THE ‘PRICE’ OF TERRORISM

Security measures are said to increase the price of terrorism. This price has not been hitherto defined in an economically meaningful way. This paper provides a precise definition by treating the terrorists’ resource endowment as a parcel of contingent claims to political influence with a price equal to the summed value of those contingent claims in potential states of the world. Equipped with this definition, an equilibrium model of the price of terrorism is deployed. Important insights are gained into the effect of terrorists’ risk aversion at the level of the price of terrorism in different states of the world and the theoretical conclusion is reached that higher security is associated with a lower price of terrorism rather than a higher price. The implications for policy are discussed.     

PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”

Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.

     

ANALYSING DEFENCE DEPENDENCY: THE IMPACT OF THE ROYAL NAVY ON A SUB‐REGIONAL ECONOMY

This paper provides a methodology for estimating the economic impact of defence spending at a sub‐regional level. It does so by calculating the income and employment generated by Britain’s Royal Navy and associated defence activities in the City of Portsmouth and its surrounding area, during the financial year 2003–2004. In an era of military consolidation, the paper offers an insight into the multifaceted impact of defence‐related expenditure. Hence, it presents a generic framework that could prove useful to other researchers when seeking to measure the sub‐regional impact of naval, airforce and army facilities in other national contexts.     

INCOMPLETE ROHLFS–SULLIVAN ANALYSIS OF THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMORED TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES FOR OVERSEAS US ARMY OPERATIONS

This comment addresses the Rohlfs–Sullivan analysis titled: ‘The Cost-Effectiveness of Armored Tactical Wheeled Vehicles [TWVs] for Overseas US Army Operations.’ The analysis evaluated policies to replace Type 1 and 2 TWVs with Type 3s. There is no evidence the analysis factored in fatality causes, fatality relationships to vehicles, or compared survivability of vehicles. Furthermore, it did not note when Type 3 TWVs were requested, when they impacted fatalities, or TWV use policies. It also assumed Type 3 TWVs prompted negative unit behaviors while discounting evidence of positive behaviors. In summary, the analysis is incomplete and should be revised.     

THE RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMBINING LOGIC WITH OBJECT­ORIENTED PARADIGM

ＴＨＥＲＥＳＥＡＲＣＨＡＮＤＩＭＰＬＥＭＥＮＴＡＴＩＯＮＯＦＣＯＭＢＩＮＩＮＧＬＯＧＩＣＷＩＴＨＯＢＪＥＣＴＯＲＩＥＮＴＥＤＰＡＲＡＤＩＧＭＺｈｏｕＬｉ;ＷｕＱｕａｎｙｕａｎ（ＤｅｐａｒｔｍｅｎｔｏｆＣｏｍｐｕｔｅｒＳｃｉｅｎｃｅ,ＮＵＤＴ,Ｃｈａｎ...     

THE PEACE DIVIDEND EFFECT OF TURKISH CONVERGENCE TO THE EU: A MULTI‐REGION DYNAMIC CGE MODEL ANALYSIS FOR GREECE AND TURKEY

This paper examines the peace dividend effect of Turkish convergence to EU membership. By employing a multi‐region dynamic CGE model, we examine the prospect for conflict resolution if Turkey becomes an EU member. The model allows us to analyse several scenarios that imply varying amounts of reduction of the military expenditure/GDP ratios. On the one hand, this change will cause a decrease in sectoral demand for military expenditures, while on the other hand, reallocation of the reduced expenditure on (i) education, (ii) tax decrease, and (iii) infrastructure, should have a huge growth impact. Our dynamic CGE simulation experiments emphasize the economic gain for all parties involved.     

A LONG‐RUN ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE NATO COUNTRIES (1960–99)

This paper analyses the long‐run demand for defence output through a homogeneous treatment of 15 NATO member countries between 1960 and 1999. We carry out a progressive study of the interactions between either defence spending or defence burden and their main determinants: income, external threat and allied military spending. To that end, we use time‐series analysis with endogenously determined structural breaks. We further consider individual country functions related to one another through a common correlated effects method, in order to take into account explicitly the connections between members of an alliance.     

THE F‐35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATIon AND EMPLOYMENT: SOME INTERIM RESULTS

The F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is important for innovation in the Dutch economy and also contributes to other programmes in the aerospace industry (spin‐off) and other industries (spillover). On top of the expected value of US$9.2 billion in development and production, based on interviews with 10 companies and research institutes, an expected spin‐off of US$1.1 billion and an expected spillover of US$120 million will result. In addition, over 23,000 man‐years are associated with the activities in the development and production of the JSF. This study excludes the large and labour‐intensive Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities. Further validation of data and an update of current results is planned for 2006.     

UNDER THE RADAR?

Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, by Dennis M. Gormley. Praeger Security International, 2008. 272 pages, $54.95.     

QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS: SUPPLY AND DEMAND RESTRAINTS IN A NORTH–SOUTH MACRO‐MODEL

This paper constructs a macroeconomic model of North–South interaction where the flow of narcotics from the South to the North is restricted. The economic effects are akin to quantitative restrictions in trade policy. Two alternative policy scenarios will be considered. One involves reducing the supply of drugs at the source, accompanied by aid. Supply‐side restrictions have negative aggregate supply‐side effects in the producing region, because of the monopoly rents generated from that type of control. This makes them a second‐best policy, particularly if the accompanying aid is not used for poverty alleviation and fails to expand domestic aggregate demand. Alternatively, demand side restrictions will be found to be superior.     

WHO IS THE ENEMY?

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and who benefits when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We determine the leadership structure under which each group is better off, as well as the circumstance that the common enemy prefers. We are able to state simple and general conditions for each group and the common enemy to benefit.     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.     

THE LAST TO DISARM?

France still sees its nuclear arsenal as essential both as insurance against future major risks and as support for an independent foreign policy. There is a wide consensus in the country to maintain a nuclear deterrent, both among political parties and the general public. A modernization program is under way that will ensure the continued efficacy of the French nuclear force well into the 2030s, and France has adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation of its disarmament commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This suggests that the likeliest future direction of France's nuclear policy is conservatism. However, other scenarios remain possible, especially in the domain of transatlantic and/or European cooperation.     

WHAT ARE THE ODDS?

Nuclear optimists and pessimists disagree on whether the odds of nuclear war are low or high. This viewpoint assesses the odds of nuclear war over the past sixty-six years, exploring three pathways to nuclear war: an international crisis leading directly to nuclear war, an accident or misperception leading to nuclear escalation or nuclear retaliation against an imaginary attack, and a general conventional war leading to nuclear war. The assessment is based on the application of Bayes's theorem and other statistical reasoning and finds that the expected probability of nuclear war during this historical period was greater than 50 percent. This level of risk is unacceptably high. It is therefore urgent that effective measures be taken to substantially reduce the risk of nuclear war.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.     

THE ‘EXPANDING TORRENT’: BRITISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

In May 2012, Zambia's Inspector-General of Police announced a crackdown on sex workers. This commentary discusses the rationale behind this proposed crackdown and the problems associated with such a policy response.     

HOW WAS THE COLD WAR WON?

Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, by Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson. Crown Publishers, 2009. 464 pages, $32.50.

The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War, by James Mann. Viking, 2009. 410 pages, $27.95.