Small countries and the consolidation of the European defence industry: Portugal as a case study

In this paper, we analyse the dilemma confronted by a small country in relation to the consolidation taking place in the European defence industry. Assuming that Portugal must maintain its armed forces, and must retain a minor defence industry, this industry must be competitive in small niches. Competitiveness must be based on, amongst other elements, technical efficiency and technological change. We investigate this issue, first characterizing the threats faced by the Portuguese defence industry, then investigating its present efficiency and finally, we discuss its role in the consolidation of the European Industry. We conclude that the Portuguese defence industry has no alternative but to opt for innovation and European partnership, which are complementary policies, but which require the active involvement of the stakeholder (i.e. the Government) in effecting these fundamental shifts in direction and emphasis. If this strategy does not succeed, the defence policy should be based on offsets.     

Colombia: Changing strategy amidst the struggle

From 1965 to the present, Colombia has been confronted by the insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The threat reached a new level in 1996 with the advent of mobile warfare, whereby large units sought to neutralize the military in an effort to seize power and institute a Marxist-Leninist regime. Unlike Vietnam, what followed was a regaining of the strategic initiative by the government and a decimation of the insurgent threat. This was accomplished with US assistance but from first to last was driven by Colombian leadership and strategy. The strategy which led to this signal change, ‘Democratic Security’, unfolded under the leadership of President Álvaro Uribe. It was a civil–military partnership, which sought to expand the writ of Colombian democracy to all elements of society. Securing the population provided the shield behind which economic, social, and political life could occur as driven by the will of the people. It was the agreement upon legitimacy as the strategic goal and reform as the route to that goal which allowed the Colombians and the Americans to work so well together.     

Country survey: Angola

This paper is a survey of Angola’s defence sector and policy from 1992, the year the civil war ended, to 2012. Angola achieved its independence upon the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeating National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Since then, fuelled by its rich natural resources, the country has grown steadily. The MPLA military forces were a central factor behind independence and maintain their central role to this day. Moreover, Angola’s support for African peace with monitoring military missions is a clear indication that the country aims to intervene in African security and military issues, with its military capabilities funded by oil revenues.     

What are the Effects of Large-scale Violence on Social and Institutional Trust? Using the Civil War Literature to Understand the Case of Mexico, 2006–2012

What is the relationship between drug violence and political attitudes? In this article, we test the relationship between violence and trust using both individual and municipality data for Mexico from 2006 to 12. Using multilevel analysis, we find no support for the thesis that individual experiences with criminal violence drives trust, nor do we find a relationship between levels of violence at the municipio level and trust. However, we do find that perceived threats to individual security leads to less social and institutional trust, but this is independent of personal experience and whether the individual resides in violent communities.     

Network structure of insurgent groups and the success of DDR processes in Colombia

We argue that organizational structure of insurgent organizations influences the prospects for success in a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR). In essence, we argue that more cohesive, tighter networks have higher levels of supervision and control on its military units and increase the probability of successful DDR processes. In order to evaluate our hypotheses, we use the theory of networks to map and characterize the network structure of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Our results suggest that armed military units grouped in smaller and more isolated components on the network remilitarize with higher probability with respect to other units on the network. Also, we find that military units with high degree of centrality on the network play an important role for the risk of conflict recurrence and success in a DDR process.