U.S. policy on preventive war and preemption

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.     

‘A Better War?’ – The View from the Nixon White House

This article examines the relationship between the White House and the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during President Richard M. Nixon's administration. It argues that dysfunctional civil-military relations between 1969 and 1972 undermined the implementation of a sound military strategy during the United States' withdrawal from South Vietnam as Nixon attempted to achieve ‘peace with honor’ during the Vietnam War's final campaigns. By 1972, the relationship between the White House and MACV headquarters had reached the nadir of civil-military relations during the Southeast Asian conflict and had served to undercut the United States' ability to effectively disengage from a long and bitterly contested war.     

Four new takes on Wilson,World War I,and the making of the post-war order

The books under review here, by Robert F. Hannigan, John A. Thompson, Trygve Throntveit, and Adam Tooze, offer an interpretation of Wilsonian internationalism and what happened to it in the 1920s. For Tooze and Hannigan, Wilsonianism was primarily a project to attain American predominance in the world. For Throntveit, Wilsonian internationalism constituted a pragmatic yet radical effort to end competitive power politics. Thompson disagrees with these arguments and asserts that the key to understanding US policy lay in how US leaders conceptualized American power. Thompson’s interpretation is especially compelling in explaining why the United States failed to engage itself more assertively in international affairs in the 1920s – a failure Tooze suggests undermined the viability of the postwar international system.     

Generalized orienteering problem with resource dependent rewards

We introduce a generalized orienteering problem (OP) where, as usual, a vehicle is routed from a prescribed start node, through a directed network, to a prescribed destination node, collecting rewards at each node visited, to maximize the total reward along the path. In our generalization, transit on arcs in the network and reward collection at nodes both consume a variable amount of the same limited resource. We exploit this resource trade‐off through a specialized branch‐and‐bound algorithm that relies on partial path relaxation problems that often yield tight bounds and lead to substantial pruning in the enumeration tree. We present the smuggler search problem (SSP) as an important real‐world application of our generalized OP. Numerical results show that our algorithm applied to the SSP outperforms standard mixed‐integer nonlinear programming solvers for moderate to large problem instances. We demonstrate model enhancements that allow practitioners to represent realistic search planning scenarios by accounting for multiple heterogeneous searchers and complex smuggler motion. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution1

The Fisher naval revolution of 1904–10 represented a deliberate attempt to achieve defense transformation to bolster Britain's pretensions to global naval supremacy. The vision called for smaller, more capable forces to do the work of larger, more expensive conventional formations. It consisted of three main elements. First, the replacement of the traditional station fleet system for protecting overseas interests by rapid deployment forces comprised of battlecruisers that could be ‘maneuvered’ by wireless to combat specific enemy threats. Second, at home, instead of a sea control strategy based upon a superior battle-fleet, a sea denial strategy based on flotilla defense commanded and controlled from London via wireless. The third element of the Fisher revolution depended upon ‘plunging’, or shaping and directing technological change through a special relationship with armaments firms. A sophisticated information-communications network was integral to the revolution.     

Even if it were but betwixt memory and reputation,in retrospect serves neither

Robert S. McNamara [and Brian Van De Mark,] In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, NewYork:NewYork Times Books, Random House, 1995. Pp.xviii + 414. $27.50. ISBN 08129–2523–8.     

Maritime interdiction in Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency

A comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy to attack the insurgent's logistic system was a key element in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The campaign of maritime interdiction required the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to attack LTTE arms smuggling, sea piracy, and maritime terrorism. The SLN degraded the insurgency's robust maritime logistical network while also devising tactics to engage the maritime insurgents who reacted with swarm and suicide boat tactics. The efforts of the SLN forced the Tamil Tigers to confront the government's final land offensives with diminished resources, thus collapsing a three decades’ old insurgency in a matter of months.     

It's all the rage: why mechanization doesn't explain COIN outcomes

A recent article, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, does a disservice to the debate over what explains counterinsurgency (COIN) success. While it establishes a negative correlation between the diffusion of military mechanization in the state system and COIN success, its theoretical argument does not hold up under close scrutiny and its micro-case comparison of two units in Iraq during 2003–2004 ignores obvious counter-examples and factors that influence COIN success, such as leadership. A deeper inquiry would have revealed that there is much more to COIN success than simply not having access to vehicles.     

Taking advantage of insurgencies: effective policies of state-sponsorship

Taking insurgency sponsorship as an instrument states have available for achieving foreign policy objectives, I consider how state-sponsors could best manipulate their support to maximize control of the proxy group. Building on research that models the state-sponsor–insurgent relationship using a principal–agent framework, I identify two key vulnerabilities to which the state-sponsor is exposed: adverse selection and agency slack. As an original contribution to the literature on state-sponsorship of insurgency, I articulate reasons why certain forms of support would be most conducive to overcoming these problems and illustrate how South Africa and Iran used those kinds of support to influence the behavior of their proxies, RENAMO and Hezbollah. Additionally, I consider how this principal–agent analysis of insurgency sponsorship also could apply when the principal is an international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda. Finally, I address the relevance of these ideas to two contemporary conflicts taking place in Syria and the Congo.