Power,polarity, and prudence: the ambiguities and implications of UK discourse on a multipolar international system

What do UK policymakers mean when they say that Britain’s strategic environment is returning to “multipolarity”? In realist international theory, polarity is a specific causal concept; the number of powers capable of balancing even the most capable other state(s) in the international system (“poles”) is taken to determine the system’s stability. Does the post-2017 appearance of polarity references in British security policy documents therefore reflect some unexpected UK renaissance of realist thought? Or is something else going on, as recent work by Ben Zala suggests? This article will demonstrate that, while UK official usage of the “multip–” word has indeed flourished recently, the term is actually being used in a more elastic, less bounded way than realism prescribes in order to generate other kinds of political effect. Specifically, “polarity” (and its “multi-” prefix) is used to characterise the behaviour of those major states that oppose Western-preferred international order, to elide Britain’s own relative power/status tensions, and to capture an expansive laundry-list of perceived international dangers. The article then discusses five ways in which a shift in polarity could negatively affect Britain; important consequences that merit preparatory contemplation, yet that an imprecise, catch-all understanding of “multipolarity” too readily obscures.     

Organizing for the ‘gray zone’ fight: early Cold War realities and the CIA’s Directorate of Operations

ABSTRACT

Despite its portrayal as something new, the concept of the ‘gray zone’ is not novel. It was the Cold War battleground in which the USA and the Soviet Union waged rival unconventional campaigns, and it was there that the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given responsibility for operating. This was not the organization’s original purpose, but Cold War exigencies forced Washington to improvise and build an organization with unique capabilities. These early years shaped the CIA’s operations directorate, creating two distinct cultures within the larger agency, one focused on intelligence collection and the other focused on covert action.     

The Persistent Deficit of Militia Officers in the Swiss Armed Forces: An Opportunity Cost Explanation

The Swiss Armed Forces are suffering from a structural deficit of militia officers despite good pay and a general supportive attitude in the population. Whereas, prior studies have focused on motivation to explain understaffing in armed forces, we offer an alternative approach based on opportunity cost. We model decision alternatives both within and outside a military organization, taking private sector employment as the reference point. We then monetize opportunity costs of leisure, fringe benefits, and private sector income not compensated. Our results suggest that in terms of opportunity cost, service as a militia officer is the least attractive option, an effect that we believe explains the persistent staff deficit. Implications of these findings for the literature and recruitment policy are discussed.     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.     

Violence in context: Mapping the strategies and operational art of irregular warfare

The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats.     

Approximation algorithms for general one‐warehouse multi‐retailer systems

Logistical planning problems are complicated in practice because planners have to deal with the challenges of demand planning and supply replenishment, while taking into account the issues of (i) inventory perishability and storage charges, (ii) management of backlog and/or lost sales, and (iii) cost saving opportunities due to economies of scale in order replenishment and transportation. It is therefore not surprising that many logistical planning problems are computationally difficult, and finding a good solution to these problems necessitates the development of many ad hoc algorithmic procedures to address various features of the planning problems. In this article, we identify simple conditions and structural properties associated with these logistical planning problems in which the warehouse is managed as a cross‐docking facility. Despite the nonlinear cost structures in the problems, we show that a solution that is within ε‐optimality can be obtained by solving a related piece‐wise linear concave cost multi‐commodity network flow problem. An immediate consequence of this result is that certain classes of logistical planning problems can be approximated by a factor of (1 + ε) in polynomial time. This significantly improves upon the results found in literature for these classes of problems. We also show that the piece‐wise linear concave cost network flow problem can be approximated to within a logarithmic factor via a large scale linear programming relaxation. We use polymatroidal constraints to capture the piece‐wise concavity feature of the cost functions. This gives rise to a unified and generic LP‐based approach for a large class of complicated logistical planning problems. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Interpreting the Ribchester Helmet

In 1796 a 13-year-old boy playing on wasteland behind his father’s house in Ribchester, Lancashire discovered an assemblage of over 30 Roman artefacts, including a decorated brass helmet. Although partially corroded the Ribchester helmet is a fine example of a first-century AD cavalry sports helmet. This article considers how the interpretation of the helmet has evolved since its discovery. The multi-faceted iconography of the helmet with its mural crown diadem is that of an elite soldier and is paralleled in other examples of cavalry sports helmets of the Ribchester type. The long-neglected imagery on the helmet bowl is reinterpreted and seen not as a haphazard collection of randomly placed combatants but as a highly structured, symmetrical composition specifically designed to be viewed from different directions.     

Ethnicity,class, and civil war: the role of hierarchy,segmentation, and cross-cutting cleavages

Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory, and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies shapes the type of civil war.