Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks

Postmodern terrorism presents a significant challenge to global security and law enforcement institutions. Non-state actors operating across international borders, engaged in an apparent global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of crime and war, pose significant challenges to both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These networked global insurgents blend political and religious fanaticism with criminal enterprises to challenge the rule of law and pose an epochal shift in the structures and relations among states. Negotiating this epochal shift requires traditional organs of national security (the diplomatic, military and intelligence services) to forge new partnerships with police and public safety organizations at the state and local (sub-national), as well as transnational levels. Significant operational, policy and cultural challenges must be overcome to forge an effective multi-lateral global network to counter global terrorism and insurgency.     

When is model complexity too much? Illustrating the benefits of simple models with Hughes' salvo equations

The simulations that many defense analysts rely upon in their studies continue to grow in size and complexity. This paper contrasts the guidance that the authors have received—from some of the giants of military operations research—with the current practice. In particular, the analytic utility of Hughes' simple salvo equations is compared with that of the complex Joint Warfighting System (JWARS), with respect to JWARS' key performance parameters. The comparison suggests that a family of analytic tools supports the best analyses. It follows that smaller, more agile, and transparent models, such as Hughes' salvo equations, are underutilized in defense analyses. We believe that these models should receive more attention, use, and funding. To illustrate this point, this paper uses two very simple models (by modern standards) to rapidly generate insights on the value of information relative to force strength. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Brothers in arms,yet again? Twenty-first century Sino-Russian strategic collaboration in the realm of defence and security

2014–2015 were years of turmoil for strategic relations, with Sino-Russian relations emerging as a particularly interesting set of ties to observe. This article asks whether recurrent Sino-Russian exhortations of friendship are mirrored by their strategic alignment in the defence and security realm, half a century after the end of the Sino-Soviet pact during the communist era. We examine the arms trade between the two countries and with regional partners, but also the recent pattern of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as a combined test of the security and defence relationship. We are able to show that the image of friendship that both Moscow and Beijing like to promote, while apparent at the UN Security Council and within the BRICS group, remains constrained by rivalry in high-tech segments of the arms industry and by lingering concerns about the prospects of peer interference in their shared regional vicinity.     

Panjwai: a tale of two COINs in Afghanistan

The US Army has two approaches to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. One is hard, or combat-focused, and the other is soft, or development-focused. This study examines two US Army task forces deployed to Panjwai District, Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. CTF 4-9 and 1-38 offer a meaningful comparison because they pursued these contrasting approaches among the same population and against the same enemy at the same time and place. The study compares each unit’s approach and finds that neither approach was successful absent the other. The article concludes by recommending further research into combining the approaches at the operational level.     

Risk pooling in a two-period,two-echelon inventory stocking and allocation problem

The object of this article is to investigate the risk-pooling effect of depot stock in two-echelon distribution system in which the depot serves n retailers in parallel, and to develop computationally tractable optimization procedures for such systems. The depot manager has complete information about stock levels and there are two opportunities to allocate stock to the retailers within each order cycle. We identify first- and second-order aspects to the risk-pooling effect. In particular, the second-order effect is the property that the minimum stock available to any retailer after the second allocation converges in probability to a constant as the number of retailers in the system increases, assuming independence of the demands. This property is exploited in the development of efficient procedures to determine near-optimal values of the policy parameters.     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.     

Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought

The Volkssturm (People's Storm or Home Guard) was formed by the Nazi Party in late 1944 as Allied forces closed in on the Reich from the east and west. The political ambitions of Martin Bormann, Hitler's secretary and the head of the Nazi Party Chancellery, were the driving force for this new national organisation. Lacking resources, the Volkssturm's military value was negligible even in eastern Germany where battalions occasionally fought with great tenacity against the Red Army. However, its foundations, character and nature were indicative of the process through which Party power had reached its zenith on the eve of the Third Reich's collapse.