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91.
Paul E Roitsch 《African Security Review》2014,23(1):3-16
From 2006 to 2011, al-Qaeda's East African proxy, al-Shabaab, served as the de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al-Shabaab and the peacekeeping force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery or development. By 2012, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the TFG in neutralising al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and providing good governance to its constituents. Al-Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and its offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamist extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean, destabilise East Africa and adversely impact millions. 相似文献
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Aviation had a highly significant role in supporting French military operations in Algeria. This was particularly true of aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Initially, however, the Air Force effort was handicapped by inappropriate approaches, too few army/air liaison officers and scepticism among army officers aware of the difficulties of earlier air operations against an insurgency in Indochina (1946–54). It also lacked sufficient suitable aircraft types. Gradually, improved aircraft and photographic techniques permitted systematic and detailed aerial mapping and intelligence work, as well as rapid provision of close air support during ground battles. Better integration of air and ground forces, along with more coordinated command and control, arrived from 1959 onwards when an air force general, Maurice Challe, became inter-service commander-in-chief in Algeria. This permitted an authentic and mostly effective combined-airms and joint service approach to the locating, tracking, engagement and destruction of Algerian nationalist bands. 相似文献
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Paul Shemella 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):449-457
All governments wrestle with the challenge of interagency coordination. Improving civil-military coordination, at the national level as well as in the field, can be a useful step in designing a more effective defense decision-making process. National-level organisations do not cooperate easily, but young military and civilian personnel with CIMIC experience can begin to open stovepipes. If vertically organized governments are ever to deal effectively with horizontally organized threats, they must become populated by those who have witnessed the power of horizontal thinking. CIMIC operations thus prepare future `bureaucrats' to create government networks capable of managing the triple threat of terrorism, insurgency and organized crime 相似文献
96.
Paul Rich 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):39-56
The September 11 global crisis prompted by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon raises major questions concerning the nature and trajectory of terrorism in the post-Cold War global order. Hitherto, terrorism has been largely debated by analysts at the level of nation states. Terrorist and insurgent movements have also been largely anchored in nationalist and ethnic power bases even when they have sought to mobilise a transnational ideological appeal on religious or class grounds. There have been a few exceptions to this pattern such as the alliance between the German Baader-Meinhof group and the Japanese Red Army Faction, but even such international alliances as this did not, until at least the 1980s, presage anything like a global terrorist network necessitating a global strategic response. This study examines terrorism and global strategic responses. 相似文献
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Paul Jackson 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):29-52
This article addresses the form and nature of an insurgency in Northern Uganda that has been active since the mid-1980s. The insurgency movement itself grew out of an internal breakdown in security lasting over several years, during which ethnicity played a critical part in defining access to power and resources within Uganda. The recent explosion of literature relating to conflict inside Sub-Saharan Africa outlines several different analytical approaches to violence. One of the most recent and influential has been that of examining greed rather than grievance as the main driver behind conflict. This articl looks at the evolution of warfare in Northern Uganda over 15 years and puts the argument that greed and grievance are not mutually exclusive in this situation and it is the interaction between the two that provides the impetus for continued violence. 相似文献
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Sales of arms are a significant component of international trade and raise a range of pressing policy issues. After a short review of the market, this paper provides a formal model of the trade which allows for competing forward‐looking suppliers whose welfare depends on both the economic benefits from the sales and the security repercussions of recipient behaviour. The recipient's behaviour depends on its military capability, a function of the stock of arms it has acquired. We first examine a myopic recipient, whose behaviour depends on current stocks, then a forward looking recipient for whom questions of the time‐consistency and the credibility of supplier threats to embargo or promises to resupply become crucial. Finally we examine the impact of supplier cooperation of the sort currently being discussed in the UN Security Council. 相似文献