COIN and civilian collaterals: patterns of violence in Afghanistan, 2004–2009

Theories and counterinsurgency doctrines emphasize the importance of avoiding civilian casualties. Yet, many operations produce large numbers of so-called collateral civilian deaths. I present two competing arguments for when collateral deaths occur. One the one hand, they could be the unintentional result of offensives when trying to maintain force protection; on the other hand, they could be the result of a deliberate choice of relying on indiscriminate violence when pressured on the battlefield. I use new data on violence in Afghanistan 2004–2009, disaggregated by province and month, to examine what type of battlefield dynamics are more likely to produce high levels of collateral civilian casualties. The results show that civilian casualties are particularly high after counterinsurgency forces suffer losses in combat.     

Are non‐lethal weapons a viable military option to strengthen the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan?

Commanders of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have repeatedly stressed the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan, in saying that the human terrain is decisive for a successful outcome of the mission. Avoidance of civilian casualties is considered of strategic importance, and by nature highly dependent on the management of tactical level Escalation of Force (EoF) situations. Non‐lethal weapons (NLWs) are expected to enable tactical commanders to avoid innocent civilian casualties in such situations. This article considers a selected NLW on its potential to accomplish this requirement. It uses a defence technology assessment approach to analyse EoF situations experienced by Dutch ISAF forces in which the NLW is inserted. The analysis demonstrates that a range of contextual factors in the Afghanistan high‐risk environment tend to narrow down the window of opportunity for the NLW to help defuse the risk of unintended civil casualties.     

Predators and Peace: Explaining the Failure of the Pakistani Conflict Settlement Process in 2013-4

ABSTRACT

Did US drone strikes cause the unravelling of the Pakistani conflict settlement process between the government and the TTP in 2013-14? In answering this question, we present strong, fieldwork-based evidence that the effects of leadership decapitation, civilian casualties, and loss of legitimacy and credibility as a negotiation partner by both the government and the TTP interacted in the context of specific social, political and cultural characteristics of a tribal society. We find that drone strikes ‘produced’ some of these factors, but not all, which allows us to conclude with four concrete policy recommendations for rethinking the use of drones.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

The ambivalent coalition: doing the least one can do against the Islamic state

The effort to degrade and defeat the Islamic State is like many other multilateral military efforts – characterized by widely varying contributions to the effort. This article seeks to understand the patterns of contributions. Three sets of explanations are applied: the lessons of Afghanistan and Libya, variations in how potential contributors feel the threat posed by the Islamic State, and domestic political dynamics. While there may be some political processes that overlap with the big lessons and with the threat of the Islamic State, the patterns of contributions thus far suggest that the key drivers of reactions to the Islamic State are the desire not to repeat Afghanistan combined with some impetus provided by Islamic State attacks in the various homelands. The conclusion suggests some policy implications as well as some ideas for future research.     

金新月毒情对我国禁毒工作的影响及对策

当前,“金新月”地区毒品生产、加工、贩运泛滥。我国西北地区与“金新月”相邻,近年来从该地区流入我国的毒品呈现迅猛上升的趋势,对我国禁毒工作构成了严重的威胁。     

Insurgency in Afghanistan: implications for Pakistan's internal and external security

In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA embarked on a massive global hunt for terrorists and launched its “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. Its failure to control insurgency in Afghanistan spilled over into Pakistan, with disastrous consequences. The resurgence of the Taliban with more formidable tactics and maneuvering skills has become more troublesome for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and for the USA and its allied forces. The fierce comeback of the insurgents has challenged the political and territorial integrity of Pakistan, one that it cannot tolerate. This article analyzes the current situation and its implications for Pakistan's security. Moreover, it looks into the internal and external security complexities that Pakistan faces and the possible implications of the US exit strategy for Pakistan's security. It concludes that the security situation in Pakistan is continuously deteriorating and no part of her territory is immune from terrorists' attacks. To be successful, Pakistan must pursue a broad-based strategy that encompasses military, political, social, economic and informational domains aimed at accomplishing four major objectives: (1) elimination of foreign terrorists and their facilitators; (2) strengthening of the political and administrative institutions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); (3) establishing a safe and secure environment conducive for sustained development and the realization of real socio-economic progress and (4) integrating the FATA into the national mainstream. In the long term, a strategy based on the concept of “Enlightened Moderation” is the right solution, not only to the internal problems of Pakistan but also for the Muslim world and the international community.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

The Value of Respect: What Does it Mean for an Army?

The Australian Army has adopted “respect” as a new addition to the existing trio of values, “courage, initiative and teamwork.” This article explores what respect may mean as an army value. The significance of respect surrounding two incidents involving Australian Defence Force personnel while on duty in Afghanistan is considered. The first is the so-called “green on blue” attack by an Afghan National Army soldier killing three Australian soldiers on 29 August 2012. The second concerns allegations of mutilation of suspected Afghan insurgents’ corpses by soldiers attached to an Australian Special Forces Unit on 28 April 2013. The incidents have resulted in internal military investigations: in the second incident, with a view to possible prosecution for breach of the law of armed conflict and related disciplinary offences; and in the case of the green on blue attack, leading to a civilian coronial inquest. This article discusses the training and modelling of behaviour required to instil such a value as respect.     

A Good Ally - Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, it focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US highlights and helps to problematise the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. Norwegian efforts in Faryab are revealing of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.     

美国创新体系军民深度融合发展特点及启示

美国具有全球最为先进的军事科技实力、军事科技创新能力和国防保障能力,美国的科技创新体系具有军民融合深度发展的特点,在军民融合创新发展上没有明显的时间滞后,是世界上军民融合科技创新体系发展最好的典型样板国家。论文梳理分析美国国防创新系统及其特点,分析美国国防科技经费预算、研究方向和项目流程,研究分析美国促进军民融合创新与发展的制度保障体系,总结美国创新体系中军民深度融合发展的特点,解析美国军民融合发展中的典型案例、各自成功的模式和主要经验,并结合我国军民融合发展的实际情况提出建议。     

The United States and Latin America: Shaping an elusive future

This article presents a regional overview of US‐Latin American security relations, focusing on those countries where US national security interests are most likely to be endangered over the next two decades. The author examines the current US strategy of ‘shaping’ the Latin security environment, with a view to assessing the strength and weaknesses of this approach. The article presents some policy recommendations, including the recommendation that the US do more to redress the historical imbalance in Latin American civil‐military relations by strengthening civilian institutions. It also argues that at the regional level a major effort be made to recapture momentum toward the creation of a Free Trade Association of the Americas.     

通信对抗无人机集群侦察区域规划规则研究

侦察区域规划是通信对抗无人机集群智能侦察的首要任务.能否合理规划侦察区域,对通信对抗侦察任务的完成至关重要.通过研究侦察区域规划分配和动态调整流程,结合通信对抗战斗原则和相关军事经验,整理归纳出通信对抗无人机集群进行侦察区域规划的行为规则、判定规则和策略规则,并提出了规则的使用建议,构想了具体应用场景.     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

When the Going Gets Tough… Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008

This article analyzes how the conflict environment in which a civilian monitoring mission is deployed influences the monitors' assessment of the operation. It draws on unique empirical material from the experience of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), deployed to oversee a ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka 2002–2008. With material from a survey and in-depth interviews, experiences of the monitors are analyzed and changes over time are traced in relation to the monitors' assessment of the mandate and organizational set-up of the mission. The study points to the difficulty of monitoring missions to address escalation during an ongoing peace process. Its function is dependent on the goodwill of the parties. In essence, monitoring missions have the potential to strengthen peace when there is momentum in favor of progress, but when relations between the parties turn sour and the conflict escalates a civilian monitoring mission basically loses its potential. During the final stages of the war, which saw a very large number of civilian casualties, the war-torn areas were closed to international observers. Moreover, international pressure for a short-term ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation was dismissed by the Sri Lankan government, which also saw the backing of several important actors, not the least China.     

ARE USA CITIZENS AT RISK OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE?

This paper analyzes the determinants of the probability of US citizens being victims of terrorist attacks in European countries, taking into account uncontrolled heterogeneity of the data. The analysis employs ITERATE data from February 1968 to December 2002 to ascertain significant characteristics that influence the probability (e.g. location, type of casualties, type of attack, and type of terrorists). To deal with the unobserved heterogeneity a random‐parameter logit model (mixed logit) is used. Some policy implications are presented.     

Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency

Quantitative measures to gauge progress in a counterinsurgency in use today include the number of enemy, friendly, and civilian casualties, and the level of violence. While common, each of these has drawbacks. With this and the sparseness of the literature on this topic in mind, we argue for a series of improved measures. These include the ratio of who is initiating incidents, an historical analysis of incidents and related variables, and an analysis of insurgent target sets. These measures are presented using data for Al Anbar province, Iraq, along with a discussion of their advantages over more common metrics.     

Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.     

ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?

ABSTRACT

In 2014, an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria emerged in Afghanistan. Wilayat Khorasan, or ISIS-K, intends to secure Afghanistan to legitimize the Islamic State’s caliphate across the ‘Khorasan Province’ including portions of Central Asia, China, Iran, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. While the group’s intent is clear, its capability confounds analysts. The authors argue that Wilayat Khorasan is likely the Islamic State’s most viable and lethal regional affiliate based on an expansionist military strategy. This is designed to enable the group’s encirclement of Jalalabad City in Nangarhar Province and is foundational to its expanded operational reach, regionalization, and lethality. Since 2016, the US-led Coalition’s counter-terrorism strategy has disrupted ISIS-K’s critical requirements and prevented external attacks. Yet, raids and strikes alone will not defeat ISIS-K. They must be calibrated against an institution-building approach that legitimizes Afghanistan’s government and redresses grievances that ISIS-K exploits to resolve.