Exact algorithms and bounds for the dynamic assignment interdiction problem

We study a multi‐stage dynamic assignment interdiction (DAI) game in which two agents, a user and an attacker, compete in the underlying bipartite assignment graph. The user wishes to assign a set of tasks at the minimum cost, and the attacker seeks to interdict a subset of arcs to maximize the user's objective. The user assigns exactly one task per stage, and the assignment costs and interdiction impacts vary across stages. Before any stage commences in the game, the attacker can interdict arcs subject to a cardinality constraint. An interdicted arc can still be used by the user, but at an increased assignment cost. The goal is to find an optimal sequence of assignments, coupled with the attacker's optimal interdiction strategy. We prove that this problem is strongly NP‐hard, even when the attacker can interdict only one arc. We propose an exact exponential‐state dynamic‐programming algorithm for this problem as well as lower and upper bounds on the optimal objective function value. Our bounds are based on classical interdiction and robust optimization models, and on variations of the DAI game. We examine the efficiency of our algorithms and the quality of our bounds on a set of randomly generated instances. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 373–387, 2017     

On the optimal detection of an underwater intruder in a channel using unmanned underwater vehicles

Given a number of patrollers that are required to detect an intruder in a channel, the channel patrol problem consists of determining the periodic trajectories that the patrollers must trace out so as to maximized the probability of detection of the intruder. We formulate this problem as an optimal control problem. We assume that the patrollers' sensors are imperfect and that their motions are subject to turn‐rate constraints, and that the intruder travels straight down a channel with constant speed. Using discretization of time and space, we approximate the optimal control problem with a large‐scale nonlinear programming problem which we solve to obtain an approximately stationary solution and a corresponding optimized trajectory for each patroller. In numerical tests for one, two, and three underwater patrollers, an underwater intruder, different trajectory constraints, several intruder speeds and other specific parameter choices, we obtain new insight—not easily obtained using simply geometric calculations—into efficient patrol trajectory design under certain conditions for multiple patrollers in a narrow channel where interaction between the patrollers is unavoidable due to their limited turn rate.© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Shortest path interdiction problem with arc improvement recourse: A multiobjective approach

We consider the shortest path interdiction problem involving two agents, a leader and a follower, playing a Stackelberg game. The leader seeks to maximize the follower's minimum costs by interdicting certain arcs, thus increasing the travel time of those arcs. The follower may improve the network after the interdiction by lowering the costs of some arcs, subject to a cardinality budget restriction on arc improvements. The leader and the follower are both aware of all problem data, with the exception that the leader is unaware of the follower's improvement budget. The effectiveness of an interdiction action is given by the length of a shortest path after arc costs are adjusted by both the interdiction and improvement. We propose a multiobjective optimization model for this problem, with each objective corresponding to a different possible improvement budget value. We provide mathematical optimization techniques to generate a complete set of strategies that are Pareto‐optimal. Additionally, for the special case of series‐parallel graphs, we provide a dynamic‐programming algorithm for generating all Pareto‐optimal solutions.     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017     

Alleviating time inconsistent behaviors via a competition scheme

Under quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, the valuation of a payoff falls relatively rapidly for earlier delay periods, but then falls more slowly for longer delay periods. When the salespersons with quasi‐hyperbolic discounting consider the product sale problem, they would exert less effort than their early plan, thus resulting in losses of future profit. We propose a winner‐takes‐all competition to alleviate the above time inconsistent behaviors of the salespersons, and allow the company to maximize its revenue by choosing an optimal bonus. To evaluate the effects of the competition scheme, we define the group time inconsistency degree of the salespersons, which measures the consequence of time inconsistent behaviors, and two welfare measures, the group welfare of the salespersons and the company revenue. We show that the competition always improves the group welfare and the company revenue as long as the company chooses to run the competition in the first place. However, the effect on group time inconsistency degree is mixed. When the optimal bonus is moderate (extreme high), the competition motivates (over‐motivates) the salesperson to work hard, thus alleviates (worsens) the time inconsistent behaviors. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 357–372, 2017     

A search game taking account of attributes of searching resources

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.     

A search game on a cyclic graph

There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

以发射质量最小为优化目标的反TBM拦截器优化研究

以反ＴＢＭ拦截器发射质量最小为优化目标,系统地研究了反ＴＢＭ拦截器总体优化技术,建立了反ＴＢＭ拦截器数学模型和优化算法,并得出重要结论。     

Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis framework

Problems in counterterrorism and corporate competition have prompted research that attempts to combine statistical risk analysis with game theory in ways that support practical decision making. This article applies these methods of adversarial risk analysis to the problem of selecting a route through a network in which an opponent chooses vertices for ambush. The motivating application is convoy routing across a road network when there may be improvised explosive devices and imperfect intelligence about their locations. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

不确定环境下无人机区域目标搜索及载荷参数影响

针对不确定环境下无人机区域搜索问题,建立了实时探测更新的搜索方法,提出了机载光电载荷参数优化配置策略。建立了基于二维离散网格的无人机区域搜索模型,采用概率地图描述目标信息的实时获取与更新;引入不确定度指标、目标网格的重访和网格探测次数控制,建立搜索目标函数;建立了基于粒子群算法的搜索路径滚动优化方法;通过对任务区域平均探测时间步数和误判概率的估计分析,建立了机载光电载荷参数优化配置策略。使用蒙特卡洛方法验证了区域搜索方法的有效性和光电载荷参数配置对搜索效率、误判概率的影响。     

对运动目标螺旋搜索误区分析

对运动目标搜索是军事系统工程的一个重要内容,其在很多领域具有广泛应用,如对潜艇搜索、对失事舰船飞机搜救、制导武器搜索捕捉目标等.用运动学和数学的有关知识分析了目标定速直航机动时的分布函数以及搜索者与其可相遇的条件,提出了对运动目标按螺旋线搜索的另一种证明方法,建立了直线搜索时目标可能位置点的数学模型,并以此为依据分析了对运动目标螺旋搜索模式的一个误区.     

A proportional defense model

This paper considers the problem of defending a set of point targets of differing values. The defense is proportional in that it forces the offense to pay a price, in terms of reentry vehicles expended, that is proportional to the value of the target. The objective of the defense is to balance its resources so that no matter what attack is launched, the offense will have to pay a price greater than or equal to some fixed value for every unit of damage inflicted. The analysis determines which targets should be defended and determines the optimal firing doctrine for interceptors at defended targets. A numerical example is included showing the relationship between the total target damage and the size of the interceptor force for different values of p, the interceptor single shot kill probability. Some generalizations are discussed.     

Sensor placement in active multistatic sonar networks

The idea of deploying noncollocated sources and receivers in multistatic sonar networks (MSNs) has emerged as a promising area of opportunity in sonar systems. This article is one of the first to address point coverage problems in MSNs, where a number of points of interest have to be monitored in order to protect them from hostile underwater assets. We consider discrete “definite range” sensors as well as various diffuse sensor models. We make several new contributions. By showing that the convex hull spanned by the targets is guaranteed to contain optimal sensor positions, we are able to limit the solution space. Under a definite range sensor model, we are able to exclude even more suboptimal solutions. We then formulate a nonlinear program and an integer nonlinear program to express the sensor placement problem. To address the nonconvex single‐source placement problem, we develop the Divide Best Sector (DiBS) algorithm, which quickly provides an optimal source position assuming fixed receivers. Starting with a basic implementation of DiBS, we show how incorporating advanced sector splitting methods and termination conditions further improve the algorithm. We also discuss two ways to use DiBS to find multiple source positions by placing sensors iteratively or simultaneously. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 287–304, 2017     

On a search for a moving target

We consider the problem of searching for a target that moves in discrete time and space according to some Markovian process. At each time, a searcher attempts to detect the target. If the searcher's action at each time is such as to maximize his chances of immediate detection, we call his strategy “myopic.” We provide a computationally useful necessary condition for optimality, and use it to provide an example wherein the myopic strategy is not optimal.     

Using container inspection history to improve interdiction logistics for illicit nuclear materials

Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013     

基于分形理论的目标航路预测

电磁干扰条件下解决断续航路预测问题对防空兵有效抗击空中目标至关重要。针对包络灰预测方法预测精度较低和Verhulst灰色预测模型计算过程复杂的情况,提出了预测航路的分形方法。在分形理论的基础上,研究了其用于目标断续航路预测的基本思路,建立了基于分形的目标航路预测模型,并对模型进行了求解。最后,利用建立的分形模型对雷达丢失目标后的目标航路进行了预测,通过实例体现了分形方法在用于航路预测时的准确性、灵活性和易实现等特点。结果表明,用该法对断续目标航路的预测具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Interdiction models for delaying adversarial attacks against critical information technology infrastructure

Information technology (IT) infrastructure relies on a globalized supply chain that is vulnerable to numerous risks from adversarial attacks. It is important to protect IT infrastructure from these dynamic, persistent risks by delaying adversarial exploits. In this paper, we propose max‐min interdiction models for critical infrastructure protection that prioritizes cost‐effective security mitigations to maximally delay adversarial attacks. We consider attacks originating from multiple adversaries, each of which aims to find a “critical path” through the attack surface to complete the corresponding attack as soon as possible. Decision‐makers can deploy mitigations to delay attack exploits, however, mitigation effectiveness is sometimes uncertain. We propose a stochastic model variant to address this uncertainty by incorporating random delay times. The proposed models can be reformulated as a nested max‐max problem using dualization. We propose a Lagrangian heuristic approach that decomposes the max‐max problem into a number of smaller subproblems, and updates upper and lower bounds to the original problem via subgradient optimization. We evaluate the perfect information solution value as an alternative method for updating the upper bound. Computational results demonstrate that the Lagrangian heuristic identifies near‐optimal solutions efficiently, which outperforms a general purpose mixed‐integer programming solver on medium and large instances.     

Optimal patrol to uncover threats in time when detection is imperfect

Consider a patrol problem, where a patroller traverses a graph through edges to detect potential attacks at nodes. An attack takes a random amount of time to complete. The patroller takes one time unit to move to and inspect an adjacent node, and will detect an ongoing attack with some probability. If an attack completes before it is detected, a cost is incurred. The attack time distribution, the cost due to a successful attack, and the detection probability all depend on the attack node. The patroller seeks a patrol policy that minimizes the expected cost incurred when, and if, an attack eventually happens. We consider two cases. A random attacker chooses where to attack according to predetermined probabilities, while a strategic attacker chooses where to attack to incur the maximal expected cost. In each case, computing the optimal solution, although possible, quickly becomes intractable for problems of practical sizes. Our main contribution is to develop efficient index policies—based on Lagrangian relaxation methodology, and also on approximate dynamic programming—which typically achieve within 1% of optimality with computation time orders of magnitude less than what is required to compute the optimal policy for problems of practical sizes. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 557–576, 2014     

装备器材保障资源调度决策模型及算法

装备器材保障资源调度问题是一个非常复杂的问题,根据其优化目标要求,从保障时间最短、保障耗费最低、安全性最高3个方面建立了该问题的多目标优化模型,并通过目标优先度决策将其转化为单目标模型;接着,采用两阶段法进行求解,将其分为最优路径决策、器材分配决策两个阶段进行决策优化,在明确资源点到需求点之间的最优路径后再进行器材资源的分配;并分别采用基于小生境的自适应遗传算法和基于生成树的遗传算法进行求解。通过实例分析,求解结果能够满足装备器材保障的要求,表明所构建的决策模型和算法是有效的。