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31.
This paper considers real-time decision rules for an inventory system where items are repaired than “used up.” The problem is to decide which user in the system has the greatest need for the newly available inventory items coming out of repair. The main result shows that two published approahes, the Transportation Time Look Ahead policy and METRIC, are optimal when the number of users gets large. A useful byproduct of the proof is a lower bound on the average backorder rate for a repair-inventory system of any size.  相似文献   
32.
Capacity improvement and conditional penalties are two computational aides for fathoming subproblems in a branch‐and‐bound procedure. In this paper, we apply these techniques to the fixed charge transportation problem (FCTP) and show how relaxations of the FCTP subproblems can be posed as concave minimization problems (rather than LP relaxations). Using the concave relaxations, we propose a new conditional penalty and three new types of capacity improvement techniques for the FCTP. Based on computational experiments using a standard set of FCTP test problems, the new capacity improvement and penalty techniques are responsible for a three‐fold reduction in the CPU time for the branch‐and‐bound algorithm and nearly a tenfold reduction in the number of subproblems that need to be evaluated in the branch‐and‐bound enumeration tree. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 341–355, 1999  相似文献   
33.
A centralized inventory system serves a number of stores with common ownership, and thus reliable and timely information sharing. Each of them pays a share of the inventory cost, and the reward structure leaves the owners of individual stores rewarded for their individual performance. Appropriate selection of a cost allocation method is important if such a centralized system is to last. In this work we propose three necessary criteria—stability (core of a related cooperative game), justifiability (consistency of benefits with costs), and polynomial computability. For a concrete example we demonstrate that common allocation procedures may not meet all three tests, and we present a method that that meets all three criteria. This kind of cost allocation analysis helps the common management to evaluate the trade-offs in choosing an allocation scheme for the cost of inventory centralization. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  相似文献   
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