The effects of information on a queue with balking and phase‐type service times

This article generalizes the models in Guo and Zipkin, who focus on exponential service times, to systems with phase‐type service times. Each arriving customer decides whether to stay or balk based on his expected waiting cost, conditional on the information provided. We show how to compute the throughput and customers' average utility in each case. We then obtain some analytical and numerical results to assess the effect of more or less information. We also show that service‐time variability degrades the system's performance. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Changing the paradigm: Simulation,now a method of first resort

Decades ago, simulation was famously characterized as a “method of last resort,” to which analysts should turn only “when all else fails.” In those intervening decades, the technologies supporting simulation—computing hardware, simulation‐modeling paradigms, simulation software, design‐and‐analysis methods—have all advanced dramatically. We offer an updated view that simulation is now a very appealing option for modeling and analysis. When applied properly, simulation can provide fully as much insight, with as much precision as desired, as can exact analytical methods that are based on more restrictive assumptions. The fundamental advantage of simulation is that it can tolerate far less restrictive modeling assumptions, leading to an underlying model that is more reflective of reality and thus more valid, leading to better decisions. Published 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 293–303, 2015     

Damage accumulation and probability of kill for gun and target engagements

Determination of the gunfire probability of kill against a target requires two parameters to be taken into consideration: the likelihood of hitting the target (susceptibility) and the conditional probability of kill given a hit (vulnerability). Two commonly used methods for calculating the latter probability are (1) treating each hit upon the target independently, and (2) setting an exact number of hits to obtain a target kill. Each of these methods contains an implicit assumption about the probability distribution of the number of hits‐to‐kill. Method (1) assumes that the most likely kill scenario occurs with exactly one hit, whereas (2) implies that achieving a precise number of hits always results in a kill. These methods can produce significant differences in the predicted gun effectiveness, even if the mean number of hits‐to‐kill for each distribution is the same. We therefore introduce a new modeling approach with a more general distribution for the number of hits‐to‐kill. The approach is configurable to various classes of damage mechanism and is able to match both methods (1) and (2) with a suitable choice of parameter. We use this new approach to explore the influence of various damage accumulation models on the predicted effectiveness of weapon‐target engagements.     

The next step in Somalia: exploiting victory,post-Mogadishu

From 2006 to 2011, al-Qaeda's East African proxy, al-Shabaab, served as the de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al-Shabaab and the peacekeeping force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery or development. By 2012, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the TFG in neutralising al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and providing good governance to its constituents. Al-Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and its offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamist extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean, destabilise East Africa and adversely impact millions.     

Aerial intelligence during the Algerian war

Aviation had a highly significant role in supporting French military operations in Algeria. This was particularly true of aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Initially, however, the Air Force effort was handicapped by inappropriate approaches, too few army/air liaison officers and scepticism among army officers aware of the difficulties of earlier air operations against an insurgency in Indochina (1946–54). It also lacked sufficient suitable aircraft types. Gradually, improved aircraft and photographic techniques permitted systematic and detailed aerial mapping and intelligence work, as well as rapid provision of close air support during ground battles. Better integration of air and ground forces, along with more coordinated command and control, arrived from 1959 onwards when an air force general, Maurice Challe, became inter-service commander-in-chief in Algeria. This permitted an authentic and mostly effective combined-airms and joint service approach to the locating, tracking, engagement and destruction of Algerian nationalist bands.     

Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC

All governments wrestle with the challenge of interagency coordination. Improving civil-military coordination, at the national level as well as in the field, can be a useful step in designing a more effective defense decision-making process. National-level organisations do not cooperate easily, but young military and civilian personnel with CIMIC experience can begin to open stovepipes. If vertically organized governments are ever to deal effectively with horizontally organized threats, they must become populated by those who have witnessed the power of horizontal thinking. CIMIC operations thus prepare future `bureaucrats' to create government networks capable of managing the triple threat of terrorism, insurgency and organized crime     

A1 Qaeda and the radical Islamic challenge to western strategy

The September 11 global crisis prompted by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon raises major questions concerning the nature and trajectory of terrorism in the post-Cold War global order. Hitherto, terrorism has been largely debated by analysts at the level of nation states. Terrorist and insurgent movements have also been largely anchored in nationalist and ethnic power bases even when they have sought to mobilise a transnational ideological appeal on religious or class grounds. There have been a few exceptions to this pattern such as the alliance between the German Baader-Meinhof group and the Japanese Red Army Faction, but even such international alliances as this did not, until at least the 1980s, presage anything like a global terrorist network necessitating a global strategic response. This study examines terrorism and global strategic responses.