Kinetics in counterinsurgency: some influences on soldier combat performance in the 1st Australian Task Force in the Vietnam War

Counterinsurgency is often characterized by large numbers of small fire-fights interspersed with a few larger battles. Heavy firepower contributes to the outcome of the larger battles but the smaller contacts are often fought by infantry without heavy weapons support. Infantry combat performance in these fire-fights is therefore a key concern. It has been fashionable to discuss soldier combat performance in terms of ‘firers’, ‘non-firers’, and ‘posturers’, but we argue that other factors have a greater impact. We provide a detailed statistical analysis of a selection of combat factors, using combat data collected by the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) during the Vietnam War. An accepted measure of soldier lethality is the ‘shots per casualty’ ratio. Using this measure we are now able to describe the combat performance of the Australian infantry section in Vietnam in much greater detail than has hitherto been possible.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

The Value of Respect: What Does it Mean for an Army?

The Australian Army has adopted “respect” as a new addition to the existing trio of values, “courage, initiative and teamwork.” This article explores what respect may mean as an army value. The significance of respect surrounding two incidents involving Australian Defence Force personnel while on duty in Afghanistan is considered. The first is the so-called “green on blue” attack by an Afghan National Army soldier killing three Australian soldiers on 29 August 2012. The second concerns allegations of mutilation of suspected Afghan insurgents’ corpses by soldiers attached to an Australian Special Forces Unit on 28 April 2013. The incidents have resulted in internal military investigations: in the second incident, with a view to possible prosecution for breach of the law of armed conflict and related disciplinary offences; and in the case of the green on blue attack, leading to a civilian coronial inquest. This article discusses the training and modelling of behaviour required to instil such a value as respect.     

Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands

ABSTRACT

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.     

Provocation,war and restraint under the nuclear shadow: The Kargil conflict 1999

ABSTRACT

The Kargil conflict was a limited war between India and Pakistan fought along the Kashmir Line of Control during the spring/summer of 1999. Named for the principal town in the combat zone on the Indian side, it was the first open warfare between India and Pakistan as declared nuclear weapons states and included the first combat employment of the Indian Air Force since 1971. Despite its intensity, it was also characterised by considerable restraint on both sides. The potential for conventional escalation, however, was high and the possibility of nuclear confrontation could not be excluded. It had significant long-term ramifications for both countries and constitutes an important part of the backdrop to their relations today.     

Peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation: The unique case of the U.S. Air Force and Battlefield Air Interdiction

ABSTRACT

Military doctrine assures a nation’s survival. Yet even when faced with a security threat that requires change, militaries rarely innovate but instead adhere to old doctrines that enhance autonomy, reduce uncertainty and claim resources. Existing theories cannot explain an important case of peacetime military innovation when the U.S. Air Force adopted Battlefield Air Interdiction to support the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. A revised theory of peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation resulting from external and internal threats explains not only why innovation occurred with Battlefield Air Interdiction but also why such successful cases are so rare.     

Political influence on civil war mortality rates: The electoral college as a battlefield

This paper employs public choice analysis to explain certain kinds of military decision‐making during the Civil War. Specifically, the political costs and benefits which may have influenced policy with respect to casualty rates in the Union army are considered. A primary empirical finding is that electoral votes per capita are a strong explainer of casualties across Union states, all else equal.     

Revisiting money-laundering legislation in Zimbabwe and the role of international organisations

ABSTRACT

International Organisations (IOs) are crucial actors in spearheading the global adoption of anti-money-laundering (AML) legislation. However, the extent to which AML legislation has been implemented in Zimbabwe under the aegis of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and East Africa and Southern Africa Money Laundering Group (ESSAMALG) may put the efficacy of legislation passed at the behest of IOs into question. This article suggests that glocalisation may enhance the international fight against money-laundering. That is to say, international standards should be applied domestically with due regard for local legislative environment.     

Accounting for army recruitment: White and non-white soldiers and the British Army

A statistically based enquiry into recruitment into the British Army over the period 1987-2000 shows that two factors tend to induce young men to enlist: high levels of unemployment in the civilian sector and positive signals from the authorities that the Army is in a recruiting phase. The same result obtains, broadly speaking, in the context of both white and non-white (ethnic minority) recruitment, although the willingness of ethnic minority young men to contemplate an Army career is only about a quarter of that of white men, other things being equal. Correspondingly, the Army shows no signs of reaching the target agreed with the Commission for Racial Equality in 1997 for a 1 percentage point increase annually in the percentage of recruits being drawn from the ethnic minorities. This article has something to say about how the Army might improve its performance in this regard by offering more in-service training and education to otherwise underqualified recruits and concentrating recruitment effort on regions of high ethnic minority unemployment.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

An empirical assessment of us air force

The US Air Force is facing a record shortfall in pilots over the coming decade. Using personnel data on more than 10,000 Air Force pilots, this study examines the factors affecting the retention of pilots and assesses the effectiveness of the pilot bonus programme implemented by the Air Force to reduce attrition. Although surveys indicated sustained deployment rates were the leading cause of job dissatisfaction among Air Force pilots, the results of this study suggest economic factors had the largest impact on retention.     

How old is too old? An economic approach to replacing military aircraft

The US Air Force is asking when to replace its aging aircraft. We develop a framework to identify economically optimal replacement strategies that recognizes cost trade-offs and incorporates age effects. We also preview a stochastic methodology. We use the framework to identify an optimal strategy, defined by the replacement age, for a generic fleet and conduct a sensitivity analysis. Quantitative illustrations show that the range of strategies that provides close-to-optimal outcomes widens as the operating and support (O&S) cost growth rate decreases and the ratio of the acquisition price to the initial O&S cost increases. A wider range implies more decision-making leeway.     

Home-Grown Fighting: A Response to the Argument for a Byzantine Influence on MS I.33

Abstract

In an earlier issue, Dr. Timothy Dawson suggested that the fighting techniques found in Royal Armouries MS I.33 may have been influenced by earlier Byzantine sword and shield combat. For evidence, he cites a series of 9th-century ivory carvings depicting similar positions found in I.33. This article is a response to Dr. Dawson’s, in which it is argued that there is ample evidence for similar combat positions being found in Western Europe that both pre-date and are contemporary with I.33.     

Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province

Abstract

In contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns de-escalation is typically achieved by obtaining the local population's collaboration. The rationale underlying this approach is that such collaboration spawns control over the population and therefore weakens the insurgent's position. This article seeks to understand how this approach is practised in the reality of contemporary counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq as well as Afghanistan counter-insurgents were confronted with fragmented indigenous societies in which the various local segments were dominated by local power-holders. Consequently, obtaining the local population's collaboration required co-option of these agents. As such a strategy of co-option is a highly localized approach, this article focuses on Afghanistan's Uruzgan province and analyzes the implementation of co-option by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which operated there from 2006 to 2010. The analysis discusses how the counter-insurgents obtained a profound understanding of Uruzgan's societal landscape and how co-option of local power-holders became part of the counter-insurgency routine. In the end, co-option was successfully implemented as TFU even succeeded in obtaining the collaboration of previously marginalized elements of the population. However, as the methods employed for co-option were mainly of a persuasive nature, the TFU co-option strategy was less effective in containing the influence of notorious spoilers. Thus this case study provides an insight into the dynamics and limitations of co-option as a tool for de-escalation in contemporary counter-insurgency warfare.     

Upper and lower bounds for a pattern bombing problem

This paper includes two simple analytic formulas for kill probability that are applicable in circumstances where shots should be fired in a pattern. The two formulas bracket the maximum kill probability achievable with an optimal pattern. The upper bound corresponds to an optimal nonfeasible pattern, and the lower bound to a nonoptimal feasible pattern.     

Decision costs in the intelligence cycle

John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti‐Myths of War 1861–1945. London: Sidgwick &; Jackson, 1980. Pp. 240; £8.95.

Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet: Earl Beatty. London: Collins,1980. Pp. 430; £12.95.

Peter and Leni Gillman, ’Collar the Lot’. How Britain Interned and Expelled its Wartime Refugees. London: Quartet Books, 1980. Pp. 314; £8.95.

Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gels An Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. Pp. xiii + 216; £8.50.

Christoph Bertram (ed), Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s. London: Macmillan, and IISS, 1980. Pp. 126; £15.

James M. Roherty (ed.), Defense Policy Formulation: Towards Comparative Analysis. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1980. Pp. 315; $14.95.

Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Dolanyi, The Dangers of Nuclear War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979. $15.00.

Kenneth Mackenzie, Turkey under the Generals. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies. Number 126, January 1981. Pp. 31.     

基于多分辨率的空军作战仿真建模研究

多分辨率建模技术是近年来建模与仿真领域研究的热点之一。首先分析了空军作战仿真面临的新挑战,指出多分辨率建模技术是解决现代作战仿真的有效方法;再在解析多分辨率建模相关概念的基础上,分析了空军作战仿真多分辨率建模的必要性;最后,采用面向实体的分析方法给出了空军作战仿真模型体系,并对模型聚合解聚问题进行了分析。     

面向任务的网络化作战体系优化模型

建模研究网络化作战体系对于分析未来信息战争的作战效能具有重要意义。面向任务是网络化作战体系的关键特征,提出了一种基于多目标遗传算法实时分配网络化作战任务的策略,从单一任务到并发任务模型,提出了一种多任务管理的实现方法,经仿真验证,网络化作战体系模型有效。     

The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894

ABSTRACT

Between 1892 and 1894 the Force Publique of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State engaged in a series of little-known counter-insurgency operations against ivory and slave traders from Zanzibar, commonly referred to as Arabs. Without a particularly strong tradition of imperial service, this article argues that the predominantly Belgian officer corps borrowed and adapted methods used by more experienced colonial forces in the 19^th Century. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the Force Publique’s counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, provide further evidence as to how some base theories could be universally applied.     

Squad leaders today,village leaders tomorrow: Muslim auxiliaries and tactical politics in Algeria, 1956–1962

From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict.