SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

PROTECTING CULTURAL MONUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy to discourage terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for a government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game‐theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any destroyed cultural monument discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists' expectations and by increasing the government's reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.     

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY EXPENDITURE,THREAT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NONLINEAR APPROACH

The main objective of the paper is to decipher the military expenditure–economic growth relationship, taking the level of economic development (income) into consideration. Our findings suggest the following: (i) military expenditure has a significantly negative relationship to economic growth for the 23 countries with initial incomes (threshold variable) less than or equal to $475.93; (ii) when the threat level is heightened, economic growth (23 countries) is expected to decrease. However, military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large threats increases growth; (iii) for the remaining 69 countries whose initial incomes (real GDP per capita in 1992 price) exceed $475.93, no significant relationship exists whether the threat variable is taken into consideration or not.     

Financial versus human resources in the Greek‐Turkish arms race: A forecasting investigation using artificial neural networks

This paper aims at forecasting the burden on the Greek economy resulting from the arms race against Turkey and at concentrating on the leading determinants of this burden. The military debt and the defence share of GDP are employed alternatively in order to approximate the measurement of the arms race pressure on Greece, and the method used is that of artificial neural networks. The use of a wide variety of explanatory variables in combination with the promising results derived, suggest that the impact on the Greek economy resulting from this arms race is determined, to a large, extent, by demographic factors which strongly favour the Turkish side. Prediction on both miltary debt and defence expenditure exhibited highly satisfactory accuracy, while the estimation of input significance, indicates that variables describing the Turkish side are often dominant over the corresponding Greek ones.     

Individual preferences and the demand for military expenditure*

Whose preferences determine the tradeoff between security and civilian output in deciding upon budget allocations to defence? This paper considers the role that consumer preferences might play in influencing military spending. We propose normative criteria to judge the economic or political efficiency of defence provision at a given time, and test them using Australian survey‐based micro‐data. Our results suggest that the political system has not delivered a simple social‐choice translation of individual preferences into collective outcomes, nor has it delivered results consistent with simple majority‐voting median preferences.     

Globalisation in the defence industry: An exploration of the paradigm for us and European defence firms and the implications for being global players

This paper explores some of the key issues associated with the restructuring of the defence industry. A comparison is made between the US and the European Defence Industrial Bases in terms of the drivers for change and the paradigms within which change has taken place. Having shown that some very important differences exist, the paper then explores the approaches that have been adopted for industry consolidation and references them to the academic literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances (SAs). Given that most of the key defence players recognise the need to be global players, the paper presents an argument that the European firms’ experience of operating with a wide range of forms of corporate alliance will serve them in good stead for operating on a global defence scale. US firms, in contrast, have focused largely on M&A activity.     

Preserving defense technologies: A strategy for economic conversion†

This paper presents a model for converting legacy defense production facilities into private‐sector economic resources. Specifically, this paper will examine as a case study the first successful conversion of a former U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons production installation, including reasons for its success, its costs and benefits, and lessons for public policy. It is envisioned that this model may be useful for mitigating local economic hardship resulting from defense “downsizing” and for privatizing production capacities critical for national defense.     

A rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances∗

This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent‐seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two‐country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three‐country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent‐seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies’ interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is computed.     

Offsets as industrial policy: Lessons from aerospace

Since 1975 “offsets” have begun to appear frequently in contracts covering international sales of aircraft and other products incorporating advanced technology. Offsets involve reciprocity beyond that normally found in an exchange of goods for money. They may involve co‐production or co‐design of the principal item to be exchanged, or acceptance by the seller of goods or services unrelated to it as partial payment (indirect offsets or countertrade).

The United States has become the major provider of offsets and anti‐offset sentiment has grown. Economists interpret them as trade diverting. Politicians from regions suffering loss of employment view them as bestowing unfair advantage to foreign competitors.

The authors examine offsets from both theoretical and policy perspectives and conclude that in such noncompetitive markets, second‐best considerations dominate, requiring case‐by‐case evaluation of impacts and rendering across‐the‐board determinations of welfare loss suspect.     

How should modeling and simulation be used to support defense acquisition?

This paper investigates the potential for modeling and simulation to contribute to new defense system development, by increasing the productivity of traditional R&D in developing system‐specific technology. Building on a previous optimal control model of defense system R&D, it shows that (1) the optimal use of modeling is related in a natural way to that of traditional R&D, and (2) both have similar optimal profiles over time. Simulated results based on limited historical data suggest that optimal use of modeling could increase the rate of growth in system‐specific technology significantly.