On the first time a separately maintained parallel system has been down for a fixed time

Consider a system consisting of n separately maintained independent components where the components alternate between intervals in which they are “up” and in which they are “down”. When the i^th component goes up [down] then, independent of the past, it remains up [down] for a random length of time, having distribution F_i[G_i], and then goes down [up]. We say that component i is failed at time t if it has been “down” at all time points s ?[t-A.t]: otherwise it is said to be working. Thus, a component is failed if it is down and has been down for the previous A time units. Assuming that all components initially start “up,” let T denote the first time they are all failed, at which point we say the system is failed. We obtain the moment-generating function of T when n = l, for general F and G, thus generalizing previous results which assumed that at least one of these distributions be exponential. In addition, we present a condition under which T is an NBU (new better than used) random variable. Finally we assume that all the up and down distributions F_i and G_i i = l,….n, are exponential, and we obtain an exact expression for E(T) for general n; in addition we obtain bounds for all higher moments of T by showing that T is NBU.     

All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy

Abstract

Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.     

Crane scheduling with spatial constraints

In this work, we examine port crane scheduling with spatial and separation constraints. Although common to most port operations, these constraints have not been previously studied. We assume that cranes cannot cross, there is a minimum distance between cranes and jobs cannot be done simultaneously. The objective is to find a crane‐to‐job matching which maximizes throughput under these constraints. We provide dynamic programming algorithms, a probabilistic tabu search, and a squeaky wheel optimization heuristic for solution. Experiments show the heuristics perform well compared with optimal solutions obtained by CPLEX for small scale instances where a squeaky wheel optimization with local search approach gives good results within short times. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Value added analysis for army equipment modernization

This paper describes the Value Added Analysis methodology which is used as part of the U.S. Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System to assist the Army leadership in evaluating and prioritizing competing weapon system alternatives during the process of building the Army budget. The Value Added Analysis concept uses a family of models to estimate an alternative system's contribution to the Army's effectiveness using a multiattribute value hierarchy. A mathematical optimization model is then used to simultaneously determine an alternative's cost‐benefit and to identify an optimal mix of weapon systems for inclusion in the Army budget. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 233–253, 1999     

‘Mad Dog?’ Samuel Huntington and the Vietnam War

Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has frequently been considered a Vietnam War hawk. His observation that ‘forced-draft urbanization’ might help the United States win the war has come to define his engagement in contemporary strategic debates. This essay argues that both Huntington’s academic work and his private policy advice to the U.S. Government in fact urged a political settlement to the conflict. It argues that in spite of this, Huntington refused to break publicly with the U.S. policy because of his wider concern over what he saw as a crisis of authority in the U.S. foreign policy and governing institutions in the era.     

Shots per casualty: an indicator of combat efficiency for the first Australian task force in South Vietnam

ABSTRACT

In combat, the ratio of shots fired per casualty inflicted can provide a measure of the combat effectiveness of a force. The shots per casualty ratio achieved by the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam is shown to change according to factors including marksmanship, tactics and combat type. While, over the course of the campaign, 1ATF fired an increasing number of shots to achieve a casualty, this is explained by improvements in the quality of Viet Cong and People’s Army small arms. Australian Task Force and US Army shots per casualty ratios are briefly compared..