Worst‐case performance of approximation algorithms for tool management problems

Since the introduction of flexible manufacturing systems, researchers have investigated various planning and scheduling problems faced by the users of such systems. Several of these problems are not encountered in more classical production settings, and so‐called tool management problems appear to be among the more fundamental ones of these problems. Most tool management problems are hard to solve, so that numerous approximate solution techniques have been proposed to tackle them. In this paper, we investigate the quality of such algorithms by means of worst‐case analysis. We consider several polynomial‐time approximation algorithms described in the literature, and we show that all these algorithms exhibit rather poor worst‐case behavior. We also study the complexity of solving tool management problems approximately. In this respect, we investigate the interrelationships among tool management problems, as well as their relationships with other well‐known combinatorial problems such as the maximum clique problem or the set covering problem, and we prove several negative results on the approximability of various tool management problems. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 445–462, 1999     

Scheduling deteriorating jobs to minimize makespan

We consider a single-machine problem of scheduling n independent jobs to minimize makespan, in which the processing time of job J_j grows by w_j with each time unit its start is delayed beyond a given common critical date d. This processing time is p_j if J_j starts by d. We show that this problem is NP-hard, give a pseudopolynomial algorithm that runs in time and O(nd) space, and develop a branch-and-bound algorithm that solves instances with up to 100 jobs in a reasonable amount of time. We also introduce the case of bounded deterioration, where the processing time of a job grows no further if the job starts after a common maximum deterioration date D > d. For this case, we give two pseudopolynomial time algorithms: one runs in O(n²d(D − d) time and O(nd(D − d)) space, the other runs in p_j)²) time and p_j) space. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 511–523, 1998     

The French Army ‘Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew

Psychological warfare had been used by the French army in the Indochina War (1946–54), and had spawned a sub-caste of French officers who moulded it and counter-insurgent propaganda into a doctrine known as guerre révolutionnaire (revolutionary war). In Algeria, in 1956, the army established a specialist training centre, the CIPCG, at Arzew on the Algerian coast, to provide courses for all officers arriving ‘in country’. By this, the French command sought to ensure that field officers possessed an approach to pacification and the political dimension to their missions well suited to the terrain and socio-political make-up of Algeria. The real ‘revolutionary war’ zealots were kept away from the directing staff, although some delivered guest lectures. Despite complaints from commanders of field units at losing experienced officers to the CIPCG instructing staff, Arzew students testified that the courses aided them in their missions. Some 10,000 French officers undertook courses at the CIPCG before it was downgraded and then disbanded after Pierre Messmer, a Gaullist, became Minister for the Armed Forces in 1960.     

Winning hearts and minds: legitimacy in the Namibian war for independence

Efforts at winning hearts and minds (WHAM) impact on and are affected by perceptions of legitimacy. In the Namibian war for independence (1966–1989) efforts of the South African counterinsurgent forces at winning hearts and minds focused mainly on persuading the population to cooperate in exchange for material benefits and services. The article demonstrates that this successfully contributed to a dimension of legitimacy that is conceptualized as pragmatic legitimacy. However, other dimensions of legitimacy are identified in which the South Africans were lacking, that is in moral, legal, and identity-based legitimacy. Furthermore, in areas where control was contested and where the population could not be shielded from insurgent intimidation, it is argued that the effects of coercion outweighed legitimacy altogether.     

Defence Transformation in South Africa: Sharing the experience with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

“There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order”—Machiavelli

This essay was written after a team of the Institute for Security Studies visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to share their experiences of the challenges of defence transformation with Congolese officials and members of civil society.

It discusses the South African defence transformation process and experience in detail and highlights the imperative for visionary leadership, commitment and communication as prerequisites for successful transformation. The DRC faces a unique opportunity to design and create an optimal national defence force for itself, which will reflect its new and evolving national policy on defence, and therefore the needs of the nation. This poses an exciting challenge and true opportunity to move beyond survival into a new age. The essay aims to make a contribution to this process.     

‘God willing,I will be back’: Gauging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's capacity to deter economic crimes in Liberia

Recently, in July 2012, the high-profile and bitterly fought nine-month race for the post of Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission, between Dr Jean Ping of Gabon, and his main challenger, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, culminated in the latter's victory. Her victory came after the deadlock at the Eighteenth AU Summit in January 2012. Borne out of the considered need for a quick fix through reliance on a vote of expediency, the election of Dr Dlamini-Zuma represented a political resolution to the crisis that arose due to the earlier ongoing electoral deadlock. Far from being a competitive election by design, the 2012 AU Commission election by default became transformed into an intensely fought campaign that put the AU in the limelight. This article briefly introduces the electoral process, explains in detail the voting behaviour of AU member states, and offers five specific reasons for the victory of Dr Dlamini-Zuma. On the surface the election looks very competitive, but the article explains why this is not the case. To create greater competition for these posts, the AU needs to overhaul the nomination process and the voting procedure. In this regard, the article proffers detailed analysis and proposes a radical revision of the existing criteria for the nomination. The article also proposes specific recommendations for the amendment of the rules of procedure of the AU Assembly to allow for a qualified majority as a deadlock breaker in the fifth round. It also assesses whether the integrity of the AU Commission election was damaged during the campaigning and voting process. In this regard, it recommends the development of a code of conduct for future elections at the AU.     

基于效果的舰载软硬武器近卫火力分配研究

针对水面舰艇利用软硬杀伤武器抗击近区目标作战使用问题,提出基于毁伤失能和据止等作战效果的软硬武器使用火力决策方法,建立水面舰艇近卫作战软硬武器火力分配模型,通过实例建立模型,并将建立的非线性模型转化成利用匈牙利算法进行解算的指派问题进行模型解算,研究的方法和结果对水面舰艇近卫作战火力分配决策方案的制定具有一定的指导意义。     

Defence spending and economic growth in South Africa: A supply and demand model*

This paper provides a contribution to the growing corpus of knowledge and understanding of the interaction between economic growth and defence spending in South Africa by specifying a Keynesian simultaneous equation model and estimating the system for the period 1961 to 1997. The model contains a growth equation, a savings equation, a trade balance equation and a military burden equation and when estimated by single equation and systems estimation methods is relatively well specified. There is evidence of an overall negative effect of military spending on the economy over this period, though the significance of individual coefficients is low. There is certainly no evidence of any positive impact, suggesting that cuts in military spending do present an opportunity for improved macroeconomic performance.     

The Economic Consequences of the Libyan Spring: A Synthetic Control Analysis

Abstract

In 2011 a wave of revolutionary movements, the so-called Arab Spring, spread in the Middle East and North Africa. Libya was one of the most affected countries, ending Gaddafi’s dictatorship after an international intervention and a civil war. This paper assesses the effects that this revolution had on Libyan economy. The analysis is made by means of the synthetic control method. Our estimates for the 2011–2014 period show (i) a cumulative loss in the growth rate of per capita real GDP of 64.15%; (ii) a cumulative loss in per capita real GDP of 56,548 dollars; and (iii) a cumulative loss in the aggregate real GDP of 350.5 billion dollars.     

Country survey XII: South Africa

This article examines the relationship between defence expenditure and economic performance in South Africa, both prior to and after that country's first fully democratic election in 1994. Prior to 1994 defence expenditure decisions were largely dominated by non‐economic factors; since then defence spending has declined in reaction to, inter alia, the need to address a number of socio‐economic inequities.

After 1975 in particular, military industrialisation in South Africa placed a disproportionately high burden on the country's industrial resources and natural economic and technical capabilities. However, although this suggests that the opportunity cost of domestic arms production has been fairly high, the country's poor economic and development performance since the mid‐1970s is a function of underlying structural deficiencies and institutional constraints rather than the consequence of inordinately high defence spending levels.