The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash

On 22 September 1979 two optical sensors on U.S. satellite Vela 6911 detected a double-flash of light that appeared characteristic of an atmospheric nuclear explosion conducted over the southern Atlantic or Indian Ocean. It became known as the Vela Incident, Event 747, or Alert 747. An anomaly between the amplitude of the two signals during the second pulse led a U.S. government expert panel established to assess the event to conclude in mid-1980 that a more likely explanation was the impact of a small meteoroid on the satellite, the debris from which reflected sunlight into the sensors' field of view. No model was presented to support the contention, and a similar anomaly—known as background modulation—was a given for the second pulse of all confirmed explosions detected by Vela, though beginning later. Nonetheless, this event has remained the subject of intense debate. This article reviews the evidence and presents an updated analysis of the original Vela signal based on recently declassified literature and on modern knowledge of interplanetary dust and hyper velocity impact. Given the geometry of the satellite, and that the bulk of the surface comprised solar panels, much of the debris from any collision would be carried away from the sensors' field of view. Thus, a meteoroid collision appears much less likely than previously assumed. The double flash is instead consistent with a nuclear explosion, albeit detected by an aged satellite for which background modulation was abnormal and/or commenced earlier, also seen in post-event SYSTEM tests. A companion paper to be published in 2018 presents radionuclide and hydroacoustic evidence supporting the conclusion that the Vela Incident was a nuclear weapon test explosion.     

‘It isn’t over until the fuel cell sings’: A reassessment of the US and French pledges of nuclear assistance in the 1970s

Based on newly declassified archival documents, the aim of this study is to contribute to an improved understanding of the evolution of the non-proliferation regime through an examination of US and French nuclear cooperation agreements in the latter half of the 1970s. The four pledges of nuclear assistance examined – US assistance to Egypt and Israel, and French assistance to Pakistan and South Korea – failed to materialise by the end of the decade. Why did that happen? What caused the four pledges to fail? We find that the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and the emergence of opposing domestic factions on the nuclear front in the supplier states generated major changes in US and French nuclear export policies, and also contributed to the development of a collaborative partnership between the two competing nuclear exporters, on the other.     

The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.     

The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India

This paper evaluates to what extent the improving Sino-Indian relations coincide with a mitigation of military threat perceptions. A critical review of the demilitarisation of the border, the military strategies with respect to the Indian Ocean and nuclear arms programmes, reveals that the two countries are still locked in a military security dilemma. Distrust still results in military balancing. The outcome is a complex and multi-level military balance of power that might not bring about peace but enhances stability.     

天基核爆光辐射探测方法研究

通过计算提出了天基核爆炸光辐射探测指标要求,根据对源项信号特征的分析,设计了具有通带为1～4000Hz带通滤波器的天基核爆光辐射探测电路,采取了降噪措施,并以实验检验了其灵敏度、信噪比、频率响应和动态范围等性能,提出了软件修正系统误差的方法．     

Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.     

Preventing the ‘Smiling Buddha’: British-Indian nuclear relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear force, 1964–68

This article examines two related issues: the policy objectives pursued by the British government to prevent India from developing nuclear weapons and the challenges presented to the Indian government in balancing Gandhian idealism with the reality of nuclear diplomacy. Building on recent research, the following issues are explored: the implementation of Anglo-American non-proliferation policy in Asia, the provision of security guarantees for India and Pakistan and the UK proposal to establish a Commonwealth Nuclear force as a means of maintaining British influence in the region. The analysis is placed within the context of Britain's overall defence policy during the 1960s focusing particularly on the British withdrawal from East of Suez and the development of nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO. The article argues that the Wilson government regarded security guarantees for India as an obstacle towards the successful conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. Britain's primary objective in advancing the concept of a Commonwealth Nuclear Force was not to increase Indian security in the face of Chinese nuclear threats but to explore possible options to internationalise Britain's nuclear forces after initial plans for a NATO nuclear force had failed.     

Book Reviews

The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.     

‘Just another border incident’: The Rann of Kutch and the 1965 India–Pakistan War

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.     

The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

Pakistan, the fastest growing nuclear weapon state in the world, has established over the last decade a nuclear management system it holds to be “foolproof.” Despite the explosion of radical groups challenging the writ of the state, it dismisses concerns by critics that its nuclear weapons are not safe and secure as “preposterous” and an attempt to “malign” the state. This article examines Pakistan's nuclear management system in four functional areas: command-and-control, physical security, nuclear surety, and doctrine. It describes what is publicly known in each area, identifies areas of omission and inadequacy in each one, and examines several premises of the nuclear program the author considers to be unfounded. Comparing these deficiencies in Pakistan's nuclear management system to the current problems plaguing the US nuclear management system, the author concludes that complacency and unfounded confidence in the efficacy of such programs, if not addressed and corrected, could lead to a future nuclear catastrophe in South Asia.     

Privatizing the struggle against Somali piracy

Pirate attacks against commercial vessels in the Western Indian Ocean and nearby seas reached an unprecedented level in 2011. Despite concerted efforts by the international community and shipping companies to address this threat by conducting naval patrols and equipping commercial vessels with non-lethal defenses, the frequency of pirate attacks continues to increase. The general ineffectiveness of existing anti-piracy measures has sparked interest in expanding the use of armed private security contractors to protect commercial vessels from pirate attacks. This article argues that armed private security contractors can, indeed, enhance the security of commercial vessels because these actors can provide onsite protection for commercial vessels, which should allow them to respond very quickly to pirate attacks, and because these actors are willing to use deadly force against pirates. However, this article also argues that expanding the use of these actors may increase the degree of violence used during pirate attacks, pose threats to the safety of innocent civilians, and violate a number of domestic and international laws.     

苏轼书信研究

苏轼书信的内容给世人展现的是苏轼生活与内心丰满亲切的一面。对苏轼书信的研究能更充分了解苏轼,感动于他的人格魅力和生存智慧。本文仅就苏轼与同僚、亲朋、师徒之间的书信为梳理对象,试图对苏轼做一合理的诠释与理解。     

India’s Taliban Dilemma: To Contain or to Engage?

India’s Afghanistan policy in the 1990s is termed a zero-sum game of influence with Pakistan. New Delhi’s aversion to the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime is considered a marker of this rivalry. This paper revisits India’s approach towards Afghanistan and examines if New Delhi was necessarily averse to engaging with pro-Pakistan political factions during 1990s. Based on fresh primary interviews with former Indian policymakers, media archives, and official reports, the paper shows that India engaged with and accommodated pro-Pakistan factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996. The Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in September 1996 challenged India’s engage-with-all approach. Nonetheless, the decision to sever ties with the Taliban and to bolster anti-Taliban factions was highly debated in New Delhi. Many in India saw the Taliban as a militant Islamist force sponsored by Pakistan. For others, however, it was an ethno-nationalist movement representing Pashtun interests, and not necessarily under Islamabad’s control.     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.     

Technical and proliferation‐related aspects of the dismantlement of Russian Alfa‐Class nuclear submarines

When does a state become a “nuclear weapon state”? How we choose to answer this question has significant implications for proliferation assessment, analysis, and policy. Traditionally, the standard demarcation line has been a state's first nuclear test, but in recent years analysts have increasingly focused instead on the accumulation of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material. The article argues that although the test/no-test indicator clearly has problems, its replacement by the SQ/no-SQ indicator would be highly counterproductive. The article instead proposes supplementing the traditional test/no-test indicator with a theory-driven approach that focuses on the incentives and disincentives to test.     

三元混合气体爆炸极限实验研究

瓦斯爆炸是煤矿灾害事故最主要的因素。瓦斯是以CH4为主,常含有CO2、CO、H2S、C2H4、C2H6、H2、SO2等的多元混合可燃性气体。随着各组分配比的不同,瓦斯的爆炸极限不同,呈现的火灾爆炸危险性也不同。利用HY12474型爆炸极限测定仪研究煤矿开采区常见的可燃气体混合物爆炸极限随组分配比变化的情况。通过对三组分不同配比混合气体的爆炸极限的测试,采用Taylor多项式,拟合出了常压下三元气体混合物的爆炸极限随组分配比变化的经验计算公式,并通过实验数据进行了验证,表明经验公式计算结果与实验数据很好吻合,具有工程应用价值。     

Provocation,war and restraint under the nuclear shadow: The Kargil conflict 1999

ABSTRACT

The Kargil conflict was a limited war between India and Pakistan fought along the Kashmir Line of Control during the spring/summer of 1999. Named for the principal town in the combat zone on the Indian side, it was the first open warfare between India and Pakistan as declared nuclear weapons states and included the first combat employment of the Indian Air Force since 1971. Despite its intensity, it was also characterised by considerable restraint on both sides. The potential for conventional escalation, however, was high and the possibility of nuclear confrontation could not be excluded. It had significant long-term ramifications for both countries and constitutes an important part of the backdrop to their relations today.     

Let’s make a (nuclear) deal: Bargaining,credibility, and the third offset strategy

An institutional perspective on nuclear deterrence cooperation within alliances has the potential to fundamentally reorient how we think about analyzing nuclear and deterrence decision-making between nuclear patrons and non-nuclear clients. It comes at a time when the presidency of Donald Trump is sure to test many of the core claims and assumptions in security studies, especially relating to bargaining and credibility within alliances. This article surveys questions that will be core to the research agenda involving alliance institutions and nuclear weapons during the Trump presidency and beyond.     

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Biological and chemical weapons are increasingly in the news. A series of events in the United States, beginning with the 11 September 2001 attacks and including mailed letters deliberately infected with anthrax later that year, have led to heightened fears of increasing resort to such agents for terror. Concurrently, the 2003 Iraq war, which failed to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has led to a great deal of cynicism about such threats, especially in the developing world. This article sets out the concerns of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about the risks of new advances in the life sciences being turned to hostile use and explains what it is doing to try to encourage objective risk assessment and reduction in that context. We argue that, setting aside the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’, there are sound reasons for actors in the life sciences in Africa to treat concerns about poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease seriously. It is in their interests to take practical action in line with their existing ethical and legal obligations in order to assess and reduce these threats.     

某型防空导弹杀伤概率评估

基于防空导弹战斗部爆炸后的杀伤特征,对战斗部爆炸后产生的有效破片、破片飞行速度、破片对目标的覆盖面积进行了分析,建立了防空导弹杀伤概率评估模型。采用仿真弹道数据,对打击目标F-16战斗机应用s im u link仿真工具绘出了杀伤概率曲线,其结果与实际分析相一致,验证了评估模型的可用性。