Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks

Postmodern terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of crime and war, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and pose an epochal shift in the structures and relations among states. Negotiating this epochal shift requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective multi-lateral global network to counter global terrorism and insurgency.     

Terrorism, Crime and Private Armies

The nature of crime and conflict is rapidly evolving. Postmodern war is increasingly influenced by non-traditional and irregular combatants: non-state soldiers. These actors are exploiting technology and networked doctrine to spread their influence across traditional geographic boundaries. This emphasis on non-traditional actors accompanies a shift in political and social organization. This shift may well be a shift in state form: from nation-state to market-state. This transition is fueled by rapid developments in technology and the adoption of network organizational forms. Conflict during this transition blurs the distinctions between and among crime, terrorism and warfare. This essay explores the dynamics of terrorism, crime and private armies during this epochal shift.     

Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State

Bangladesh is currently facing an incremental growth of radicalization. This radicalization can be traced back to the country’s early post-Independence years. Over time, political violence, ideological clashes between secular and right-wing ideologies, and weak governance have created conditions for the growth of radical Islam. The public rhetoric on corruption, weakening of democratic institutions, inadequate law enforcement agencies, fragile justice delivery system, fledgling educational and social institutions and growing unemployment provides further space for alternative narratives by extremist ideologues. Home-grown extremist outfits have received ideological and tactical supports from transnational terrorist network such as Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), but only in a limited manner. The supply and demand side of radicalization in Bangladesh has not yet been addressed by actors such as the government, private sector, civil society and media. The failures in multiple sectors in the state governance have led to a situation where IS and AQIS now see Bangladesh as a potential ground for exerting their supremacy as flag bearers of radical forms of Islam.     

信息价值的战场网络战攻击威胁评估方法

通过构建信息价值综合评估模型,对C4ISR网络信息价值程度进行定量评估.然后对战场网络战攻击行为进行分析,将其攻击威胁量化到信息价值评估模型,通过被攻击网络信息价值的变化来衡量网络战攻击的威胁程度,从而提供了一种网络战攻击威胁的评估方法.     

Globalization's Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law

The international system has great difficulty in dealing with illegitimate non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates. This is due to two main factors: the quality and quantity of influence these illegitimate actors have obtained in an era of globalization, and the fact that international law considers only individual criminals and terrorists as subjects, rather than the entire illegitimate enterprise, and does not adequately link individuals, enterprises and states to more nuanced and complex forms of sponsorship of illegal activities. This work offers an outline for tools that should be embedded in the fabric of international law and agreements, to sustain credibility against illegal non-state actors, to hold accountable  sponsors of illegality and to reinforce the legitimacy of globalization.     

Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict,resistance and co-existence

Abstract

An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed movements in post-conflict settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop in wartime. This political identity is itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by the political ideology, practices and institutions established by the rebel organisation, but also by the relationship with the state and its political institutions. Far from functioning in a vacuum or isolated, rebel groups, especially when operating as alternative providers of governance, build multi-layered networks of relations with the state, the pre-existing traditional society institutions as well as with other domestic and international political actors. The study focuses specifically on two complex armed groups, Hezbollah and Hamas, relying on primary sources as well as in-depth fieldwork on these groups’ socio-political institution (In this case field work refers to both in-depth direct observation of the groups’ social networks and political infrastructures as well direct interviews and meetings with key stakeholders involved in the administration of those activities. The time-frame for the field work spans between 2008 and 2013). The research tracks their multiple interactions with the state through grassroots activism, institutional politics and governance. Despite their considerable differences, at their cores, both organisations operate in a liminal space between open war and fragile post-conflict setting; between grassroots activism and institutional politics; between armed resistance and political accommodation; and between competition and cooperation with the state. As such, they represent useful starting points to begin deconstructing and problematising existing dichotomies still prevalent in studying both rebel governance and rebel-to-political transitions, including the binary state-non-state opposition. In doing so, the analysis highlights the importance of taking into account the often hybrid and multi-layered political legacies adopted by armed groups during wartime and their impact in shaping their political trajectories as well as the potential roles for these groups in post-conflict settings.     

Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Abstract

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.     

Born violent: Armed political parties and non-state governance in Lebanon's civil war

We know little of the internal governing practices of non-state actors once in control of territory. Some territories have witnessed the establishment of new institutions of public goods remarkably similar to state institutions. This article compares four armed political parties governing territory during the Lebanese civil war. These non-state violent actors established complex political and economic institutions and administrative structures. Despite the wide range of ideologies and identities of these actors, they all converged in their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the particular ways of achieving those priorities. Data from interviews and the actions of the armed political parties suggest a combination of ideology and desire for control is causal in generating public institutions, partly attributable to the high degree of citizen activism marking the Lebanese case.     

The interaction between local and international power in EU police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

ABSTRACT

This article explores the interaction between local and international power structures in EU peacebuilding. While citizens in a state only face order from one authority (the state), local actors in a peacebuilding context are subject to orders from two institutions (the domestic state and the peacebuilding mission). This article explores the nature of interactions of these two institutions and their effect on local police officers’ compliance and resistance. Specifically, it analyzes the example of the police restructuring process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It demonstrates that the choices of local officers to comply or resist depended on whether the interactions between the EU Police Mission and the local police organization were positive and mutually supportive, or whether they were competitive and contradictory. The findings of the article contribute to the debates on the role of local power and the importance of local legitimacy in peacebuilding.     

Preventing conflict upstream: impunity and illicit governance across Colombia’s borders

This article explores how transnational borderlands matter for conflict prevention and, in particular, so-called upstream engagement, which aims to reduce threats to global stability and security that arise from the world’s increasing interconnectedness. Accounting for transnational borderlands in vulnerable regions is crucial for conflict prevention as pursued by the defence and security sector because borderlands are catalysts of the negative side of global interconnectedness: they are business hubs for transnational organised crime, sites of retreat for conflict actors, and safe havens for terrorists. The border areas’ proneness to impunity and the ability of violent non-state actors to govern these spaces illicitly contribute to the emergence of these characteristics. I therefore argue that upstream conflict prevention needs to do two things to address these risks: first, to overcome a national security approach centred on the borderline and instead acknowledge transnational security dynamics in borderlands on both sides of the border; second, to overcome the state-centred governance lens to also consider governance exerted by non-state actors. The article draws on empirical data from a six-year study including over a year of fieldwork in and on Colombia’s borderlands.     

Africa's toy soldiers,non-state armed groups,and ‘voluntary’ recruitment

Armed conflict on the African continent has witnessed increasing recruitment of child soldiers, often at the hands of non-state armed groups. Unfortunately this practice continues unabated in the face of legal obligations prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers under international humanitarian law, and international and regional human rights law. While international condemnation of the practice has led to attempts to increase the minimum age for recruitment to 18, a disjuncture persists between the legal obligations states sign up to, and the actual enforcement of these prohibitions at a domestic level.

International criminal law jurisprudence emanating from the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court is being monitored closely, as these courts seek to enforce the prohibition in all armed conflicts, and against both state actors and non-state armed groups. International humanitarian law only protects child soldiers who have been unlawfully recruited. In this piece, the authors take a closer look at what amounts to unlawful recruitment in light of customary international humanitarian law, since this body of law also binds non-state actors, even without further criminalising legislation at a domestic level. Moreover, the article briefly explores whether a child can ever void this protected status by volunteering to participate directly in hostilities.     

US Counterinsurgency vs Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism

Terrorist networks involve not only non-state actors but also an international environment in which state sponsors and 'gray areas' play significant roles. Non-state actors need the sanctuaries of state sponsors and of areas outside of effective state control to recruit, organize, and train their ranks, and to finance their activities. Through statistical analysis of statements of Iranian state intentions, and measures of direct US military interventions, this study examines how US military interventions into Iran's perceived sphere of interests deterred Iranian support for terrorist actions by its proxy groups against United States targets from 1980 to 1990.     

Countering insurgency: Turkey’s policy toward the PKK’s transnational dynamics in Europe

Insurgents often develop international connections and benefit from external assistance from a variety of sources. Support from diaspora communities has long been considered one of the critical external factors in the persistence of insurgent groups. Yet how the counterinsurgent state addresses external support from transnational ethnic communities and what factors influence the state's policies remain understudied. By focusing on the transnational political practices of the Kurdish community and the PKK in Western Europe, this paper examines how Turkey has addressed the diasporic support for the PKK since the 1980s. It shows that three major factors – the composition of foreign policy decision-makers, their ideological contestation over the Kurdish question, and the European political context – have affected Turkey's policy regarding the PKK's transnational dynamics in Europe.     

Deviant globalization: the application of strategic landpower*

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US landpower was able to gain control rapidly over terrain. However, that control ebbed as US presence weakened. Non-state actors, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda, gained control of segments of the population. Transnational Criminal Organizations capitalized on this permissive environment to strengthen their networks, often eroding the legitimacy of the host nation government, fueling regional instability, and, ultimately, undermining US policy objectives. The proliferation of deviant globalization, or the connectedness of subversive elements, is a key indicator of future conflict. Strategic landpower is uniquely positioned to influence the physical, psychological, economic, and social interactions of various non-state actors and their association with deviant globalization. It is no longer enough to seize and hold terrain. Landpower must also have the capability to influence the actions and attitudes of populations on that terrain wherever and whenever these interactions occur.     

Self-Defense Militias,Death Squads,and State Outsourcing of Violence in India and Turkey

What explains the variation in states’ nonstate partners in civil warfare? States often use nonstate actors to do what their regular military forces cannot do well – navigate the local population. Some of their nonstate partners are ordinary civilians, while others are battle-hardened fighters with a rebellious or criminal past. The choice of proxy carries serious implications for the patterns and effects of violence during civil war, human rights, and international security. This article is the first to disaggregate the nonstate counterinsurgents and offer an explanation for why and how states use each type. It brings together the politics of collaboration with the politics of exploitation. The article shows that the state’s use of nonstate proxies is shaped by the supply of willing collaborators, the state’s ability to exercise control over them, and the trade-offs underlying the use of the different types of nonstate actors. The empirical evidence used to support this argument comes from a novel, comparative study of Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign against Kurdish separatists and India’s counterinsurgency against Kashmiri separatists. The original data were collected through fieldwork in the disputed territories of each country.     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017     

Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed

Abstract

This article explores the effect of connectivity on strategic affairs. It argues that the effect on war's character is potentially, although not yet shown in practice, considerably large. Its effect upon the distribution of power among states in the international system is small, contrary to the claims of ‘cyberwar’ alarmists. All told, however, its effect upon strategic affairs is complex. On the one hand, it represents a significant advance in the ‘complexification’ of state strategies, understood in the sense of the production of intended effects. On the other hand, strategists today – still predominantly concerned with the conflicts and confrontations of states and organised military power – are generally missing the power which non-traditional strategic actors, better adapted to the network flows of the information age, are beginning to deploy. These new forms of organization and coercion will challenge the status quo.     

基于IMM-RUASFF的网络化目标跟踪算法

针对目前网络化目标跟踪算法存在实时性差、精度低等问题进行了研究。首先,基于网络信息共享需求,建立了网络探测节点的目标跟踪模型;其次,网络探测节点目标跟踪需求和实战要求发现目标经常是有多种运动状态并存,而单一模型的滤波器不能满足对机动目标跟踪性能的要求,采用了基于交互式多模型(Interacting Multiple Model,IMM)的有反馈实时更新的异步状态融合算法。最后,针对多个探测节点目标跟踪的状态融合估计问题,提出了一种有反馈实时更新的异步状态融合算法,通过仿真验证了算法的有效性。     

Crime facilitation purposes of social networking sites: A review and analysis of the ‘cyberbanging’ phenomenon

There have been growing claims in media circles and law-enforcement settings that street gangs and criminal groups are turning to Internet-based social networking sites for various reasons ranging from the showcasing of their images and exploits to the suspected recruitment of members. The present study investigates whether such a trend is, in fact, in place. The presence of street gangs on these Internet sites is referred to as cyberbanging. While there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that gangs are turning to social networking sites, there is little available research on exactly how street gangs and criminal groups use the Internet. Our main argument is that gang culture is in many ways an individualized phenomenon and this feature ties in directly with recent assessments of the Internet as a setting that is governed by a process of networked individualism. This theoretical link between the individualized gang setting and the presence of gang members on social networking sites helps us understand why recruitment is improbable even in a context where people are openly diffusing their image and exploits to a growing number of Internet users. The empirical segment of this research adds to this general outlook. Based on a keyword search of over 50 street gang names, the three main social networking sites (Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace) were monitored for street gang presence. Results illustrate that gang presence on social networking sites is linked primarily to promoting a general gang or street culture through individual displays. In regard to the visitors to such sites, there is no evidence that they are being tricked or manipulated in any way. They are, however, showing their curiosity in regard to such groups and, for those who share their comments and opinions, signs of support are evident. Thus, whereas criminal gangs are not proactively using the Internet to convert anyone into being gang members, social networking sites are creating a new venue for people who share or are sensitive to the values underlying street gang lifestyle to come together. These sites essentially create a new convergence setting for gang members to interact with a wider number of people who would probably never have been exposed to their lifestyles and exploits through physical interactions. The study's conclusion extends these findings toward further research in this area, as well as outlining the more relevant implications for law-enforcement monitoring of this growing phenomenon.     

TERRORISM AND DETERRENCE POLICY WITH TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT 1

This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians’ vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be ‘hawk to ‘dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from ‘dove’ toward ‘hawk,’ with terrorism intensified in the society.