Optimal joint preventive maintenance and production policies

We study joint preventive maintenance (PM) and production policies for an unreliable production‐inventory system in which maintenance/repair times are non‐negligible and stochastic. A joint policy decides (a) whether or not to perform PM and (b) if PM is not performed, then how much to produce. We consider a discrete‐time system, formulating the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) model. The focus of the work is on the structural properties of optimal joint policies, given the system state comprised of the system's age and the inventory level. Although our analysis indicates that the structure of optimal joint policies is very complex in general, we are able to characterize several properties regarding PM and production, including optimal production/maintenance actions under backlogging and high inventory levels, and conditions under which the PM portion of the joint policy has a control‐limit structure. In further special cases, such as when PM set‐up costs are negligible compared to PM times, we are able to establish some additional structural properties. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

A note on the two machine job shop with exponential processing times

Consider two machines, labeled 1 and 2. A set of tasks has to be processed first on machine 1 and after that on machine 2. A second set of tasks has to be processed first on machine 2 and after that on machine 1. All the processing times are exponentially distributed. We present a policy which minimizes the expected completion time of all tasks.     

To catch an intruder: Part A—uncluttered scenario

We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017