PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”

Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.

     

THE ‘PRICE’ OF TERRORISM

Security measures are said to increase the price of terrorism. This price has not been hitherto defined in an economically meaningful way. This paper provides a precise definition by treating the terrorists’ resource endowment as a parcel of contingent claims to political influence with a price equal to the summed value of those contingent claims in potential states of the world. Equipped with this definition, an equilibrium model of the price of terrorism is deployed. Important insights are gained into the effect of terrorists’ risk aversion at the level of the price of terrorism in different states of the world and the theoretical conclusion is reached that higher security is associated with a lower price of terrorism rather than a higher price. The implications for policy are discussed.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

MAKING HISTORICAL SURVEYS OF STATES’ NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

In signalling its wish to participate in the Additional Protocol at an early stage, Sweden took several steps at the national level long before it actually ratified the protocol in May 2004. In 1998, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) initiated a project to conduct a historical survey of Swedish nuclear weapons research for the period 1945–72. Sweden thus took an important step for the sake of transparency. SKI worked out a general model of how a nationally based survey could be designed, and gradually other states approached SKI in order to learn more about the methods and goals of the historical surveys. In 2002, a cooperative project was initiated between Sweden and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finland joined the cooperative effort, and it thus became a dialogue and project carried out by five neighboring states to make national surveys. This article presents summaries of the national reports from Sweden and the Baltic states.     

ARE USA CITIZENS AT RISK OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE?

This paper analyzes the determinants of the probability of US citizens being victims of terrorist attacks in European countries, taking into account uncontrolled heterogeneity of the data. The analysis employs ITERATE data from February 1968 to December 2002 to ascertain significant characteristics that influence the probability (e.g. location, type of casualties, type of attack, and type of terrorists). To deal with the unobserved heterogeneity a random‐parameter logit model (mixed logit) is used. Some policy implications are presented.     

THE RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMBINING LOGIC WITH OBJECT­ORIENTED PARADIGM

ＴＨＥＲＥＳＥＡＲＣＨＡＮＤＩＭＰＬＥＭＥＮＴＡＴＩＯＮＯＦＣＯＭＢＩＮＩＮＧＬＯＧＩＣＷＩＴＨＯＢＪＥＣＴＯＲＩＥＮＴＥＤＰＡＲＡＤＩＧＭＺｈｏｕＬｉ;ＷｕＱｕａｎｙｕａｎ（ＤｅｐａｒｔｍｅｎｔｏｆＣｏｍｐｕｔｅｒＳｃｉｅｎｃｅ,ＮＵＤＴ,Ｃｈａｎ...     

NATO AS AN EXTERNAL DRIVER OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN POST‐COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

So far, economic analyses of NATO enlargement have been restricted to aspects of regional security while political analyses focused on indirect peace‐building effects on democracy in the first place. Our panel regressions for 25 post‐communist countries for the period from 1996 to 2008 reveal that direct incentives provided by NATO pre‐accession are important for broad‐based institutional development. Results are even more robust than for variables measuring EU pre‐accession or NATO membership effects. This supports the argument that NATO can act as a transformative power and should strengthen its political agenda.     

CALCULATION OF BURNING RATE CHARACTERISTICS IN ACCELERATED FIELD FOR SOME ALUMINIZED SOLID PROPELLANTS

ＣＡＬＣＵＬＡＴＩＯＮＯＦＢＵＲＮＩＮＧＲＡＴＥＣＨＡＲＡＣＴＥＲＩＳＴＩＣＳＩＮＡＣＣＥＬＥＲＡＴＥＤＦＩＥＬＤＦＯＲＳＯＭＥＡＬＵＭＩＮＩＺＥＤＳＯＬＩＤＰＲＯＰＥＬＬＡＮＴＳＣａｏＴａｉｙｕｅ（ＤｅｐａｒｔｍｅｎｔｏｆＡｅｒｏｓｐａｃｅＴｅｃｈ...     

ANALYSING DEFENCE DEPENDENCY: THE IMPACT OF THE ROYAL NAVY ON A SUB‐REGIONAL ECONOMY

This paper provides a methodology for estimating the economic impact of defence spending at a sub‐regional level. It does so by calculating the income and employment generated by Britain’s Royal Navy and associated defence activities in the City of Portsmouth and its surrounding area, during the financial year 2003–2004. In an era of military consolidation, the paper offers an insight into the multifaceted impact of defence‐related expenditure. Hence, it presents a generic framework that could prove useful to other researchers when seeking to measure the sub‐regional impact of naval, airforce and army facilities in other national contexts.     

A LONG‐RUN ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE NATO COUNTRIES (1960–99)

This paper analyses the long‐run demand for defence output through a homogeneous treatment of 15 NATO member countries between 1960 and 1999. We carry out a progressive study of the interactions between either defence spending or defence burden and their main determinants: income, external threat and allied military spending. To that end, we use time‐series analysis with endogenously determined structural breaks. We further consider individual country functions related to one another through a common correlated effects method, in order to take into account explicitly the connections between members of an alliance.     

THE F‐35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATIon AND EMPLOYMENT: SOME INTERIM RESULTS

The F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is important for innovation in the Dutch economy and also contributes to other programmes in the aerospace industry (spin‐off) and other industries (spillover). On top of the expected value of US$9.2 billion in development and production, based on interviews with 10 companies and research institutes, an expected spin‐off of US$1.1 billion and an expected spillover of US$120 million will result. In addition, over 23,000 man‐years are associated with the activities in the development and production of the JSF. This study excludes the large and labour‐intensive Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities. Further validation of data and an update of current results is planned for 2006.     

QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS: SUPPLY AND DEMAND RESTRAINTS IN A NORTH–SOUTH MACRO‐MODEL

This paper constructs a macroeconomic model of North–South interaction where the flow of narcotics from the South to the North is restricted. The economic effects are akin to quantitative restrictions in trade policy. Two alternative policy scenarios will be considered. One involves reducing the supply of drugs at the source, accompanied by aid. Supply‐side restrictions have negative aggregate supply‐side effects in the producing region, because of the monopoly rents generated from that type of control. This makes them a second‐best policy, particularly if the accompanying aid is not used for poverty alleviation and fails to expand domestic aggregate demand. Alternatively, demand side restrictions will be found to be superior.     

THE PEACE DIVIDEND EFFECT OF TURKISH CONVERGENCE TO THE EU: A MULTI‐REGION DYNAMIC CGE MODEL ANALYSIS FOR GREECE AND TURKEY

This paper examines the peace dividend effect of Turkish convergence to EU membership. By employing a multi‐region dynamic CGE model, we examine the prospect for conflict resolution if Turkey becomes an EU member. The model allows us to analyse several scenarios that imply varying amounts of reduction of the military expenditure/GDP ratios. On the one hand, this change will cause a decrease in sectoral demand for military expenditures, while on the other hand, reallocation of the reduced expenditure on (i) education, (ii) tax decrease, and (iii) infrastructure, should have a huge growth impact. Our dynamic CGE simulation experiments emphasize the economic gain for all parties involved.