Technical note: Characterization of binomial semivalues through delegation games

Semivalues are allocation rules for cooperative games that assign to each player in a given game a weighted sum of his marginal contributions to all coalitions he belongs to, where the weighting coefficients depend only on the coalition size. Binomial semivalues are a special class of semivalues whose weighting coefficients are obtained by means of a unique parameter. In particular, the Banzhaf value is a binomial semivalue. In this article, we provide an axiomatic characterization for each binomial semivalue. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Why do they serve? Changes and differences in motives of Danish soldiers deployed to peace-keeping and peace-enforcing missions

This paper investigates what motivates young people to volunteer for peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions and how their motives change between pre- and post-deployment. Data include information about social and military background, and motives for more than 600 soldiers, 444 of whom answered the survey both before and after deployment. Soldiers are deployed to different missions under the same circumstances. To conceptualize motives among soldiers, we use factor analysis and find three factors: challenge, self-benefit, and fidelity. Challenge represents an occupational orientation; fidelity, an institutional orientation; and self-benefit, a desire for adventure. Exploiting the within-subject design of our data, we find that pre- and post-deployment motives vary significantly according to the type of mission and soldiers’ previous experiences (first-timers or experienced soldiers). Our results suggest that after the mission, peace-keepers are generally more disappointed than peace-enforcers. Our results also show that self-benefit motives are important for younger soldiers with only a high school education, and that this group usually serves as peace-enforcers during their gap year.     

Crime facilitation purposes of social networking sites: A review and analysis of the ‘cyberbanging’ phenomenon

There have been growing claims in media circles and law-enforcement settings that street gangs and criminal groups are turning to Internet-based social networking sites for various reasons ranging from the showcasing of their images and exploits to the suspected recruitment of members. The present study investigates whether such a trend is, in fact, in place. The presence of street gangs on these Internet sites is referred to as cyberbanging. While there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that gangs are turning to social networking sites, there is little available research on exactly how street gangs and criminal groups use the Internet. Our main argument is that gang culture is in many ways an individualized phenomenon and this feature ties in directly with recent assessments of the Internet as a setting that is governed by a process of networked individualism. This theoretical link between the individualized gang setting and the presence of gang members on social networking sites helps us understand why recruitment is improbable even in a context where people are openly diffusing their image and exploits to a growing number of Internet users. The empirical segment of this research adds to this general outlook. Based on a keyword search of over 50 street gang names, the three main social networking sites (Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace) were monitored for street gang presence. Results illustrate that gang presence on social networking sites is linked primarily to promoting a general gang or street culture through individual displays. In regard to the visitors to such sites, there is no evidence that they are being tricked or manipulated in any way. They are, however, showing their curiosity in regard to such groups and, for those who share their comments and opinions, signs of support are evident. Thus, whereas criminal gangs are not proactively using the Internet to convert anyone into being gang members, social networking sites are creating a new venue for people who share or are sensitive to the values underlying street gang lifestyle to come together. These sites essentially create a new convergence setting for gang members to interact with a wider number of people who would probably never have been exposed to their lifestyles and exploits through physical interactions. The study's conclusion extends these findings toward further research in this area, as well as outlining the more relevant implications for law-enforcement monitoring of this growing phenomenon.     

A non‐linear defence‐growth nexus? evidence from the US economy

The defense‐growth nexus is investigated empirically using time series data for the US and allowing the effect of defense spending on growth to be non‐linear. Using recently developed econometric methods involving threshold regressions, evidence of a level‐dependent effect of military expenditure on GDP growth is found: the positive externality effect of defense spending prevails for relatively lower levels of defense spending (with respect to the history of defense spending in the US) and reverts its influence for higher levels.     

COUNTRY SURVEY XX: DEFENCE SPENDING AND PEACEKEEPING IN URUGUAY

Uruguay is a country with a very unusual profile, since it has just 3.4 million inhabitants but is among the top ten troop contributors to the UN PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) and is the first contributor per capita. In 2002 and 2003 it was the seventh troop contributor to the UN, and by the end of 2005 it was eighth in the UN ranking. Uruguay has never had any imminent external threat to its security after its independence in 1828, and it has had no internal threat since the end of the urban guerrillas’ actions in the 1970s. The country has no defence industry, and has always had an all‐volunteer military service, which presently involves almost 1% of the total population, and about 2% of the labour force. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that, in the past decades, Uruguayan defence spending has been influenced mainly by internal factors, most of them of an economic nature. The high participation in PKO has not increased military expenditure and it has produced a positive impact on the country’s economy.     

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN

In 2003, the “E3”—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—engaged Iran in talks over Tehran's nuclear program and were joined in negotiations the next year by the European Union (EU). Given the dim prospects of success for these talks, why did the E3/EU pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran? This article's three-track analysis attempts to answer that question by examining the emergence of the EU nonproliferation policy prior to the E3/EU-Iran talks, analyzing the European-Iranian relationship as it pertains to cooperation and negotiations over nonproliferation and other issues, and considering contemporary influences on the E3/EU. The European Union was ultimately unsuccessful in its negotiations with Tehran, but its efforts were worthwhile. In the future, the organization can play a vital nonproliferation role; today, the circumstances that hampered previous European efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff have improved and could be capitalized on by the European Union and the international community.     

COURTING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH “DUAL-BENEFIT” NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENT

President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders continue to assert that the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors is one of most pressing challenges to global security today. Yet, Western efforts to engage governments—particularly governments across the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have largely yielded disappointing results. This viewpoint examines the need for a new strategy to engage the developing world in nonproliferation programs. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable, and ultimately are destined for failure. An alternative “dual-benefit” nonproliferation engagement strategy utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments needed to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. In a concluding section, we recommend that the “Group of 8” Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement as it sets out to identify and fund WMD nonproliferation capacity-building initiatives beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.