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61.
F. G. Hoffman John Bew David French Nicolas Lewkowicz Thomas Rid Paul Staniland 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(5):777-795
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With the words quoted above, the new Secretary of State for Defence in the Thatcher government revealed for the first time the existence of a project that have remained a closely guarded secret, even from amny Cabinet members of four governments, since the late 1960s. Despite the passage of more thatn 20 years since Mr Pym's announcement, the story of the Chevaline project still remains largely unknown outside a small group of select politicians, officials and scientists. This article sets out to use recently declassified documents and what is in the public domain to tell the story of Chevaline from the secret debates about the need to improve Britain's Polaris deterrent force shortly after it was deployed in the late 1960s to the official announcement of the project in 1980 and its eventual operational deployment in 1982. In particular, attention is focused on three main questions: Why was the project kept secret for so long? Why did the improvement programme take so long to come to fruition? Why, given the spiralling costs involved, was it not cancelled? In order to consider these questions relating to what Pym described as ‘the front end’ of the Poaris missile, it is necessary to begin by looking at the background to the project. 相似文献
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John H. Maurer 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):102-127
Brian Johnson, The Secret War. London: BBC, 1978. Pp. 352; £6.50. R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–45. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. xx + 556; £7.95. Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords 1904–46. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. 00 (Information not available from publisher); £8.50. Adrian Preston, ed., General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second War. London: Croom Helm, 1978. Pp. 138; £5.95. W. G. F. Jackson. ’Overlord’: Normandy 1944. London: Davis Poynter, 1978. Pp. 250; £6.75. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. 292 + index + appendices; Np. Gerard J. Mangone, Marine policy for America—The United States at Sea. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. Pp. 370, £17.50. F. M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit. London: Leo Cooper, 1978. Pp. 189 + xv; £7.50. Allen R. Millet, Ed., A Short History of the Vietnam War. London &; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. Pp. 169; £2.75. Robert P. Berman, Soviet Airpower in Transition. Washington: Brookings, 1978. Pp. 82; $2.95 (Paper). 相似文献
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This article proposes two dual‐ascent algorithms and uses each in combination with a primal drop heuristic embedded within a branch and bound framework to solve the uncapacitated production assembly distribution system (i.e., supply chain) design problem, which is formulated as a mixed integer program. Computational results indicate that one approach, which combines primal drop and dual‐ascent heuristics, can solve instances within reasonable time and prescribes solutions with gaps between the primal and dual solution values that are less than 0.15%, an efficacy suiting it for actual large‐scale applications. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013 相似文献
67.
Lawrence E. Cline 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):275-287
The insurgency in southern Thailand has proven to be intractable over the last few years. The insurgents, who comprise several different groups, have largely retained the initiative in a series of relatively unsophisticated operations. Although involving ethnic Malay Muslims – and marked by an increasingly strong Islamist ideology – the insurgency has been predominantly ethnic rather than religious. External jihadist involvement has been minimal at best. The recent coup in Thailand may improve the odds of reaching some form of accommodation with the southern insurgents; but it is likely that the south will remain a continuing security problem for Bangkok. 相似文献
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Lawrence E. Cline 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3-4):574-591
Multiple ethnic insurgencies have existed in Myanmar since independence. The military junta's response has been extremely brutal at the tactical level, but has shown some political astuteness at the strategic level, with a series of ceasefires with most of the ethnic groups. Despite these ceasefires – most of which have resulted in the continued existence of quasi-independent armed groups – other ethnic movements have continued their armed operations. The overall strategic picture is one of stalemate, with the ethnic movements continuing to exist, but with few realistic prospects of expanding their operations. 相似文献
69.
John P. Cann 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):196-225
In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances. 相似文献
70.
J. Brent Wilson Ian F.W. Beckett John T. Fishel Richard Dale 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):425-432
John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Chapel Hill and London; The University of North Carolina Press 1994. Pp.vii + 239, 1 map, biblio., index. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–8078–2169–1. Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945. London: Frank Cass, 1994. Pp.x + 256; index. £32 (cloth); £15 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4516–8 and 4109 X Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp.242, index, $35/$17.50 (paper). ISBN 0–8032–8369–5. William M. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994. Pp. xii +308, 3 maps, biblio., index. $69.95/£39.95 (cloth); $29.95/£16.95(paper). ISBN 1–85649–266–4 and 266–4. 相似文献