and semi-dynamic trade-in programs. In an extended model, we consider the scenario in which the manufacturer stocks a batch of new products in the beginning of the selling horizon and the inventory cannot be replenished. Following a revenue management framework, we characterize the structural properties with respect to time period and inventory level of new products.     

Dynamic learning,pricing, and ordering by a censored newsvendor

We address the problem of determining optimal ordering and pricing policies in a finite‐horizon newsvendor model with unobservable lost sales. The demand distribution is price‐dependent and involves unknown parameters. We consider both the cases of perishable and nonperishable inventory. A very general class of demand functions is studied in this paper. We derive the optimal ordering and pricing policies as unique functions of the stocking factor (which is a linear transformation of the safety factor). An important expression is obtained for the marginal expected value of information. As a consequence, we show when lost sales are unobservable, with perishable inventory the optimal stocking factor is always at least as large as the one given by the single‐period model; however, if inventory is nonperishable, this result holds only under a strong condition. This expression also helps to explain why the optimal stocking factor of a period may not increase with the length of the problem. We compare this behavior with that of a full information model. We further examine the implications of the results to the special cases when demand uncertainty is described by additive and multiplicative models. For the additive case, we show that if demand is censored, the optimal policy is to order more as well as charge higher retail prices when compared to the policies in the single‐period model and the full information model. We also compare the optimal and myopic policies for the additive and multiplicative models. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Competing with channel partners: Supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands

Private‐label products are of increasing importance in many retail categories. While national‐brand products are designed by the manufacturer and sold by the retailer, the positioning of store‐brand products is under the complete control of the retailer. We consider a scenario where products differ on a performance quality dimension and we analyze how retailer–manufacturer interactions in product positioning are affected by the introduction of a private‐label product. Specifically, we consider a national‐brand manufacturer who determines the quality of its product as well the product's wholesale price charged to the retailer. Given the national‐brand quality and wholesale price, the retailer then decides the quality level of its store brand and sets the retail prices for both products. We find that a manufacturer can derive substantial benefits from considering a retailer's store‐brand introduction when determining the national brand's quality and wholesale price. If the retailer has a significant cost disadvantage in producing high‐quality products, the manufacturer does not need to adjust the quality of the national‐brand product, but he should offer a wholesale price discount to ensure its distribution through the retailer. If the retailer is competitive in providing products of high‐quality, the manufacturer should reduce this wholesale price discount and increase the national‐brand quality to mitigate competition. Interestingly, we find the retailer has incentive to announce a store‐brand introduction to induce the manufacturer's consideration of these plans in determining the national‐brand product quality and wholesale price. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Joint inventory and pricing decisions for perishable products with two‐period lifetime

We consider a periodic review model over a finite horizon for a perishable product with fixed lifetime equal to two review periods. The excess demand in a period is backlogged. The optimal replenishment and demand management (using price) decisions for such a product depend on the relative order of consumption of fresh and old units. We obtain insights on the structure of these decisions when the order of consumption is first‐in, first‐out and last‐in, first‐out. For the FIFO system, we also obtain bounds on both the optimal replenishment quantity as well as expected demand. We compare the FIFO system to two widely analyzed inventory systems that correspond to nonperishable and one‐period lifetime products to understand if demand management would modify our understanding of the relationship among the three systems. In a counterintuitive result, we find that it is more likely that bigger orders are placed in the FIFO system than for a nonperishable product when demand is managed. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on supply chain performance under demand uncertainty

Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of an intermediate product or service within a firm. This product or service is transferred between two divisions of the firm. Thus, transfer pricing is closely related to the allocation of profits in a supply chain. Motivated by the significant impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on operational decisions and the corresponding profits of a supply chain, in this article, we study a decentralized supply chain of a multinational firm consisting of two divisions: a manufacturing division and a retail division. These two divisions are located in different countries under demand uncertainty. The retail division orders an intermediate product from the upstream manufacturing division and sets the retail price under random customer demand. The manufacturing division accepts or rejects the retail division's order. We specifically consider two commonly used transfer pricing methods for tax purposes: the cost‐plus method and the resale‐price method. We compare the supply chain profits under these two methods. Based on the newsvendor framework, our analysis shows that the cost‐plus method tends to allocate a higher percentage of profit to the retail division, whereas the resale‐price method tends to achieve a higher firm‐wide profit. However, as the variability of demand increases, our numerical study suggests that the firm‐wide and divisional profits tend to be higher under the cost‐plus method than they are under the resale‐price method. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Designing and pricing menus of extended warranty contracts

Extended warranties provide “piece of mind” to a consumer in that product failures which occur after the base warranty expires are rectified at little or no cost. They also provide an additional source of revenue for manufacturers or third‐party providers, such as retailers or insurance providers, and help cultivate consumer loyalty. In this article, we analyze a number of extended warranty contracts which differ in design, including restrictions on deferrals and renewals. With the use of dynamic programming, we compute the optimal strategy for a consumer with perfect information and determine the optimal pricing policy for the provider given the consumer's risk characterization. We also provide insight into when different contracts should be issued. Finally, we illustrate how profits can be dramatically increased by offering menus of warranty contracts, as opposed to stand alone contracts, with the use of integer programming. Surprisingly, risk‐taking consumers provide the greatest benefit to offering menus. These insights can help a company develop a comprehensive warranty planning strategy for given products or product lines. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Coordinated pricing and inventory control problems with capacity constraints and fixed ordering cost

This article addresses a single‐item, finite‐horizon, periodic‐review coordinated decision model on pricing and inventory control with capacity constraints and fixed ordering cost. Demands in different periods are random and independent of each other, and their distributions depend on the price in the current period. Each period's stochastic demand function is the additive demand model. Pricing and ordering decisions are made at the beginning of each period, and all shortages are backlogged. The objective is to find an optimal policy that maximizes the total expected discounted profit. We show that the profit‐to‐go function is strongly CK‐concave, and the optimal policy has an (s,S,P) ‐like structure. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when shortage creates hype

In this study, we analyze the joint pricing and inventory management during new product introduction when product shortage creates additional demand due to hype. We develop a two‐period model in which a firm launches its product at the beginning of the first period, before it observes sales in the two periods. The product is successful with an exogenous probability, or unsuccessful with the complementary probability. The hype in the second period is observed only when the product is successful. The firm learns the actual status of the product only after observing the first‐period demand. The firm must decide the stocking level and price of the product jointly at the beginning of each of the two periods. In this article, we derive some structural properties of the optimal prices and inventory levels, and show that (i) firms do not always exploit hype, (ii) firms do not always increase the price of a successful product in the second period, (iii) firms may price out an unsuccessful product in the first period if the success probability is above a threshold, and (iv) such a threshold probability is decreasing in the first‐period market potential of the successful product. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 304–320, 2015     

Optimal inventory and dynamic admission policies for a retailer of seasonal products with affiliate programs and drop‐shipping

This article investigates the optimal inventory and admission policies for a “Clicks‐and‐Bricks” retailer of seasonal products that, in addition to selling through its own physical and online stores, also sells through third‐party websites by means of affiliate programs. Through postings on partners' webpages, an affiliate program allows a retailer to attract customers who would otherwise be missed. However, this retailer needs to pay a commission for each sale that originates from the website operators participating in the program. The retailer may also refer online orders to other sources (such as distributors and manufacturers) for fulfillment through a drop‐shipping agreement and thus earns commissions. This would be an option when, for example, the inventories at the physical stores were running low. Therefore, during the selling horizon, the retailer needs to dynamically control the opening/closing of affiliate programs and decide on the fulfillment option for online orders. On the basis of a discrete‐time dynamic programming model, the optimal admission policy of the retailer is investigated in this paper, and the structural properties of the revenue function are characterized. Numerical examples are given to show the revenue impact of optimal admission control. The optimal initial stocking decisions at the physical stores are also studied. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Optimal pricing for a short life‐cycle product when customer price‐sensitivity varies over time

Technology products often experience a life‐cycle demand pattern that resembles a diffusion process, with weak demand in the beginning and the end of the life cycle and high demand intensity in between. The customer price‐sensitivity also changes over the life cycle of the product. We study the prespecified pricing decision for a product that exhibits such demand characteristics. In particular, we determine the optimal set of discrete prices and the times to switch from one price to another, when a limited number of price changes are allowed. Our study shows that the optimal prices and switching times show interesting patterns that depend on the product's demand pattern and the change in the customers' price sensitivity over the life cycle of the product. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010