Globalisation in the defence industry: An exploration of the paradigm for us and European defence firms and the implications for being global players

This paper explores some of the key issues associated with the restructuring of the defence industry. A comparison is made between the US and the European Defence Industrial Bases in terms of the drivers for change and the paradigms within which change has taken place. Having shown that some very important differences exist, the paper then explores the approaches that have been adopted for industry consolidation and references them to the academic literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances (SAs). Given that most of the key defence players recognise the need to be global players, the paper presents an argument that the European firms’ experience of operating with a wide range of forms of corporate alliance will serve them in good stead for operating on a global defence scale. US firms, in contrast, have focused largely on M&A activity.     

The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective

European defence policy has been dominated by politics. This paper shows how economic principles can be used to derive guidelines for the formulation of European defence policy. The inefficiencies of the EU's existing defence arrangements are identified. It is shown that there is scope for efficiency improvements in the EU's Armed Forces and its defence industries.     

European defence industry consolidation and domestic procurement bias

How have European cross-border defence industrial mergers and acquisitions affected domestic procurement bias among the major EU powers? This article departs from the findings of Andrew Moravcsik more than two decades ago suggesting that major West European states had no ingrained preferences for defence industrial autarchy. When cross-national armament projects were derailed, this could be attributed to political efforts of national defence industrial champions favouring purely domestic projects. As former national champions join pan-European defence groups, their preferences are likely modified. Does this shift procurement towards non-European “off-the-shelf” solutions which, according to Moravcsik, are favoured by defence departments? Or does it give impetus to a stronger preference for European as opposed to domestic systems? In this article, procurement patterns in the aftermath of cross-border defence industry consolidation will be analysed. Procurement bias is assessed in two industry segments characterised by pervasive consolidation.     

The future of the defence firm in small and medium countries

The Western European defence industry used to be characterized by numerous constraints, especially in the small countries, subject to uneconomic defence production policies. It faces, since the end of the Cold War, a succession of new challenges such as budget restrictions, armament reductions and geopolitical upheavals. The EU is pushing in the direction of a cohesive foreign policy, including security and defence. Today, the emergence of a more consolidated European defence industry and the presence of oligopolistic European companies imply the definition of new roles for the EU and for its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The solution is not protectionism, but more co‐operation to ensure effective defence production at a socially acceptable cost. In the framework of this co‐operation, defence companies in small and medium countries have a role to play as part of the supply chain to major weapon system integrators.     

The Czech defence and security industry: taking the pulse to an ailing man

ABSTRACT

The paper summarises the evolution of the iron triangle of the mutual relationships amongst the ministry of defence, defence industry, and the political elite in the post-communist Czech Republic in 1990-2020. The essay stresses the oddness of this relationship. On the one hand, the government is bound by a partnership to the Defence and Security Industry Association of the Czech Republic (DSIA), a lobbying group of more than 100 organisations that conduct business in defence and security sector in Czechia. Yet, since its creation in 2000, this assemblage of industries within DSIA's market position is falling, in fact. Neither political parties in power, nor the governments have been able to support national defence industry through the small military. Just a few DSIA national members are able to compete internationally with their cutting-edge products. Others have evolved into middlemen trading intime-expired Czechoslovak equipment retired from the Czech Armed Forces.     

To free or not to free (ride): a comparative analysis of the NATO burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania

ABSTRACT

The recent rise in the defence budgets among the NATO members reawakens the free-riding dilemma. This article provides an analysis of the defence spending of two new member states, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Based on the free-riding theory, we explain why some of the new NATO members decide to increase their defence budgets (Lithuania), and others do not (Czech Republic). In contrast to the majority of works which focus either on the US as the biggest spender or on the “old” members of the Alliance, we explain under what circumstances some of the small European states who became new NATO members started to increase their defence budgets even though they do not have to, and the literature suggests that free-riding is easier. In the process, we identify three crucial factors that in?uence the decision-making process in this regard: the level of threat perception, economic situation, and the US pressure.     

Addressing the “headwinds” faced by the European arms industry

ABSTRACT

The European arms industry is challenged by several adverse “headwinds.” Fragmentation leads to costly duplications and, in conjunction with stagnating budgets and sharply increasing costs, prevents firms from exploiting economies of scale and learning. This is exacerbated by size differentials vis-a-vis the leading US arms manufacturers and competition from emerging producers. As some “headwinds” are self-enforcing, far-reaching industrial and policy responses are required to improve the industry's outlook. As exports may not indefinitely compensate for low domestic demand, there is an economic imperative for further cross-border collaboration and consolidation. Despite various EU policy initiatives, progresses regarding the European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence Technological Industrial Base have been relatively slow. It remains to be seen whether the European Defence Fund will be the proclaimed “game-changer,” raising competitiveness of the European arms industry. At the same time, the UK's withdrawal from the EU adds uncertainties.     

Patents and Dual-use Technology: An Empirical Study of the World's Largest Defence Companies

Abstract

This paper examines the generation of technological knowledge by leading companies in the defence industry. In particular, we test whether the characteristics of large defence companies are related to both the production of different types of patents (civilian, military and mixed), and the generation of dual-use technologies. To explore these links, we rely on economic data for the top 100 defence companies from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, and patent information from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. Our results show that the relationship between the production of civilian patents and the size of the company is positive and significant. However, this relationship does not hold for the production of military patents. Furthermore, the military commercial profile is unrelated to the generation of military patents. Regarding the involvement in dual-use technologies, firms engaged in dual-use are those with higher military sales, a greater number of employees and a larger number of patents (civilian, military and mixed) than those not engaged in dual-use. Furthermore, we found a skill effect (more involvement in dual-use per employee) in European firms compared to US firms. These findings help to identify which firms should be targeted by government policies if increasing dual-use technologies becomes a political objective.     

The Serbian defence institution: the need for clear policy guidance to improve the Serbian defence planning,management, and command processes

ABSTRACT

The uncritical layering of western liberal defence governance norms and concepts on top of existing legacy concepts has impeded achieving coherent military capabilities and capacities when Serbia’s political and military leadership tried to reform the defence system using Western benchmarking principles and Western countries’ best practices. The process of this change has been more valuable than its actual output, as defined by increased capabilities. Such outcomes should be reflective of policy guidance, and can be thought of as closing the trinity loop of a defence planning system: plans, money and execution. This article addresses two key functional areas of the Serbian defence institution. First, it assesses the current state of defence planning to discern its strengths and weaknesses to ascertain if plans are tied to financial decision-making. Second, a full examination of current Serbian defence management is conducted to discern whether weaknesses exist that distract from producing operational capabilities. Both areas are analyzed thoroughly and some solutions for change are proposed. Also, the article analyzes the appearance of two negative phenomena in the planning process – economization and managerialism.     

Country survey VI: Australia

Australia is a geographically large country, with the world's longest national coastline to defend, but a relatively small economy of some 17.5 million people. Since World War II, Australia has faced the dilemma of how to structure defence policy in the absence of an identifiable threat. Its policy of self‐reliance aims to permit Australia to conduct defensive operations in the event of low/medium level threats without depending immediately on its allies. This is to be achieved through the technological sophistication of defence equipment, a highly professional but small defence force and local industry support.

The burden of defence, measured as the share of defence outlay in GDP declined from about 3% in 1971–72 to about 2.3% in 1993–94. It has been the Government's policy to encourage the development of local defence‐related industry, in particular in areas such as: electronics/optics; communications and information technology; aerospace; shipbuilding and repair, munitions; and land vehicles. However, defence procurement has a small impact on the Australian economy as a whole.     

Defence industry in Iran – between needs and real capabilities

ABSTRACT

The paper’s goal is to analyses the potential of the Iranian defence industry, including both research-and-development and production capabilities. It is argued that, despite official statements about the great power and sophistication of the Iranian defence industry, in reality its capabilities are very limited and cannot meet the operational needs of the Iranian armed forces. At the same time, it is argued that many official releases, which are abundantly available in the Iranian press and often unthinkingly repeated by the Western media, do not present the real and value of military products, but are rather a tool for deception and propaganda.     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

FDs and Military Reform

Abstract

Ron Smith looks at procurement procedures within a European context, taking account of the problems currently facing defence industries and aduocates the institution of a European Defence Union, to be closely monitored by a joint finance Ministry to prevent overspending and monopoly.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race

The aim of this paper is to indicate the extent to which the arms race against Turkey, in which Greece and Cyprus have been entangled, imposes a defence expenditure burden that is tough for the two allies to bear. To do so we have resorted to evaluating the optimal military expenditure for the two countries, allied in the context of the Integrated Defence Doctrine, which is compatible with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies. All experiments and scenarios examined lead to the conclusion that the current defence burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. The fact remains, however, that under the circumstances, a one-sided disarmament policy like the one currently followed by Greece, is a risky choice given that the long-term armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven as leading, leave very small room to the Greek and Cypriot sides to reduce their own defence expenditure.     

Fighting a Just War in the Midst of an Unreasonable International Strife: World War I and the Collapse of the Central European System of the Triple Imperial Dominion

ABSTRACT

This article constitutes an attempt to demonstrate the complexity of factors affecting the legitimate acquisition and reasonable exercise by a political community of the right to war as specified in the just war criteria of jus ad bellum. To achieve this purpose, a brief analysis is presented of the intentional participation in World War I of thousands of Polish volunteers forming military units deployed by the Central Powers on the Austrian-Russian front. Considered in light of the standard principles of just war, the military enterprise of the Polish Legions, as they were called, turns out to be a paradoxical instance of warfare which, while being part of a state-to-state aggression, must be deemed compliant with all the principles in question. As a means of explaining this paradox, a modification of the concept of justified intervention is proposed, embracing military efforts aimed at the ultimate defeat of all the (unjustly) warring parties operating within a given territory. In consonance with the classic just war approach, it is also argued that the justification for such an intervention is essentially dependent on its being initiated by, or attributable to, an unquestionable state agent acting in defence of the state’s basic prerogatives.     

The Effects of Defence Spending Reductions: A CGE Estimation of the Foregone Peace Dividend in the Case of Greece

With the collapse of bipolarity and the end of the East-West armaments race, defence budgets have shrunk and military expenditures across many countries have fallen, opening-up the prospect of potential beneficial economic spin-offs. In the case of Greece, a country with a higher than average defence burden, military spending has not exhibited similar downward trends as it has done in other members of NATO and the European Union. The paper, using a Computable General Equilibrium model, estimates through simulations the effects on the Greek economy had reductions in current defence spending been equal to the NATO average. The results from the CGE estimations suggest that a shift of expenditure from defence into non-defence public spending would have an appreciable beneficial impact.     

Domestic political and external security determinants of the demand for greek military expenditure

By European Union and NATO standards, Greece consistently allocates substantial human and material resources to defence. The Greek defence burden (i.e. military expenditure as a share of GDP) has invariably been appreciably higher than the EU and NATO averages. The paper applies an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to present cointegrated estimates of the demand function for Greek military expenditure, in which domestic political factors and external security determinants are incorporated. Our empirical findings suggest that Greek defence spending over the period 1960-1998 has been influenced by both external security concerns, namely Turkey, as well as changes in the domestic political scene.     

Country survey XVII: New zealand's defence policy

New Zealand's current defence strategy, first expressed in NZ Government (1991), is one of "self-reliance in partnership". We outline the country's defence policy in historical context, examine its current defence expenditure and capabilities, and document the genesis of recent major changes in security policy. We pay particular attention to the role of explicit economic analysis and advice in the formation of these policy changes.     

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: TRENDS IN COST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UK AEROSPACE

This paper, intended to stimulate debate, suggests that we are at a turning point in the history of the UK military aerospace industry. It argues that there is urgent need for a fresh vision as to how the UK military aerospace industry can both prosper and make its maximum contribution to the defence of Britain. Further, the resulting plans and policies must emphasise the robustness of defence capabilities in a future in which the only thing we can be certain is that it will be very different from the present – especially whenever defence most matters.