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Christopher Clary 《战略研究杂志》2019,42(5):677-700
ABSTRACTThis article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors. 相似文献
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Laurence A. Baxter 《海军后勤学研究》1982,29(2):323-330
It is shown that Krakowski's relevation transform generates the nonhomogeneous Poisson process in an analogous fashion to the way in which Stieltjes convolution generates the renewal process. Properties of failure rates and of inter-failure times are discussed and an application to warranty analysis is described. 相似文献
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Cathy Downes Christopher Dandeker Paddy Griffith David Edgerton F. H. Toase Davina Miller 《Defense & Security Analysis》1990,6(1):103-112
National Security Concepts of States: New Zealand. By Kennedy Graham. Taylor & Francis, London (1989), ISBN 0-8448-1614-0, £27.00
Power and Prestige in the British Army. By R.G. L. von Zugbach. Gower, Aldershot (1988), ISBN 0-566-05561-9, £22.50
The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare—Ideas, Organization, and Field Command. By Edward Hagerman. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1988), ISBN 0-253-30546-2, $37.50 (£23.29)
British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars: a Reappraisal of Rearmament. By G. A. H. Gordon. Macmillan, London (1988), ISBN 0-333-42332-1. £29.50
Armies in Low-intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis. Edited by David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell. Brassey's Defence Publishers, London (1989), ISBN 0-08-036253-2, £25.00 ($45.00); Deadly Paradigms: the Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. By Michael Shafer, Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0-7185-1311-8, £28.00
British Defence Policy Striking the Right Balance. By J. Baylis. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0-333-49133-5, £29.50 or £9.99 相似文献
Power and Prestige in the British Army. By R.G. L. von Zugbach. Gower, Aldershot (1988), ISBN 0-566-05561-9, £22.50
The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare—Ideas, Organization, and Field Command. By Edward Hagerman. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1988), ISBN 0-253-30546-2, $37.50 (£23.29)
British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars: a Reappraisal of Rearmament. By G. A. H. Gordon. Macmillan, London (1988), ISBN 0-333-42332-1. £29.50
Armies in Low-intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis. Edited by David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell. Brassey's Defence Publishers, London (1989), ISBN 0-08-036253-2, £25.00 ($45.00); Deadly Paradigms: the Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. By Michael Shafer, Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0-7185-1311-8, £28.00
British Defence Policy Striking the Right Balance. By J. Baylis. Macmillan, London (1989), ISBN 0-333-49133-5, £29.50 or £9.99 相似文献
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In February 2012, Iran announced its willingness to resume negotiations with the Western powers. This statement followed in the wake of a damning report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the imposition of additional sanctions by the international community on an Iranian economy already under pressure. Tehran's announcement also coincided with increased speculation regarding an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, however, this seemingly positive step appeared to be undermined by Iran's concomitant announcement that “huge” technical progress has been made on Iran's nuclear programme. This article will explore the significance of the recent political, diplomatic and technical developments in the Iranian nuclear affair and situate them in the broader context of Tehran's nuclear strategy. The analysis will assess the potential for this latest phase in the Iranian nuclear crisis to reverse Iran's current trajectory and initiate a rapprochement between Iran and Western powers. 相似文献
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Christopher M. Faulkner Joshua E. Lambert Jonathan M. Powell 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):641-659
ABSTRACTThis paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination. 相似文献
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AbstractPost-uprisings Middle East politics is frequently described as a ‘regional cold war’ involving proxy warfare that emphasises the role of shared identities linking external and local actors. But does the ‘content’ of identities impact proxy war dynamics? This article considers the present ‘battle for Syria’, a local conflict that became a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving actors emphasising identities on various levels, most notably national, religious/ sect and ethnic. It suggests that identity content does matter, with global powers more reluctant than regional players to back groups identifying at sub-national level, while foreign non-state actors are enthusiastic backers of sub-national identity. 相似文献
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Christopher Tuck 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2016,27(6):996-1018
This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy. 相似文献
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The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: Radionuclide and Hydroacoustic Evidence for a Nuclear Explosion
This article offers a new analysis of radionuclide and hydroacoustic data to support a low-yield nuclear weapon test as a plausible explanation for the still contentious 22 September 1979 Vela Incident, in which U.S. satellite Vela 6911 detected an optical signal characteristic of an atmospheric nuclear explosion over the Southern Indian or Atlantic Ocean. Based on documents not previously widely available, as well as recently declassified papers and letters, this article concludes that iodine-131 found in the thyroids of some Australian sheep would be consistent with them having grazed in the path of a potential radioactive fallout plume from a 22 September low-yield nuclear test in the Southern Indian Ocean. Further, several declassified letters and reports which describe aspects of still classified hydroacoustic reports and data favor the test scenario. The radionuclide and hydroacoustic data taken together with the analysis of the double-flash optical signal picked up by Vela 6911 that was described in a companion 2017 article (“The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash”) can be traced back to sources with similar spatial and temporal origins and serve as a strong indicator for a nuclear explosion being responsible for the 22 September 1979 Vela Incident. 相似文献