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121.
Michael J. Armstrong 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):66-77
This article considers two related questions of tactics in the context of the salvo model for naval missile combat. For a given set of targets, how many missiles should be fired to produce an effective attack? For a given available salvo size, how many enemy targets should be fired at? In the deterministic version of the model I derive a simple optimality relationship between the number of missiles to fire and the number of targets to engage. In the stochastic model I employ the expected loss inflicted and the probability of enemy elimination as the main performance measures and use these to derive salvo sizes that are in some sense “optimal.” I find that the offensive firepower needed for an effective attack depends not only on a target's total strength but also on the relative balance between its active defensive power and passive staying power. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007 相似文献
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This article is concerned with the determination of pricing strategies for a firm that in each period of a finite horizon receives replenishment quantities of a single product which it sells in two markets, for example, a long‐distance market and an on‐site market. The key difference between the two markets is that the long‐distance market provides for a one period delay in demand fulfillment. In contrast, on‐site orders must be filled immediately as the customer is at the physical on‐site location. We model the demands in consecutive periods as independent random variables and their distributions depend on the item's price in accordance with two general stochastic demand functions: additive or multiplicative. The firm uses a single pool of inventory to fulfill demands from both markets. We investigate properties of the structure of the dynamic pricing strategy that maximizes the total expected discounted profit over the finite time horizon, under fixed or controlled replenishment conditions. Further, we provide conditions under which one market may be the preferred outlet to sale over the other. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 531–549, 2015 相似文献
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Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics. 相似文献
126.
Michael Goodman 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):120-151
With relations with the Soviet Union growing ever ‘hotter’, it became essential for the British to comprehend Soviet atomic development. However, British intelligence had to rely on more overt methods of intelligence collection, which provided an inadequate basis from which to proceed. This was further hindered by the interpretation of such information on the basis of Anglo-American development and by the 1946 McMahon Act. Accordingly the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949 was not accurately predicted by the British. Meanwhile British war planning centred on the year 1957, based – it was argued – on strategic forecasts. Yet the impact of recently released intelligence material throws this into question, and instead reveals that the date reflected British war readiness, rather than when British intelligence predicted the Soviet Union would have achieved the nuclear capability to wage a successful war. 相似文献
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Michael J. Armstrong 《海军后勤学研究》2013,60(8):652-660
This article analyzes versions of the salvo model of missile combat where area fire is used by one or both sides in a battle. Although these models share some properties with the area fire Lanchester model and the aimed fire salvo model, they also display some interesting differences, especially over the course of several salvos. Although the relative size of each force is important with aimed fire, with area fire, it is the absolute size that matters. Similarly, although aimed fire exhibits square law behavior, area fire shows approximately linear behavior. When one side uses area fire and the other uses aimed fire, the model displays a mix of square and linear law behavior. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 652–660, 2013 相似文献
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This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland. 相似文献