“No boots on the ground”: the effectiveness of US drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

The number of US drone strikes against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen has increased significantly since 2010, but received limited academic attention. This article examines the effectiveness of this drone campaign using an existing theoretical framework. Crucially, we contribute to the framework by adding a fourth intervening variable, namely target correspondence. Through a single case study, it is found that drones have only enjoyed limited success in degrading AQAP's hierarchical structure, qualified human resources and access to key material resources, and in some cases – owing to our target correspondence analysis – this limited success has come at a price. It is found that drones have temporarily disrupted AQAP by successfully eliminating senior leaders involved in coordinating and overseeing external operations. Overall, AQAP's ability to hit Western targets remains significant.     

Attributing Cyber Attacks

Who did it? Attribution is fundamental. Human lives and the security of the state may depend on ascribing agency to an agent. In the context of computer network intrusions, attribution is commonly seen as one of the most intractable technical problems, as either solvable or not solvable, and as dependent mainly on the available forensic evidence. But is it? Is this a productive understanding of attribution? — This article argues that attribution is what states make of it. To show how, we introduce the Q Model: designed to explain, guide, and improve the making of attribution. Matching an offender to an offence is an exercise in minimising uncertainty on three levels: tactically, attribution is an art as well as a science; operationally, attribution is a nuanced process not a black-and-white problem; and strategically, attribution is a function of what is at stake politically. Successful attribution requires a range of skills on all levels, careful management, time, leadership, stress-testing, prudent communication, and recognising limitations and challenges.     

Optimization and mediated bartering models for ground delay programs

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the airline community within the United States have adopted a new paradigm for air traffic flow management, called Collaborative Decision Making (CDM). A principal goal of CDM is shared decision‐making responsibility between the FAA and airlines, so as to increase airline control over decisions that involve economic tradeoffs. So far, CDM has primarily led to enhancements in the implementation of Ground Delay Programs, by changing procedures for allocating slots to airlines and exchanging slots between airlines. In this paper, we discuss how these procedures may be formalized through appropriately defined optimization models. In addition, we describe how inter‐airline slot exchanges may be viewed as a bartering process, in which each “round” of bartering requires the solution of an optimization problem. We compare the resulting optimization problem with the current procedure for exchanging slots and discuss possibilities for increased decision‐making capabilities by the airlines. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.     

Maintaining peace in a neighbourhood torn by separatism: the case of Satun province in southern Thailand

While separatist-related conflict has re-emerged in southern Thailand, there is one predominantly Muslim border province that has remained outside of the conflict. Satun province has been conspicuously unaffected by the Malay-Muslim separatist movement, despite its shared history and ethnic origins with the conflict-affected provinces. In contrast to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, the process of state penetration in Satun was gradual and comparatively less coercive, leading to relative stability and encouraging political and economic integration. This comparative study analyzes the history of cooperative state–minority relations and political stability in Satun province, and draws important lessons directly applicable to the unrest in neighbouring provinces.